

GURJ
Grinnell Undergraduate Research Journal
Vol. IV
Spring 2017

Staff

Executive Board

Rachel Aaronson '17
Editor-in-Chief

Editorial Board

Humanities Editors

Christina Brewer '18

Jeremy Esptein '18

Jon Mehlhaus '19

Eliana Schechter '17

Science Editors

Pranjal Drall '20

Joseph Galaske '17

Kara Nielsen '17

Julia Shangguan '18

Social Science Editors

Jenny Chi '17

Jinna Kim '17

Emily Porter '18

Jack Thornton '17

Interdisciplinary Editors

Leah Barr '18

Misha Lamb '18

Faculty Advisory Board

Jenny Anger
Art History

Bradley Graham
Economics

Danielle Lussier
Political Science

Alfredo Rivera
Art History

George Drake
History

Shanon Hinsa
Biology

Wayne Moyer
Political Science

Eiren Shea
Art History

Meghan Ference
Anthropology

Carolyn Lewis
History

Sharon Quinsaat
Sociology

Pablo Silva
History

Editor's Note

Dear Reader,

I am excited to present the fourth volume of the Grinnell Undergraduate Research Journal (GURJ).

This journal displays the culmination of student research across class years and disciplines. Through its publication, the journal aims to celebrate student research in a variety of different forms and nurture continued dedication to research and learning. These artcicles represent an array of different topics, and demonstrate the interdisciplinary learning that is core to a Grinnell education.

This journal would not have been possible without the work of our board. In particular, I am deeply grateful to Elizabeth Rodrigues and the rest of Burling Library staff for their help digitizing the journal and streamlining the editing and layout proccesses. Additionally, I would like to thank Dean of the College Mike Latham for his support as the journal continues to grow.

Sincerely,

Rachel Aaronson '17 SGA Vice President for Academic Affairs '16-'17
Editor-in-Chief

Table of Contents

Ophelia: A Psychological Portrait 6
Xena Fitzgerald '17

Breaking Down the Spectacular Simulacra: A Comparative Analysis of Jia Zhangke's The World and Zeng Fanzhi's Mask 14
Fenyi Wu

Immigrants into Citizens (and Back Again): The Development of Israeli Identity in Jewish Immigrants to Israel 20
Molly Kraus Steinmetz '17

32 **Paper Promises: An Analysis of United Nations Rhetoric Surrounding Refugees**
Karin Yndestadt '17

40 **Electoral Reform in Burkina Faso, Electoral Violence in Burundi: Issues of Civil Society and Power Sharing**
Vincent Benlloch '18

48 **Evolving Social Norms, Disincentivized Families, and the Persisting Gender Gap in Education**
Evelyn Wideman '17

62 **Not your Mother's Profession: An Exploration of Computing Women in Madurai, India**
Kathryn Yetter '18

Josiah Bushnell Grinnell: Radical Abolitionist Through and Through 72
William Hamilton '17

Marijuana, Mothers, Morals, and the Military: Rhetorical Motifs and Epistemic Authority in Pro-Medical Cannabis Testimonies 84
Misha Lamb '18

Effects of CO_2 Enrichment on the Response of Legume-Rhizobia Symbiosis to Elevated Soil 94
Siyuan Du '20

Cover Photo: "The Earthly Allegory" by Xena Fitzgerald '17
Page 19: "Fields" by Leiana'ala Voss '17
Page 31: "Untitled" by Alex Neckopulos '17
Page 47: "When the Corn Flies" by Bailey Dann '17
Page 61: "Planets" by Michael Owusu '17
Back Cover: "Nature's Fabric" by Leina'ala Voss '17

Ophelia:
A Psychological Portrait

Xena Fitzgerald
Class of 2017

The tragic image of Ophelia, a young noblewoman who drowns during the play Hamlet, has haunted Britain since Shakespeare wrote her into existence around the year 1600. Ophelia reached the peak of her popularity around the mid-nineteenth century. In the realm of painting, she was a popular subject for Pre-Raphaelite painters who were concerned with tropes of Victorian femininity as well as with the psychology of their subjects. In this paper I will consider how the artist Anna Lea Merritt (1844-1930), who was influenced by the Pre-Raphaelite movement, leapt beyond popular tropes to visually portray Ophelia in her 1880 painting with emotional and psychological depth more successfully than her contemporaries (fig. 1).

Born in Pennsylvania, Merritt, like Mary Cassatt, pursued an artistic career in Europe. Instead of following the Impressionists in Paris, Merritt chose to settle in London in 1870 and work under the influence of the late Pre-Raphaelites. There, she met painters such as Whistler, Burne-Jones, Holman Hunt, and her eventual husband Henry Merritt.[1] Henry died only three months after their wedding, and Merritt never remarried. Instead, she dedicated her life to painting and supported herself mainly on portrait commissions. Outside of portraiture, she occasionally painted religious, floral, and literary subjects. Like the Pre-Raphaelites, Merritt painted illustrations inspired by British literary heroes Tennyson and Shakespeare.

The Pre-Raphaelites were by no means the first artistic group interested in Shakespeare. Illustrations of Shakespearean scenes became immensely popular about a century earlier with the formation of John Boydell's Shakespeare Gallery, which was dedicated to exhibiting paintings of Shakespearean subjects and published engraved reproductions and smaller Shakespearean illustrations.[2] Of course, these publications included illustrations of Ophelia such as the illustration by Richard Westall (fig. 2). Over the next hundred years and beyond, Ophelia's popularity never fell. Her large representation in art contributed to a variety of popular interpretations of her character.

Ophelia as a character is frequently represented as various forms of femininity. Art historian Kimberly Rhodes explains that during the Victorian era Ophelia represented a range of female typologies from the "dutiful daughter" to the "madwoman."[3] Because Ophelia has very few lines within the play and her most significant action, her death, does not even appear on stage, Rhodes describes her as "a blank page on which patriarchy can inscribe and project its desires."[4] Along with other Shakespearean heroines, Ophelia was taken up as an exemplar for femininity.[5] Moral guides such as Anna Jameson's Characteristics of Women, Moral, Poetical, and Historical instructed women and girls to emulate Ophelia's "modesty, grace, and tenderness."[6] Furthermore, many scholars even note a parallel between Ophelia and the Virgin Mary.[7] The similarity is particularly apparent during Act III when Hamlet walks in while Ophelia kneels alone holding a book much like customary Annunciation scenes as evident in the comparison of a fifteenth-century annunciation scene (fig. 3) and a Pre-Raphaelite depiction of Hamlet and Ophelia by the artist Dante Gabriel Rossetti (fig. 4).[8]

Scholar Georgianna Ziegler argues that Victorians idealized Ophelia as "more than human" and fetishized both her innocence and purity. Ziegler attributes Ophelia's popularity as a painting subject to Victorian men's fascination with "the idea of capturing that moment right before a young girl opens into full womanhood and the death of innocence."[9] However, in addition to her symbolism of feminine innocence and grace, Ophelia also played another role in Victorian culture: becoming a trope of the 'madwoman.' Ophelia's extreme melancholy, vulgar songs, disheveled appearance, and accidental/suicidal death account for the interpretation of Ophelia as a subcategory of the 'madwoman' trope.[10] In her article "The Feminization of Madness," art historian Jane Kromm describes how

Ophelia's madness is sexualized through various stages of undress and close connection with flowers, which associate her with the fertility goddess Flora (fig. 5 and 6).[11] Additionally, Kromm argues that Ophelia is represented as the "least passive, most unruly among the lovelorn madwoman prototypes."[12] Kromm identifies these madwoman Ophelia-type figures in various illustrations of insane asylums such as the "sprawling Ophelia-type" central figure in Bonaventura Genelli's Glance in an Asylum (1850) (fig. 7) and the woman dropping wilted flowers in the bottom right hand corner of Amand Gautier's Madwomen of the Salpêtrière: Courtyard of Agitated Inmates (1855) (fig. 8).[13] These figures in illustrations of psychiatric hospitals indicate that while 'the Ophelia type' became a subcategory of 'the madwoman,' depicting Ophelia as a 'madwoman' was far less popular than depicting her as tragically beautiful and slightly melancholic.

Artists contemporary to Merritt, such as Pre-Raphaelite brother John Everett Millais (1829-1896), French Academic painter Alexandre Cabanel (1823-1889), and Pre-Raphaelite follower John William Waterhouse (1849-1917) all represent Ophelia as a beautiful and tragic victim in their depiction of narrative scenes just before Ophelia's death (fig. 9, 10, 11, and 12). Millais and Cabanel both portray a weak and listless Ophelia already fallen into the water, emphasizing the tragedy of her death. Cabanel includes the broken willow bough behind her to increase the narrative understanding of the painting. All three artists accentuate Ophelia's beauty by depicting her with extremely pale skin, long flowing hair, and wearing ornate medieval gowns. Compared to these contemporary painters, Merritt's depictions of Ophelia are more relatable for the viewer and more sensitively portray Ophelia's psychological state.

Although Ophelia was a wildly popular subject for male artists, who usually illustrated her more positive attributes, Ophelia was far less popular among female artists, who preferred to paint Shakespearean heroines such as Juliet, Rosalind, or Celia who provided clearer "source[s] of moral education." In fact, perhaps because of the moral ambiguity surrounding Ophelia's character, Merritt was one of the only female artists at the time to paint Ophelia and one of the only artists not to idealize her portrayal of Ophelia. In her first depiction of Ophelia from 1879 (fig. 13), Merritt directly contradicts Jameson's moral education guide which described Ophelia as "too soft, too good, too fair, to be cast among the briers of this working-day world" without sexualizing her insanity.[14] Using a recognizable model in contemporary garb, an undefined setting, and a reliance on photography, Merritt transports Ophelia to the contemporary 'working-day' world, making her more relatable for both the artist and the viewer.

For the portrait-style etching, Merritt relied on sketches from life and photographs (fig. 14 and 15) of the popular actress Ellen Terry in the role of Ophelia.[15] Merritt attempted to render the likeness of the actress while illustrating the psychology of Ophelia through her facial expression with furrowed brows and woeful upward gaze. Contemporary audiences would have easily recognized the face of the well-known actress in her contemporary hairstyle and fur-collared dress, thereby identifying more strongly with her emotionally. Only her melancholic expression and loose fistful of flowers clutched to her breast identify the actress as Ophelia. Unlike the contemporary paintings described earlier, there are no indications of the setting of the play, since Merritt locates Ophelia in a dark undefined background. The black background deviates from the Pre-Raphaelite trend of situating Hamlet and Ophelia in vaguely medieval settings and instead lends the etching a sense of timelessness that pulls Ophelia into the contemporary day.

While Merritt's reliance on photography further "modernizes" Ophelia, her artistic interpretation produces the emotional quality of the etching.[16] Several photographers at the time, such as Duchenne de Boulogne and Hugh Welch Diamond, were interested in the physiology of human facial expression, including physical expressions of insanity, and photography's ability to document such features. Diamond employed 'the Ophelia type madwoman' trope by photographing a psychiatric patient in the guise of Ophelia (fig. 16).[17] Considering these photographic pursuits, Merritt's writings demonstrate her belief that while photography can assist the artist in accurate portrayals of facial expression, the painter can portray emotions far beyond the ability of the camera. She writes,

> "Photography can fix the features and expression of a face at the given moment, but an artist receives the expression of a face in the sympathetic mirror of his own soul and acquires the skill to reproduce it with paints on canvas... he will convey a sense of character beyond the power of the photograph."[18]

This quote demonstrates that Merritt identified with the subjects that she painted and valued their emotional and psychological state. She considered it her duty as an artist to portray the expression of her subjects' internal state more powerfully than could be done with the camera. Similarly, her interaction backstage with the actress Ellen Terry reveals the importance she placed on Ophelia's emotional significance:

> "I called at her room behind the scenes and saw her as she came off the stage, tears on her cheeks, still feeling the reality of Ophelia's sorrows. Her emotion was even more impressive than it had been from the front—my admiration was entirely captured."[19]

Intent on portraying a deep sense of emotional distress and madness, Merritt was dissatisfied with the etching of Terry since she believed that it "sacrificed much of the expression in order to preserve the likeness."[20] Therefore, she decided to return to the subject and make a painting of Ophelia "really mad."[21]

Merritt's oil painting, from the following year, shares a similar black background but the increased detail in Ophelia's bouquet offers an additional clue to understanding this uniquely psychological representation of Ophelia. Her bundle of foliage and flowers is even more haphazard and includes rosemary, daisies, and pansies, which are among the plants mentioned with Ophelia's lines in Act IV, Scene 5. In the scene, Ophelia hands out flowers in a delusional mania and sings lewd songs as she describes their symbolism: "There's rosemary, that's for remembrance... there is pansies, that's for thoughts..."[22] By portraying Ophelia in her 'madness' of scene five Merritt emphasizes Ophelia's psychological state instead of her death, the for a radical change from other contemporary artists' work.

Ophelia's bouquet is also significant because of Merritt's personal passion for flowers. Later in life, Merritt dedicated her time to gardening, painting flowers, and writing about flowers. In her essay My Garden published in 1901, Merritt's extensive personification of flowers in her garden denies their strict association with feminine virtues. Instead, Merritt interpreted them as emotional and psychological beings. She writes: "The care of my flowers became a passion. Their wants and needs I studied as though they were conscious beings, as indeed I believe them to be."[23] Merritt goes on to describe the complex personalities of several flowers. For example she describes the daisy, which typically represented innocence as: "...the most underhand, grasping, selfish, ill-regulated little plant that exists."[24] For Merritt, the rose, generally associated with love, was "the most complex individual. Each rose has its own ideas and whims."[25] Instead of subscribing to the established language that attributed positive feminine symbols to flowers, Merritt gave flowers alternative significance by granting them agency and unique personalities. Through her writing, it is evident that Merritt's subversive interpretation of flowers supports her interest in the psychology of Ophelia, a character intimately bound to nature, who is rarely seen without flowers and dies among them. In her painting and writings, Merritt subverted the symbolic meanings of both flowers and the character of Ophelia, two symbols of femininity, to consider their psychological significance.

Even more obvious than the changes in her bouquet, the figure of Ophelia in Merritt's painting also differs substantially from the figure in her earlier etching. Instead of Ellen Terry's nearly pulled back hairstyle, the Ophelia in the painting has brilliantly orange disheveled hair with wisps seemingly caught in a light breeze. Her hands are not as smooth nor as delicately posed as Ellen Terry's. Turned at a three quarters view toward the left of the composition, the model, noticeably a different person, shares a similar, but slightly more believable, facial expression from the previous etching. Her eyes and lightly parted lips seem to more honestly reveal an internal forlornness and fear.

The evolution from the etching to painting demonstrates Merritt's desire to depict her subject with more psychological depth. To more accurately portray Ophelia's internal psychological state, Merritt visited Bedlam Hospital, a psychiatric hospital in London, to observe the patients for inspiration.[26] There, Merritt met the perfect model. She describes her encounter with a woman in the hospital gardens, a fitting place considering Ophelia's connection with nature:

> "Among them moved a lovely-looking young woman, picking up odds and ends as she slowly walked. Then she dropped on her knees, continuing to move, kneeling and grasping against her breast the bundle she had gathered—faded flowers, torn bits of paper, dead leaves, a reel of cotton! Just in front of us she stopped, looking full in my eyes with an expression questioning, doubtful, full

> of pain. Suddenly she grasped my skirt and said, 'Kiss me.' I kissed her forehead and then hastily turned to be led away. Something of her expression I got into my picture."[27]

Distraught and clutching her pitiful bouquet, the woman from this anecdote shares striking similarities with Ophelia. Unfortunately, it is unlikely that the woman who served as Merritt's inspiration was aware that Merritt was going to paint her. Merritt's visit to the hospital, use of a likely non-consensual model, and eventual monetary gain from selling the painting is all somewhat exploitative. However, I believe that the painting does more justice than harm. In Merritt's view: "The great inspiration or impulse for a work of art is to convey thought or emotion from one human mind to another" and her portrait is an exemplary success in this regard.

Although some scholars argue that portraits of Ophelia in the typology of insanity normalize mental illness as a beautiful and desirable attribute of femininity, Merritt's portrait denies some the common tropes of sexualizing or glorifying mental illness.[28] While the woman portrayed is reasonably attractive she does not have the graceful elegance or sensuality found in other paintings of Ophelia by Millais, Waterhouse, or Cabanel. Rather, Merritt's sensitive attention to the facial expression and intent to accurately depict is more similar to Théodore Géricault's 'Portraits of the Insane' series that included portraits of insane asylum patients against dark backgrounds such as A Woman Suffering from Obsessive Envy (1822) (fig. 17). Merritt uses Géricault's portrait style of a dark background and attention to facial expression but instead of portraying the tropes of Ophelia as a medieval beauty, she reinterprets the character as a real and contemporary psychiatric patient. Therefore, Merritt's portrait transports Ophelia into contemporary reality and depicts an outward expression of mental illness not as she imagined it, but as she witnessed it. While Ophelia has been used by artists to represent shallow tropes of Victorian femininity, Anna Lea Merritt's 1880 portrait transcends all former interpretations to reflect, with diligence and care, the complexity of an individual's emotional suffering.

Figure 1 not included. Merritt, Anna Lea. *Ophelia*, 1880.

Figure 2. Westall, Richard. *Ophelia*, 1805, oil on canvas, University of Tenessee at Chatenooga. Availble from https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Westall-Ophelia.jpg

Figure 3. Hey, Jean. *Annunciation*, 1490-95, oil on panel, The Art Institute of Chicago. Available from https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:The_Annunciation,_1490-1495,_by_Jean_Hey_(Master_of_Moulins)_-_Art_Institute_of_Chicago_-_DSC09637.JPG

Figure 4. Rossetti, Dante Gabriel. *Hamlet and Ophelia*, 1858, drawing on paper, The British Museum, London. Available from https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Dante_Gabriel_Rossetti_-_Hamlet_and_Ophelia.JPG

Figure 5 not included. Cignani, Carlo. *Flora*, 17th century, oil on canvas, Estense Gallery, Modena.

Figure 6 not included. Böcklin, Arnold. *Flora*, 1875, tempera on panel, Museuem de Bildenden Kunste, Leipzeg.

Figure 7 not included. Genelli, Bonaventura. *Glance in an Asylum*, 1868, Kunsthalle Hamburg.

Figure 8. Gautier, Amand. *Madwomen of the Salpêtrière: Courtyard of Agitated Inmates,* 1855. Available from https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Gautier_-_Salpetriere.JPG

Figure 9. Millais, John Everett. *Ophelia*, 1851-52, oil on canvas, © Tate, London. Image released under Creative Commons CC-BY-NC-ND 3.0. Available from http://www.tate.org.uk/art/artworks/millais-ophelia-n01506.

Figure 10. Cabanel, Alexandre. *Ophelia,* 1881, oil on canvas, private collection. Availble from http://www.the-athenaeum.org/art/detail.php?ID=7693.

Figure 11. Waterhouse, John William. Ophelia, 1894, oil on canvas, private collection. Available from https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ophelia_1894.jpg.

Figure 12. Waterhouse, John William. *Ophelia,* 1910, oil on canvas, private collection. Available from https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ophelia_1910.jpg.

Figure 13 not included. Merritt, Anna Lea. *Ophelia*, 1879, etching, Museum of Fine Arts, Boston.

Figure 14 not included. Window & Grove, Miss Ellen Terry as "Ophelia", 1878.

Figure 15 not inclued.. Window & Grove, Miss Ellen Terry as "Ophelia", 1878.

Figure 16 not included.. Diamond, Hugh Welch. Ophelia (Patient from the Surrey Country Lunatic Asylum), c. 1850.

Figure 17 not included. Géricault, Théodore. *A Woman Suffering from Obsessive Envy*, 1822. Oil on canvas, Musee de beaux arts de Lyon.

Notes

1. Jason Stieber, "Guide to the Anna Lea Merritt Papers 1863-1922," Archives and Special Collections Library and Research Center (National Museum of Women in the Arts, 2006): 1.
2. Anne Leonard, "Boydell Shakespeare Gallery," in The Tragic Muse: Art and Emotion, 1700-1900, ed. Anne Leonard (Chicago: Smart Museum of Art, University of Chicago, 2011), 54.
3. Kimberly Rhodes, Ophelia and Victorian Visual Culture (Burlington: Ashgate, 2006): 8.
4. Ibid., 4.
5. Pamela Gerrish Nunn, "Between Strong-Mindedness and Sentimentality: Women's Literary Painting," Victorian Poetry 33, no. ¾ (1995): 428.
6. Georgianna Ziegler, "Sweet Rose of May: Ophelia Through Victorian Eyes," in The Myth and Madness of Ophelia, ed. Carol Solomon Kiefer (Amherst: Mead Art Museum, 2001), 42.
7. Bridget Gellert Lyons, "The Iconography of Ophelia ," English Literary History 44, no. 1 (1977): 61.
8. Ziegler, "Sweet Rose of May," 45.
9. Ibid., 50.
10. Jane Kromm, "The Feminization of Madness in Visual Representation ," Feminist Studies 20, no. 3 (1994): 523.
11. Ibid., 513.
12. Ibid., 511.
13. Ibid., 521.
14. Zeigler, "Sweet Rose of May," 42.
15. S. R. Koehler, "The Works of the American Etchers: VII. Anna Lea Merritt," The American Art Review 1, no. 6 (1880): 230.
16. Rhodes, Ophelia and Victorian Visual Culture, 155.
17. For more on Diamond's photograph of Ophelia see Carol Solomon Kiefer "The Myth and Madness of Ophelia" in The Myth and Madness of Ophelia and Kimberly Rhode's "From Life: Ophelia and Photography" from Ophelia and Victorian Visual Culture. For more on the relationship between photography and physiognomy, see "Capturing Insanity: The Wedding of Photography and Physiognomy in the Mid-Nineteenth-Century Medical Journal Article" in Patient Tales Case Histories and the Uses of Narrative in Psychiatry by Carol Berkenkotter.
18. Anna Lea Merritt, Love Locked Out: The Memoirs of Anna Lea Merritt with a checklist of her works (Boston: Museum of Fine Arts Boston, 1982), 202.
19. Ibid., 129.
20. Ibid., 130.
21. Ibid.,
22. William Shakespeare, Hamlet, prince of Denmark, ed. K. Deighton (London: Macmillan, 1919): IV. 5. 55-58.
23. Anna Lea Merritt, "My Garden," The Century Magazine LXII, no. 3 (1901): 344.
24. Ibid., 344.
25. Ibid., 348.
26. Other artists such as William Hogarth have depicted scenes of Bedlam Hospital.
27. Merritt, Loved Locked Out, 130.
28. Rhodes, Ophelia and Victorian Visual Culture, 12.

Bibliography

Koehler, S. R. "The Works of the American Etchers: VII. Anna Lea Merritt." The American Art Review 1, no. 6 (1880): 229-230.

Kromm, Jane. "The Feminization of Madness in Visual Representation ." Feminist Studies 20, no. 3 (1994): 507-535.

Leonard, Anne. "Boydell Shakespeare Gallery." In The Tragic Muse: Art and Emotion, 1700-1900, edited by Anne Leonard, 54-57. Chicago: Smart Museum of Art, University of Chicago, 2011.

Lyons, Bridget Gellert. "The Iconography of Ophelia ." English Literary History 44, no. 1 (1977): 60-74.

Merritt, Anna Lea. Love Locked Out: The Memoirs of Anna Lea Merritt with a checklist of her works. Boston: Museum of Fine Arts Boston, 1982.

Merritt, Anna Lea. "My Garden." The Century Magazine LXII, no. 3 (1901): 342-350.

Nunn, Pamela Gerrish. "Between Strong-Mindedness and Sentimentality: Women's Literary Painting." Victorian Poetry 33, no. ¾ (1995): 425-447.

Poulson, Christine. "A Checklist of Pre-Raphaelite Illustrations of Shakespeare's Plays ." The Burlington Magazine 122, no. 925 (1980): 244-250.

Rhodes, Kimberly. Ophelia and Victorian Visual Culture. Burlington: Ashgate, 2006.

Shakespeare, William. Hamlet, prince of Denmark, edited by K. Deighton. London: Macmillan, 1919. Shakespeare Online. 20 Feb. 2010. http://www.shakespeare-online.com/plays/hamlet_4_5.html

Stieber, Jason. "Guide to the Anna Lea Merritt Papers 1863-1922." Archives and Special Collections Library and Research Center, National Museum of Women in the Arts, 2006. https://nmwa.org/sites/default/files/shared/4.3.4.2_anna_lea_merritt_papers_1863-1922.pdf

Stott, Annette. "Floral Femininity: A Pictorial Definition ." American Art 6, no. 2 (1992): 60-77.

Ziegler, Georgianna. "Sweet Rose of May: Ophelia Through Victorian Eyes." In The Myth and Madness of Ophelia, edited by Carol Solomon Kiefer, 41-53. Amherst: Mead Art Museum, 2001.

Breaking Down the Spectacular Simulacra:

A Comparative Analysis of Jia Zhangke's The World and Zeng Fanzhi's Mask

Fenyi Wu
Class of 2017

With the continuous accumulation of wealth and the growing influence of politics, Chinese society is experiencing a transformative process that invites multiple levels of interpretation. China's adoption of a market economy, in particular, has formed a new type of biopolitical regime that promotes a culture of commercialism and consumerism in an era of increasing globalization. This regime has the ability to control the people through the propaganda of cultural spectacle: directors tend to make genre films that purposely promote a wealthy and aristocratic fantasy; painters create pieces that particularly cater to the aesthetic of art market. Such a spectacle was foreseen by Guy Debord, a French theorist who wrote the influential Society of the Spectacle in 1967. In Debord's terms, "the spectacle is not a collection of images, but a social relation among people, mediated by images" (4). This succinct statement reveals that a form of politics dominates the biological body by imposing a certain perception of life and defining relationships with others. One effective political tactic, for example, involves increasingly blurring the line between reality and its representations: the formation of simulacra, imitations that do not have an original. Considering both concepts of spectacle and simulacra, this paper will examine the idea of simulacra embodied in Jia Zhangke's film The World (2004) and in Zeng Fanzhi's mask paintings. Specifically, both Jia and Zeng first establish but then subvert the spectacular simulacra in their works, demonstrating their effort against a postmodern illusion and thus regain the critical aspect of film and art.

In order to closely observe both Jia's and Zeng's works, it is important to examine the notion of spectacle and simulacra. For the perspective of spectacle, Debord emphasizes how the economic production order in modern society causes the alienation of people and leads to the domination of the masses by commodities. This alienation starts with the division between human labor and final product. As a result of this division, one's biological body tends to be separated from others'; losing the perspectives of others makes one's own sense of reality vulnerable to distortion, and often leaves a gap for the spectacle to fill in. By and large, the most prominent spectacle in modern society is that of a false sense of abundance, which invades the private lives of people in the form of commodity comfort. Such an invasion leads to the decline of social interaction, and ultimately, to commodity's total occupation of society (Debord 42).

The notion of simulacra is significant because simulacra helps to package the artificial commodities for the consumers to accept voluntarily. Contextualizing this simulacra in the postmodern age, French philosopher Jean Baudrillard points out that people experienced a precedence of simulacra: "the representation precedes and determines the real" (Felluga). Here, the border between reality and its representations collapses. Instead of approaching the real object, people embrace the meaning that the object conveys; such an approach causes the difference between reality and meaning to disappear, leaving the simulacrum — a shell of reality that has no real meaning. In a postmodern society, the combination of spectacle and simulacra – spectacular simulacra – permeates various aspects of social life. Often, it serves to neutralize people's doubts and anxieties about being manipulated by an estranged political force in China.

Situated at the center of the spectacular simulacra, contemporary Chinese society displays a unique ecosystem of biopolitical coexistence: the simultaneous operation of the socialist ideology and global capitalism after the economic reforms of 1978. Analyzing this contradicting interaction, Lu Tonglin points out that "global capitalism 'sacralizes' biopolitical power—the regulation of bodies—through the overwhelming presence of dispositifs, anything that regulates living beings by distancing them from their lives" (164). Here, spectacular simulacra serve

a similar function as the ubiquitous existence of dispositifs. Under the regime of the Communist Party and the burgeoning power of a capitalist economy, the spectacular simulacra turns its target to cultural products, an inevitable stage of commodification. Jia Zhangke and Zeng Fanzhi, representatives of the cultural producer, blend critical perspectives into cinematic apparatus and paintings to counter spectacular simulacra. Though working with different subjects and media, both Jia and Zeng seek to achieve a similar goal: to help society get in touch with reality and to rescue the alienated population from the distortions of spectacular simulacra. Both Jia and Zeng take the advantage of image, which can be used as an important device to counter the spectacles and simulacra propagated by the economic and political discourse in postmodern China – the power of imagery can also open the eyes of the viewers to the ambiguity they have been exposed to. Thus, it is essential to analyze how both artists highlight the spectacles and simulacra in their works and make them obvious to the viewers.

Jia's film, The World, marked an important transition in his film career: it was his first film produced under the official censorship of the State Administration of Radio Film and Television (SARFT). Such censorship not only revealed the control of cultural products by the Communist Party but also required Jia to convey his message with more powerful yet subtle visual representations. Compared with Jia's previous productions, this film shows deep compassion for Chinese peasants, a neglected group in the mainstream cinema. In most of his productions, Jia emphasizes an evanescent peasant root in Chinese culture. In The World, Jia places emphasis on the life of the migrant workers who live in an amusement park in a Beijing suburb, which includes miniatures of famous monumental structures and scenic spots around the globe – an artificial replication of the world. Indeed, the amusement park serves as a microcosm of Chinese society, a spectacular yet bizarre simulacra (Lu 170). Through this setting of a suburban theme park, a place that is distant from yet still close enough to China's political capital, Jia depicts the plight of the disaffected peasants in two ways: the alienation of migrant workers and the marginalization of their desire. Standing between their humble hometown and the unfamiliar metropolis, these workers exist in a limited space of urbanization, driven by the force of global capitalism. In the film, Tao and Taisheng, a dancer and a security guard in the amusement park provide performance and safety to the tourists. Faced with temptations of wealth and struggles of morals, these lovers survive a gas leak, symbolizing a sense of rebirth and reconnection.

Compared with Jia's depiction of migrant workers in Beijing, Zeng chooses the prototype of his mask paintings from the same locale but with a strong feeling of urban consumerism, mimicking a European haute culture (Shiff 12). Painting, as a medium of expression, seems to contrasts with the concealing quality of masks. But by looking at the purposes of both, one can see that painting a picture is very much similar to the action of looking through a mask: an artist produces a work, mediated by the paint and the brush; one looks through a mask, a vision mediated with the disguise of a mask. Both experiences of painting and wearing a mask avoid a direct communication between people and the world. With these parallels in mind, Zeng uses the canvas to generate an imaginary plane, which differs from the viewers' reality. Thus, the picture plane, like a mask, does not allow the viewer to approach the realm on the canvas. Such parallels between the medium itself and the mask theme allow a particular spectatorship to arise: by confronting these masked figures, viewers are forced to accept the possibility of inauthenticity and duplicity, which make viewers reflect on their own experience of wearing invisible masks during social interaction. As a result, "the social types that Zeng has represented as masked are not so different from types he depicts unmasked—unmasked in a material sense, not necessarily in a psychological sense" (Shiff 13). In order to make the simulacra clear to the viewers, Zeng does not emphasize the individual behavior but a collective one: he replicates the masked images in various scenarios to form a striking seriality, highlighting the contrast between the artificial and the natural and showing the dichotomy of unity and alienation.

Understanding how both artists provide the audience with visual access to the spectacular simulacra requires an analysis of the details in their works. More specifically, in the opening scene of The World, Tao, dressed as an Indian dancer with a green costume, walks through a crowded backstage area and tries to find a slip of Band-Aid. This sequence lasts for about two minutes, filled with hyperbolic costumes, heavily powdered makeups and dim lighting. At first glance, this scene introduces a busy preparation for a dance performance—a spectacle of precise bodily

movements and practiced actions—which actually starts in a chaotic and disordered space. Later in the performance scene, the film plays a celebrative score with audiences applauding in the background as the performers enter the stage one by one. On the stage, female performers are wearing distinct costumes that represent various countries, yet they are dancing in a same manner as if different cultures have the exact same dance steps. Here, the film applies both visual and audio devices to push for a feeling of contrast, a deliberate attempt to show the isolation between the backstage and the onstage performance as well as the alienation between the dancers and the audiences. In order to demonstrate how this repetitive pattern of spectacle works on the regulation, Jia inserts similar dancing scenes along with the same music scores three times in the film. For Debord, "the basically tautological character of the spectacle flows from the simple fact that its means are simultaneously its ends. […The light of the spectacle] covers the entire surface of The World and bathes endlessly in its own glory" (13). Instead of glorifying the performance itself, Jia inserts repetitive scenes of dancing and creates a cycle that destabilizes the tautology of the spectacle, in which similar images interrupt the order of capitalist production rather than reinforce it. By seeing this absurdity in the dancing, a clumsy imitation of dancing cultures around the world, the viewers can be separated from the spectacle.

Embodying a similar idea of cycle and repetition, Zeng's mask paintings have several common characteristics that define his series. For example, in figure 1 the man wears a light grey suit with a black coat covering his shoulder. His head tilts slightly towards the left and his hands are exposed under the draperies of the coat. His legs are crossed as if he is walking on a runway. On the right side, a spotted dog lies on the ground and looks towards the left. This painting illustrates a typical human figure in Zeng's works: the figure usually has a disproportional body and enlarged heads and hands; and the figure dresses in western style clothes, suggesting a sense of high value and wealth. The mask on the figure's head does not look distinct from an actual face. It actually clings to the face like a thin layer of coating, so the expression on the mask seems to actually have the dimensions of the face instead of just being painted on a surface. In the commodification of postmodern society, consumption no longer means consuming enough to sustain one's self and survive; it means buying or owning products that represent one's identity, "a degradation of being into having" (Debord 17). Promoted by a commercial culture, images of novelty and delicacy flood daily life, which turns the having into appearing, a constant pursuit of immediate prestige (Debord 17). Through the repetition of similar figures, Zeng comments critically on the continuous pursuit of consumption. He turns the familiar into the unfamiliar, thus creating a sense of ridicule. Such a sense separates the viewers from the identity imposed by the commercial culture and consumerism.

Beyond the visual repetition and cycle in their works, both artists also draw one's attention to communication and reflection. In The World, Jia introduces a Russian dancer, Anna, who is brought by a human trafficker to the park and later is forced to engage in prostitution. Here, the film illustrates how the biological body is traded as any other products with a price tag in postmodernity. Thus, it is safe to say that under the influence of global capitalism, the way of communication loses its diversity and only exists in the form of exchange-value, a measurement of money or capital. In order to counter such a monotonous communication, the film creates a new universal language that delivers meanings across cultural boundaries without any translation. Jia includes various scenes depicting Anna and Tao's conversation, in which they speak Russian and Chinese simultaneously yet seem to understand each other. This play on language subverts the dominant voice of exchange-value, highlighting communication through actions, eye contacts, gestures and expressions. Such a technique challenges how language shapes and defines the physical life. By adopting different kinds of languages other than speaking, the film releases viewers from the shackles of symbolic meanings and economic values.

Compared with the language adopted in The World, Zeng chooses to express communication through representations of a mirror. A mirror, a medium between reality and its reflection, serves a visual twist in arts. In figure 2, a man, wearing a red suit with blue shirt and yellow tie, is looking at his reflection in a mirror. Here, the reflection in the mirror, along with the figure who looks into the reflection, generate an interesting juxtaposition of two simulacra. With a closer observation, one sees that the actual figure outside the mirror frame does not have a thread tied over his ears, suggesting that he may not wear any mask. Such an interpretation makes the whole composition

more complicated, as if an unmasked figure discovers his masked reflection in the mirror. This man's silent communication with the reflection finds parallels in the audiences looking at this picture as a mirror, forming an interactive spectatorship between the real and the imagined. Through the mirror, Zeng forces the viewers to confront the simulacrum in a blunt yet frank way, underlining a sense of estrangement. Thus, the mirror in Zeng's painting indicates how people wish to appear to substitute one social form for another, masked from themselves, but it is ironic that the best pose which one believes in further distances the social self from the natural self (Shiff 21).

In addition to the communication with oneself or others, Jia and Zeng also use visual motifs to disrupt a continuous narrative or representation. In The World, Jia inserts short clips of animation into the film. One prominent moment is the aircraft scene, in which Taisheng tries to seduce Tao to have sex with him but Tao pulls his hand away. Here, the film cuts to a clip animation: Taisheng receives a message and flies on an airplane; meanwhile, Tao floats in the air and flies freely over different districts of the city. The animation visually breaks a linear narrative, subverting the practice of mainstream cinema. This intentional decision deconstructs the suturing effect of cinema, which requires natural transitions and seamless editing. The animation provides a rare chance for the viewers to break from their expectation of spectacle so they can follow Tao's inner imagination, a desire to have a free life in the capital city despite of all the life struggles. Animation, originally representing the realm of imagination and fantasy, helps the viewers depart from the realistic scenes, rejecting the ambiguity in spectacles.

Contrary to the animation in The World, Zeng adopts a specific representation in his paintings to create visual excess by adding animals in the whole composition, especially dogs. In figure 1, the dog is placed next the human figure, as an extra element that imbalances the whole picture plane. The dog can be read as a pet that follows the steps of its master, allegorizing how people are manipulated like animals to follow the invisible order of capitalist spectacles. Another perspective regards the dog as another animal species that visualizes a mock or irony of spectacular simulacra that people accept. Indeed, compared with Zeng's earlier works, his later works varied this motif by painting a rocking horse or toy dog (Figure 3). This variation alludes to the birth of animal simulacra in contemporary society: the actual animal or pet is obsolete; what people embrace is what the animal characteristics represent. Through the animal motif in paintings, Zeng portrays an excessive picture plane that pushes the viewers further to rethink their relationship with real and representations.

Faced with the society of integrated spectacle, where political power becomes increasingly invisible and powerful, Jia Zhangke and Zeng Fanzhi examine postmodern China with a critical eye and seek remedy with films and paintings (Lu 168). Working with different media, Jia's film echoes Zeng's canvas. Their works emphasize a sense of repetition, communication and visual diversions: the cycle of repeated scenes and images unveils the ludicrous homogeneity; the universal language in the film and the mirror in the mask painting imply a reconnection to others and to oneself, confronting the normalized alienation within late capitalist economy; and the visual break of animation and the visual excess of animal and toy in the painting break up the viewers' spectatorship with the spectacle or simulacra by providing another perspective of looking at the world. Through their artistic expression, the viewers can access the late capitalist mechanism happening in Chinese society and witness how films and paintings form a strong cultural force that can tackle the dominance of spectacular simulacra.

Figure 1 not included. Fanzi, Zheng. *Mask*, 1998.

Figure 2 not included. Fanzi, Zheng. *Mask Series,* 1998.

Figure 3 not included. Fanzi, Zheng. *Mask Series*, 2006.

Bibliography

Debord, Guy. Society of the Spectacle. Rev. Detroit: Black & Red, 1983.

Felluga, Dino. "Modules on Baudrillard: On Simulation." Introductory Guide to Critical Theory. Last updated Jan. 31, 2011. Purdue U. accessed May 11, 2016. <http://www.purdue.edu/guidetotheory/postmodernism/modules/baudrillardsimulation.html>.

Shiff, Richard. Zeng Fanzhi: Every Mark Its Mask. Ostfildern: Hatje Cantz, 2010.

Tonglin, Lu. "Fantasy And Reality Of A Virtual China In Jia Zhangke's Film The World." Journal Of Chinese Cinemas2.3 (2008): 163-179. Film & Television Literature Index with Full Text. Web. 15 May 2016.

Immigrants into Citizens

(And Back Again): The Development of Israeli Identity in Jewish Immigrants to Israel

Molly Kraus- Steinmetz
Class of 2017

Right now, any Jew in the world with sufficient money and freedom of movement can get on a plane, fly to Israel, and become naturalized within six months. They can become legal citizens with all the responsibilities, rights, and benefits that entails: voting, serving in the army, receiving resources, paying taxes. But current research provides no definitive answers on whether they also become affective citizens in the process— that is, whether they identify as Israeli. And if this transformation does take place, does it happen as soon as they step off the plane and become immersed in their new country's culture? When they become naturalized and receive all the legal documentation to mark them as citizens? When they buy their first homes, or have their first children? Or does it happen even earlier, at the moment they decide to seek Israeli legal citizenship?

Answers in the current literature on citizenship conflict, but all value the importance of understanding the difference between legal and affective citizenship, between a documented connection to a state and an equally strong imagined connection to a nation (Joppke 2007). The very ideology underlying the nation-state seems to make this question unnecessary, positing that citizens are people with legal citizenship, and that they all naturally identify with their country. But there are many cases where these two identities do not match up, resulting in situations where people who identify with and participate in their home country have not been granted citizenship from above, or where people who on paper have all the attributes of a citizen share none of the expected loyalty or identity. In those situations, we can more clearly see the cracks between nation and state that lay bare the artificiality of the entire nation-state system.

This paper is an exploration of that fundamental question of the relationship between legal citizenship and affective citizenship through a quantitative examination of the identity patterns of Jewish immigrants to Israel in the 20th century. I use survey data from the 2001 and 2006 Israeli Election Study to explore whether foreign-born Jewish citizens of Israel are more or less likely than their native-born peers to identify as Israeli. Based on my findings, I argue that Israeli identity can be quickly developed, but that this identity is also easily discarded or subordinated based on changes in political context. These findings cast doubt on primordialist Zionist discourses of Israeli identity, highlight the importance of distinguishing between identity and assimilation within this field of study, and complicate the idea that national identity is a strong bond slowly built up over the course of one's time in a country.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Joppke (2007) argues that characterizing the difference between affective citizenship and legal citizenship is essential to the field of citizenship studies. While legal citizenship describes an individual's relationship with the state, and its development can be directly observed through examination of documents, affective citizenship describes an individual's imagined relationship with the idea of the nation, and takes place on a much more personal level. Mismatches between national identity and legal citizenship abound, ranging from individuals who acquire second legal citizenships as a backup but do not fully consider themselves members of their new country, to long-time residents of a country who lack documentation of their citizenship because of a lack of state infrastructure for recording births (Spiro 2016, Sadiq 2009). Although the past 200 years have been characterized by states attempting to propagate ideas of nationhood and national identity in order to bolster their legitimacy and instill loyalty in their subjects, the asymmetrical experiences of people who have either legal citizenship or affective citizenship but not the other provide visible counterexamples to the idea that the nation-state is a natural and completely

functional form of political organization.

Given the importance of national identity in supporting or undermining the concept of the nation-state, the question of how to define and measure it has been the subject of much discussion. Dekker (2003) argues that national feeling, liking, pride, preference, superiority, and finally nationalism all constitute points along a spectrum measuring the strength of an individual's affective relationship with their nation. But other conceptualizations instead create a dichotomy of two distinct national sentiments: nationalism and constructive patriotism (Davidov 2011, Blank and Schmidt 2003). Still more authors have emphasized the importance of measuring national identity not through a forced multiple choice where national identity is pitted against other identities, which elides multiculturalism and liminal identities, but through questions that measure the strength of national identity (Jedwab 2009, Amit 2011).

These measurement schemes have been used, among other things, to characterize the national identity of immigrants and develop theories of what factors lead immigrants to identify with their host countries. Although these theories vary, the degree to which the immigrant is viewed as a member of the nation and the attitudes of the host nation emerge as major factors in determining whether an immigrant truly becomes an affective citizen (Smooha 2008).

The Israeli case

Research on Jewish immigration to Israel has identified several distinct periods of immigration, each with their own characteristics and immigration patterns. Prior to 1947, Ashkenazi (European or Western) Jewish immigration to Palestine was minimal and largely ideologically motivated, with highly organized groups of Eastern European Jews seeking to build a new society. These immigrants successfully framed themselves as more loyal and committed than the Mizrachi (African or Asian) Jews who entered at the same time, establishing a pattern of ethnic discrimination persists to this day (Peled 2008). The establishment of the state of Israel as a legal entity in 1948 brought with it a wave of mass immigration of Mizrachi fleeing repression from their Middle Eastern home states and Ashkenazi Holocaust survivors seeking a new place to live (Smooha 2008). Most of this immigration happened before 1951; in total, over a million Jews are estimated to have migrated to Israel between 1947 and 1964. This influx was heightened by the 1950 establishment of the so-called "Law of Return," which guaranteed entry and citizenship to all Jews and their close family members, expediting their immigration process compared to non-Jews (Peled 2008).

Jewish immigration to Israel remained at low levels with minor fluctuations until 1989, when reforms associated with perestroika (restructuring) opened the door to Jews and their families leaving the USSR in large numbers. Over the next decade, Israel absorbed as many as a million immigrants from the former Soviet Union (FSU) and 85,000 from Ethiopia (Amit 2011, Smooha 2008). As a result of a rule change in 1970 that had extended Law of Return rights to the grandchildren of Jews as well as their children, somewhere between a quarter to a third of these FSU immigrants were non-Jews who immigrated with their Jewish relatives (Shuval 1998, Elias and Kemp 2010). After 1999, immigration resumed a more stable low rate comparable to pre-1989 period (Cohen 2009).

Theories of Israeli immigrant identity

The political Zionism that forms the ideological basis for the state of Israel historically has provided one theoretical framework for understanding the phenomenon of Jewish immigration to Israel. It advances a theory of ingathering, where the establishment of Israel as a liberal nation-state would inevitably lead to world Jewry returning to within its borders to live in their homeland. More religiously-oriented strands added to this theory of historical determinism an explicit element of diasporic messianic thought, asserting that all Jews came from Israel and therefore would not be immigrating to a state, but returning to their homeland (Hertzberg 1971). Under these theories, newcomers to Israel are not immigrating so much as making aliyah—literally "going up" or embarking on a pilgrimage.

These ideologies are reflected in the official policies and statements of the modern state of Israel, which has also sought to advance specific narratives of immigration. They reinforce the narrative of returning to a homeland by framing the founding of the state as a renewal of the Jewish people after 2,000 years of diaspora, and assert in the controversial Law of Return that "Every Jew has the right to come to this country," symbolically laying claim to millions of citizens of other countries as their own citizens (IMFA 2016, Jewish Agency 2016). The Law of Return resembles,

in this sense, a sort of extreme version of jus sanguinis descent-based citizenship policy, where instead of applicants being expected to prove that their ancestors were citizens or residents of the state they are trying to immigrate to, they are required only to prove that their ancestors were Jews. Jewish ancestry is therefore equated to historical residency in Israel; being a Jew and being "from" Israel are constituted as one and the same (Shuval 1998). Therefore, the Law of Return does not just function as a material way to affect the demographics of the country, fill newly conquered land and increase its labor force, though the impact immigration has in those fields is certainly relevant—from 1948 to1995 over half of the Jewish population growth in Israel came from immigration (Peled 2008, Semyonov and Lewin-Epstein 2003). The Law of Return also functions as rhetorical device promoting a specific theory of Israeli immigration (Shuval 1998).

Many modern scholars have rejected the historical determinism and explicit political agenda of the ideologies used by the state of Israel and its forefathers, but still treat migration to Israel as unique, unlike patterns in "standard" countries of immigration. They posit that Israel is not a regular immigration destination, but the epicenter of a returning diaspora, where "immigrants feel an affinity with the destination even prior to migration" (Semyonov and Lewin-Epstein 2003). The assumption is that migrants to Israel, even if they come fleeing anti-Semitism rather than passionately seeking a homeland, already identify with Israel, and that Israeli society views Jewish immigrants as brethren to be welcomed in with open arms (Cohen 2009). This position is supported by the robust assistance Israel provides new immigrants to help them settle into the country, and of course, the rhetoric of the state itself, which praises Jewish immigration to Israel (Remennick 2009).

Other authors are more attuned to the similarities between Israel and other receiving states. Increasing numbers of non-Jewish labor migrants disrupts the narrative of Jewish return—with non-Jewish migrant workers making up 11% of the Israeli private sector, Israel is as reliant on migrant workers as many other developed economies (Elias and Kemp 2010). There's also convincing evidence that Jewish immigrants to Israel are motivated by economic push factors as well as or instead of personal pull factor connections to the state of Israel. The fluctuations in the migration rate between 1951 and 1989 largely mirrored economic upturns and downturns, and while Israeli immigrants from North America indicated in interviews that while their primary motivations for making aliyah were largely religious or spiritual, their economic prospects in Israel also factored into their decision (Shuval 1998, Amit and Riss 2007). As economic situations improved in Russia and Ukraine, immigration from the FSU tapered off, and archival evidence shows that as many as 90% of FSU Jews in 1987 would have preferred to resettle in America rather than Israel (Remennick 2009, Lazin 2006).

Nor has Israel been exempt from anti-immigrant sentiment. Non-Jewish migrant workers are viewed by some segments of the native Israeli population as a threat to the state of Israel's identity (Elias and Kemp 2010) Even Jewish immigrants have seen discrimination or nativism. As immigrants from the FSU, many of whom had high levels of education and human capital, poured into the country in the 90s, many veteran Israelis viewed them as oversaturating the job market and creating economic burdens. Ethiopian Jewish immigrants in the same period were stigmatized as poor and uneducated, and marked as racially other despite their Jewishness (Remmeick 2009). Government monetary assistance for immigrants during a time when the Israeli economy was still small also drew resentment from veteran Israelis (Shuval 1998).

Given all these contradictions, it is clear that Zionist narratives cannot be relied upon to fully provide an answer to the question of what it means to be Israeli. Yoav Peled offers one alternate schema, arguing that Israeli citizenship is actually characterized by three simultaneous competing discourses: republicanism, liberalism, and ethnonationalism. Liberalism defines an Israeli as a documented member of the state who receives the rights of citizenship; ethnonationalism's vision of an Israeli is a Jew living in a Jewish state. And under republicanism, which was strongest during the pre-state period, an Israeli was someone committed to the work of building Israel, a definition which cast Ashkenazi Jews who immigrated out of ideological commitment to the idea of a socialist self-governing Jewish community as more authentically Israeli than Mizrahi Jews, who were they were able to frame as more opportunistic and apolitical (Peled 2008). In contemporary times, this republican hierarchy manifests through Israel's "universal" conscription law: Jewish men, who serve longer tours of duty, are glorified, while Muslims, who are barred from service, are distrusted,

and conscientious objectors with political motives are derided for their disloyalty (Orson-Levy 2008, Peled 1992, Weiss 2012).

Empirical research on Israeli immigrant identity

The conflict about how Israeli identity and citizenship should be conceptualized is further complicated by an accompanying paucity of descriptive research on identity patterns among Israelis. For immigrants, research has largely focused instead on assimilation, and which groups are more likely to accomplish it. Smooha (2008) argues that greater human capital, ethnic similarity to the ruling class, and the decreased need for national homogeneity as Israel became a more established state all made it easier for Ashkenazi FSU immigrants to assimilate or succeed in Israel compared with the Mizrahi immigrants of the 1950s, who became enshrined as a disadvantaged ethnic group instead. However, the research on whether FSU immigrants truly have assimilated is mixed. FSU immigrants have created institutions and spaces within Israel to preserve Russian culture and heritage (Remmenick 2003). Since the 1992 elections, they have also tended to vote in a block that comprises around 11% of the electorate—the same size as the Ultra-Orthodox Jewish community and the Israeli Arab community (Al-Haj 2002). They have been instrumental in power shifts between the left-wing Labor party and the right-wing Likud, and from 1996 onward have often voted for explicitly Russian (FSU) political parties, possibly indicating that they still consider themselves a distinct subset of the population who share traits with each other and can obtain better collective outcomes through ethnic mobilization (Philippov and Knafelman 2011, Al-Haj 2002, Khanin 2000).

Analysis of FSU university students who came to Israel between the ages of 11 and 18 finds that in this elite subset, women, Hebrew-proficient immigrants, immigrants who had been younger when they entered the country, immigrants from rural rather than urban areas, and immigrants whose parents had found employment in Israel were more likely to assimilate or more assimilated (Remennick 2003). A study of FSU soldiers found that prior identification as Israeli increased the possibility that the socializing structures of the army would help them in their adaptation, but those who were already marginalized or separated from the Israeli mainstream didn't experience the adaptation boost the military brought for other immigrant soldiers (Ben Shalom and Horenczyk 2004). Research into the material experiences of immigrants finds that all groups of immigrants were economically disadvantaged when entering the country compared to veteran Israelis, but that they all reached parity with native-born Israelis within twenty years (Semyonov and Lewis-Epstein 2003). Ethiopian Jews who immigrated in the 80s and 90s were perceived by Israeli society to be higher-risk, and therefore given a specific kind of state resettlement assistance that has left them one of the poorest groups in Israel today, and segregated from the rest of Israeli society by housing location (Elias and Kemp 2010). Altogether, visible differences or lack of language skills and human capital are some of the main predictors for lack of assimilation, indicating that even in a state like Israel where all Jews are supposed to be part of the same "nation," assimilation may be less a matter of will or inclination to fit in and more a matter of acceptance by the host population.

However, there is very little research on the identity of Jewish immigrants to Israel. Remennick argues based on historical context and interviews that the small wave of Soviet Jews entering Israel in the 1960s and 70s was more ideologically oriented and Zionist than their countrymen who flooded out of the USSR starting in 1989, and therefore were far more likely to identify as Israeli than the "opportunistic" later FSU immigrants (2009). Interviews with North American immigrants to Israel show that this specific subset is largely religiously motivated and immigrated after years of deliberation, making them more likely to wholeheartedly identify with Israel than immigrants motivated by push factors rather than pull factors (Amit and Riss 2007). An analysis of attitudes towards non-Jewish immigrants found that 90% of Israelis considered feeling Israeli to be a major factor in who is Israeli, providing more context into what Israelis think Israeli identity looks like (Rajiman and Hochman 2009). And one mixed-methods study looked at whether recent immigrants from the FSU, Ethiopia, and North America primarily identified as Israeli, Jewish, or by their former nationality, and found that the latter two groups largely identified as Jewish, but the FSU immigrants were evenly split between the three choices (Amit 2011)

At this time, there have been no empirical analyses of the longer-term process of how Jewish immigrants become Israelis after migration, and no analyses that compare these immigrants with their native-born peers. In this paper, I remedy that gap by

using repeated cross-sectional survey data to examine how both native-born Israelis and immigrants from multiple time periods ranked their national, religious, and ethnic identities in 2001 and 2006. This research allows us to gain a more natural, long-term perspective of whether immigrants are coming to identify as Israeli compared to their native-born peers, rather than relying only on their responses soon after immigration.

METHODS

To explore the question of how immigrants to Israel identify, I conducted a quantitative analysis using data from the 2001 and 2006 Israeli Election Study (IES). Data was collected through questionnaires and interviews conducted either in Russian or in Hebrew, and respondents were selected through a stratified random sample, found by the researchers to be representative of the Israeli population. The data was accessed through the Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) and was analyzed in SPSS 24.

Based on existing research in the field, I expected to find the following relationships and trends in both years of data:

a) Immigrants would be less likely to identify as Israeli than non-immigrants

b) An immigrant's chance of identifying as Israeli would increase as the number of years they have spent in the country increases

c) Immigrants who migrated during the major waves of the 50s and 90s would be less likely to identify as Israeli than those who immigrated during periods with lower immigration rates

As past research had indicated that direct questions about identity rather than indirect tests of loyalty are the best way to measure national identity, I selected responses to the question "Which of the following concepts best defines your identity" as my response variable for all these hypotheses (Dekker 2003). In 2001, the options given to Jewish respondents for this question were "Israeli", "Jewish", "Ashkenazi/Sephardic", and "Religious/Secular", and Arabs were asked another, different question about identity. In 2006, the options were changed slightly so that the same question could be used for both Jewish and Arab respondents: "Jewish" was replaced with "Jewish/Palestinian" and "Ashkenazi/Sephardic" with "Ethnic Group/Arab." The researchers also offered "Russian" as an identity option in 2006. However, only three respondents identified as Russian, and this differences in how the questions were asked was largely cosmetic. I believe, therefore, that any difference I later found between respondents in the different years was due to changing demographics and political context, not to inconsistency in the response variable.

Other scholars have criticized forced choice identity questions like my chosen response variable for artificially separating identities that do not actually conflict (Jedwab 2009) These concerns are valid, but due to limited access to data, the forced choice identity question was the best available measure of identity, despite its flaws. In addition, other analysis has argued that the two largest categories for this question, Israeli and Jewish, actually are in conflict (Ram 2000). Since a respondent's response to this question could indicate whether they conceptualize Israeli citizenship as liberal or ethnonationalist, I tentatively proceeded using the forced choice identity question (Peled 2008).

In order to more clearly measure the relationships I was interested in, I created several new variables from the existing data in both years. I collapsed the four options for identity into just two options: Israeli and Other. I similarly collapsed the many labels for countries of origin into just two categories, Israel and Other, so that I could directly compare the responses of respondents born in Israel and respondents who were born elsewhere and immigrated to Israel.

I used the Year of immigration variable to compute a new scale variable, Years since immigration, measuring the number of years an immigrant respondent had spent in the country, and used both Year of immigration and Age to compute another scale variable, Age at immigration, estimating within one year the age at which the immigrant had probably entered Israel. I also created several categorical variables, summarized in Figure 1, to group immigrants based on when they immigrated. Finally, I selected a series of demographic explanatory variables to further help me understand the characteristics of the immigrant subpopulations.

Figure 1: New variables for immigration-specific information

Variable Name	Period of Immigration	Immigrated during wave?	Immigration Wave
Variable Values	1946 or earlier 1947-1951 1952-1988 1989-2000 2000* or later	Yes No	First wave (1947-1951) Second wave (1989-1999) No wave (all other years)

I performed two kinds of tests to examine identity patterns among different immigrant groups. For categorical explanatory variables, I used cross-tabulations to generate observed and expected counts for how many people in each group identified as Israeli or Other and evaluated the significance of the relationship with a chi-squared test of independence. For tests where my explanatory variable was numerical, I used a binary logistic regression to estimate the degree to which my explanatory variable could predict whether a respondent answered the identity question with Israeli or Other. I used an alpha level of .05 to evaluate significance for all tests.

RESULTS

2001

For the 2001 dataset (n = 1234), I found no significant relationship between country of birth and identity. 37.8% of immigrants identified as Israeli, compared with 39.2% percent of native-born Israelis. Among immigrants (n = 608), I found no significant relationship between identity and the following demographic variables: continent of birth, sex, income (self-reported and measured on an ordinal scale), years since immigration, age at arrival, period of immigration, and wave of immigration. Immigrants who were identified as coming from the FSU after 1989 or as having immigrated during a mass immigration wave were also not significantly more or less likely to identify as Israeli. There was, however, a statistically significant relationship within the immigrant subset of the data between identity and ethnicity, religious observance, and religious identity. Being Ashkenazi and secular were associated with identifying as Israeli, while being Sephardic, observing "all" religious obligations, or identifying as religious or Haredi were all associated with identifying as one of the other options. Results for these tests and their significance be found in Figure 2. Comparisons between these significant groups within the immigrant subset and the general population can be found in Figure 3.

Figure 2: Summary of explanatory variables for 2001 dataset

Explanatory Variable	p-value	Population	Significantly more Israli-defined groups	Significantly less Israeli-defined groups
Country of birth	.611	All respondents		
Continent of birth	.093	Immigrants		
Ethnicity	.043	Immigrants	Aschkenazim	Sephardim
Sex	.299	Immigrants		
Level of religious observance	.014	Immigrants		
Religious identity	.000	Immigrants	Secular	Religious, Haredi
Immigrant from FSU since 1988	.160	Immigrants		
Income	.323	Immigrants		
Years since immigration	.160	Immigrants		
Age at arrival	.702	Immigrants		
Periof of immigration	.402	Immigrants		
Immigrated during wave?	.268	Immigrants		
Wave of Immigration	.268	Immigrants		

Figure 3: Significant patterns among immigrants compared with the same groups from the general 2001 population

Group	% Israeli among immigrants	% Israeli among population
Aschkenazim	41.6%	41.6%
Sephardim	32.5%	31.9%
Secular	45.6%	49.5%
Religious	23.2%	15.5%
Haredi	13%	3.7%
Observe "all of it"	20%	9.0%

2006

In the 2006 dataset (n = 1608), I found no

significant relationship between country of birth and identity. 42.1% of immigrants identified as Israeli, compared with 41.8% percent of native-born Israelis. Among immigrants (n = 680), I found no significant relationship between identity and continent of birth, years of schooling, and whether an immigrant came to Israel during a wave of mass immigration. However, as the number of years since a respondent had migrated increased and as their age of arrival decreased, the chances that they identified as Israeli increased. Respondents who identified themselves as secular, reported low religious observance, were not immigrants from the FSU after 1989, identified themselves as having a "high" social class, took the survey in Hebrew rather than Russian, and immigrated during the 1947-1951 period were all significantly more likely to identify as Israeli. These results are summarized in Figure 4.

Figure 4: Summary of explanatory variables for the 2006 dataset

Explanatory Variable	p-value	Population	Significantly more Israeli-identified groups	Significantly less Israeli-identified groups
Country of birth	.913	All respondents		
Continent of birth	.945	Immigrants		
Sex	.773	Immigrants		
Level of religious observance	.000	Immigrants	Not at all	A lot
Religious identity	.000	Immigrants	Secular	Religious, Haredi
Immigrant from FSU since 1989	.016	Immigrants	No	Yes
Social class	.015	Immigrants		Low
Years since immigration	.003	Immigrants	[greater]	[lower]
Age at arrival	.000	Immigrants	[lower]	[greater]
Language of inteview	.003	Immigrants	Hebrew	Russian
Period of immigration	.014	Immigrants	1947-1951	1989-1999
Immigrated during wave?	.626	Immigrants		
Wave of immigration	.003	Immigrants	First wave	Second wave

I further examined trends among groups who identified primarily as non-Israeli by disaggregating the non-Israeli identities and performing additional cross-tabulation and chi-squared analysis of the relationship between those significant demographic categorical variables and identity. I found that the more religiously identified respondents were more likely to identify as Jewish instead of Israeli, but that respondents who described themselves as being of "low" social class, FSU immigrants, and respondents who had immigrated between 1989 and 1999 were more likely to identify themselves as "Secular/Religious." Additionally, the latter two groups tended to identify as "Ashkenazi/Sephardic." In Figure 5, these strong positive relationships (adjusted residuals greater than 2.0) between groups and identities are marked with an X when they occur. Additional strong negative relationships (adjusted residuals lower than -2.0) are marked with O.

Figure 5

Variable	Value	Valid % of the population	Jewish	Aschkenazi / Sephardic	Religious/ Secular
Immigration wave	Second wave	52.1%		X	X
Social class (Self-identified)	Low	17.7%			X
FSU immigrant after 1989	Yes	45.7%	O	X	X
Religious self-definition	Religious	6.5%	X		
Religious self-definition	Haredi	3%	X		
Religious observance	A lot	13.3%	X		O
Religious observance	All of it	4.1%	X		
Language of the interview	Russian	46.4%	O	X	X

DISCUSSION

Prior to analyzing the data, I had expected that the results would confirm a view of identity as something that Israeli immigrants slowly acquire over the course of their time in Israel, until they reach a level of identification similar to that of veteran Israelis. Since my two years of analysis were somewhat removed from the years of highest immigration volume, I had expected that this process would already have begun by 2001, and

would be more pronounced by 2006.

Instead, the data shows a very different story. Notably, immigrants in the aggregate did not significantly differ from veteran Israelis in terms of their identity—in both years, immigrants and non-immigrants identified as Israeli in almost identical proportions. Three theories could explain this particular negative finding. Israel could have extremely robust assimilative structures that have a high rate of success in instilling Israeli identity in immigrants. Israel's immigrants could just be uniquely similar to the native-born population even immediately after the entered the country, lending credence to primordialist Zionist theories that Israeli Jews and diasporic Jews share a national identity. Or the label of immigrants could be obscuring massive variations within the immigrant subset of the population, with some groups identifying as significantly more Israeli than the general population and some identifying significantly less. Further examination of the immigrant subsets of the population in 2001 and in 2006 provided two very different answers to explain these negative results.

In 2001, the only demographic variables that were found to be significant were ethnicity and two measures of religiosity, and none of the immigration-related demographic variables, such as continent of origin or year of immigration, seemed to be correlated with identifying as Israeli. As an immigrant's period of immigration or number of years they had spent in the country had no relationship with identity, the hypothesis that Israel was extremely successful in assimilating its immigrants seemed suspect—even if this process were happening rapidly, the data should have shown some indication that more recent immigrants were less Israeli-identified. The group discrepancy theory was also unsupported by the data, as the three variables that most strongly stratified the immigrant community were also strong determinants of Israeli identity in the general population. As the immigrant population was no more stratified by any of these demographic variables than Israelis as a whole, it seemed unlikely that examining ethnicity and religiosity would uncover evidence of strong differences between some groups of immigrants and native-born Israelis more generally. Therefore, the 2001 immigrant data would seem to provide support for the Zionist theory that Israel's immigrants strongly resemble their native-born population and require little socialization to develop the same levels of identity as the native-born population.

The 2006 data tells a completely different story. In this year, in addition to the same religiosity patterns observed in 2001, multiple immigration-related variables emerged as strong predictors of Israeli identity—more recent immigrants from the FSU, or immigrants from the latest wave of immigration, were less likely to identify as Israeli than their peers from previous periods. Poor and Russian-speaking immigrants were also more likely to be among this group of "non-Israelis." The assimilation hypothesis therefore has more credence here, as long-time immigrants from the first migration wave emerged as the more Israeli-identifying group, compared with more recent immigrants, who were much less likely to identify as Israeli. The Zionist hypothesis, on the other hand, does not fit this data—the tendency of immigrants from the 1989-1999 wave to identify as Israeli in far lower proportions than the rest of the immigrant community or the general population seems at odds with the idea that immigrants to Israel are members of the same imagined community as their native-born peers. The aggregation hypothesis seems far more relevant to the 2006 data. Although immigrants on the whole identified as Israeli in similar numbers to native-born Israelis, this average masks deep divisions: in reality, immigrants who came to Israel during periods of low immigration identify similarly to the native-born population. However, immigrants from the 90s wave are far less Israeli-identified, while immigrants from the 50s are far more.

When the two years are considered together, though, none of the three hypotheses can hold up to the combined data. If Israeli immigrants develop their Israeli identity over time, why did they not appear to be doing so in 2001, and why were Israeli identification rates among some groups actually lower five years later? If Israeli immigrants are really just like the native-born population, why did immigrants from the 90s wave and the FSU have such disproportionately low numbers of Israeli identities in 2006? And if the surface similarity between native-born Israelis and immigrants as a whole is hiding deep divisions and discrepancies within the immigrant population, then where were those discrepancies in 2001? No single theory of how assimilation happens or how identity works can explain completely different patterns only five years apart. Therefore, I argue instead that identity is conceptualized and formed differently in different sociopolitical contexts and throughout historical periods.

No research has specifically analyzed changes in

immigrants' identity during the 2001 and 2006 periods, but I can draw some tentative conclusions based on a cursory examination of Israeli history. The 2001 data was gathered during the Second Intifada, when Israel was at war with Palestinians residing in its borders or within the Occupied Territories—a time when Israelis could be united against a common enemy, but when Sephardic or Mizrahi Jews who appeared ethnically similar to Palestinians may have been under greater suspicion from the Ashkenazi mainstream. This could explain both the tendency of Sephardic Jews in the 2001 dataset to identify as Jewish in smaller numbers than their Ashkenazi peers, and the general unimportance of country of origin in determining identity during this period. During a time of national crisis, it would seem that immigrants who were visibly members of the nation tended to behave similar to other Israelis and were more likely to identify with the country, while the immigrants who lacked this visible marker of membership and could be associated with the "enemy" had identity patterns that more closely matched their native-born non-Ashkenazi peers than their Ashkenazi fellow immigrants.

The data from 2006 was gathered while Israel was at peace but certain immigrant identities were highly mobilized. The 2006 elections saw the rise of Yisrael Beitenu, a political party whose supporters, leadership, and candidates were largely immigrants from the former Soviet Union, and which was largely understood by the public to represent the interests of those immigrants. Although I did not investigate political preferences of the FSU immigrants who did not identify as Israeli in this period, my data did indicate that those immigrants were much more likely to identify themselves by their ethnicities (largely Ashkenazi) and their level of religiosity (largely secular) than they were to identify as Jews—an identity that seems consistent with Yisrael Beitenu's secularist, far-right, anti-Arab platform.

Taken together, these findings indicate that Israeli national identity is not, in fact, something that is built up over time and largely stable once established. Instead, they suggest that identity can be quickly obtained, but also quickly discarded, and that whether an individual places their Israeli identity ahead of their other identities depends heavily on the political context and which of their identities is being mobilized at the time. Demographic characteristics play a role in who is more likely to identify as Israeli, but the specific relationships between groups and identities can be subject to change: for example, high religious observance consistently correlated with non-Israeli identity, but in 2001, Sephardim were less likely to identify as Israeli, while in 2006, it was recent Ashkenazi immigrants who spurned the Israeli identity.

CONCLUSION

Previous theorizing on Israeli identity had presented multiple ideas of how and when Israeli identity formed, from ethnonationalist Zionist narratives that posit identity as inborn and inherent in all Jews, to liberal discourses of citizenship that tie Israeliness to legal status and rights. My quantitative data analysis suggests that, at least for Jewish immigrants, Israeli identity is something far more mercurial and contextual. Using cross-sectional data from 2001 and 2006, I find that Israeli identity in 2001 had almost nothing to do with whether someone was an immigrant, but that in 2006 FSU immigrants were far less likely to identify as Israeli than all other immigrant groups. Taken together, these findings indicate that Israeli identity can be easily obtained, especially for Jews who don't visibly appear to be immigrants or "other," but that it can also be easily discarded as other identities are mobilized and assigned greater importance.

Further research into this conception of Israeli citizenship could expand its scope to other years, and employ more nuanced measures of identity that don't suffer from the methodological flaws of forced multiple choice identity questions. It could also hopefully remedy provide more research into the effects of ethnicity, language, and socioeconomic status, which I was unable to fully explore because of data limitations and inconsistencies. Finally, comparative research analyzing immigration patterns in other countries could be instructive in investigating the degree to which this finding confirms or contradicts the idea that Israel has unique patterns of migration.

This research indicates that, despite the efforts of nation-states to instill a sense of belonging to an imagined national community in their legal citizens, national identity and state-granted citizenship are still very different concepts. Even among people who have been granted legal Israeli citizenship and told that their religion makes them inherently part of the Israeli community, national identity still takes root in uneven, incomplete, and impermanent ways, demonstrating that despite the nation-state's current status as the dominant form of political organization, the process of wedding

the nation to the state in the minds of its subjects is far from complete.

Works Cited

Al-Haj, Majid. 2002. "Ethnic mobilization in an ethno-national state: the case of immigrants from the Former Soviet Union in Israel." Ethnic and Racial Studies 25(2):238-257.

Amit, Karin. 2012. "Social integration and identity of immigrants from western countries, the FSU and Ethiopia in Israel." Ethnic and Racial Studies 35(7):1287–1310.

Amit, Karin and Ilan Riss. 2007. "The Role of Social Networks in the Immigration Decision-Making Process: The Case of North American Immigration to Israel." Immigrants & Minorities 25(3):290–313.

Arian, Asher, and Michal Shamir. ISRAELI ELECTION STUDY, 2006. ICPSR20221-v1. Tel-Aviv, Israel: Mashov Institute [producer], 2006. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2007-08-01.

Ben Shalom, Uzi and Gabriel Horenczyk. 2004. "Cultural Identity and Adaptation in an Assimilative Setting: Immigrant Soldiers from the Former Soviet Union in Israel." International Journal of Intercultural Relations 28(6):461–79.

Blank, Thomas and Peter Schmidt. 2003. "National Identity in a United Germany: Nationalism or Patriotism? An Empirical Test With Representative Data." Political Psychology 24(2):289–312.

Cohen, Yinon. 2009. "Migration Patterns to and from Israel." Contemporary Jewry 29(2):115–25.

Cook-Martín, David. 2013. The scramble for citizens: dual nationality and state competition for immigrants. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Davidov, E. 2010. "Nationalism and Constructive Patriotism: A Longitudinal Test of Comparability in 22 Countries with the ISSP." International Journal of Public Opinion Research 23(1):88–103.

Dekker, Henk, Darina Malova, and Sander Hoogendoorn. 2003. "Nationalism and Its Explanations." Political Psychology 24(2):345–76.

Elias, Nelly and Adriana Kemp. 2010. "The New Second Generation: Non-Jewish Olim, Black Jews and Children of Migrant Workers in Israel." Israel Studies 15(1):73–94.

Hertzberg, Arthur. 1971. The Zionist idea: a historical analysis and reader. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.
Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs. "About Israel." Retrieved December 17, 2016 (http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/AboutIsrael/Pages/default.aspx)

Joppke, Christian. 2007. "Transformation of Citizenship: Status, Rights, Identity." Citizenship Studies 11(1):37–48.

Jedwab, Jack. 2009. "National identities and social integration in Canada and Israel." Canadian Universe, 1(1):73-96.
Jewish Agency, The. "The Law of Return." Retrieved December 17, 2016 (http://www.jewishagency.org/first-steps/program/5131).

Khanin, Vladimir. 2000. "Israeli 'Russian' parties and the new immigrant vote." Israel Affairs 7(2-3):101–34.
Lazin, Fred A. 2006. ""Freedom of Choice": Israeli Efforts to Prevent Soviet Jewish Emigres to Resettle in the United States." Review of Policy Research 23(2):387–412.

Peled, Yoav. 1992. "Ethnic Democracy and the Legal Construction of Citizenship: Arab Citizens of the Jewish State." American Political Science Review 86(02):432–43.

Peled, Yoav. 2008. "The Evolution of Israeli Citizenship: an Overview." Citizenship Studies 12(3):335–45.
Philippov, Michael and Anna Knafelman. 2011. "Old values in the new homeland: political attitudes of FSU immigrants in Israel." Israel Affairs 17(1):38–54.

Rajiman, Rebeca and Oshrat Hochman. 2009. "National attachments, economic competition, and social exclusion of non-Ethnic migrants in Israel: a mixed-Methods approach." Quality & Quantity 45(6):1151–74.

Ram, Uri. 2000. "National, Ethnic or Civic? Contesting Paradigms of Memory, Identity and Culture in Israel." Conflicting Philosophies of Education in Israel/Palestine 43–60.

Remennick, Larissa. 2003. "The 1.5 Generation of Russian Immigrants in Israel: Between Integration and Sociocultural Retention." Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies 12(1):39–66.

Remennick, Larissa. 2015. "The Two Waves of Russian-Jewish Migration from the USSR/FSU to Israel: Dissidents of the 1970s and Pragmatics of the 1990s." Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies 18(1-2):44–66.

Roislien, H. E. 2012. "Religion and Military Conscription: The Case of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF)." Armed Forces & Society 39(2):213–32.

Sadiq, Kamal. 2009. Paper Citizens: How Illegal Immigrants Acquire Citizenship in Developing Countries. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Sasson-Levy, O. 2008. "Individual Bodies, Collective State Interests: The Case of Israeli Combat Soldiers." Men and Masculinities 10(3):296–321.

Semyonov, Moshe and Noah Lewish-Epstein. 2003. "Diasporas and ethnic migrants: Germany, Israel, and post-Soviet successor states in comparative perspective." in Diasporas and ethnic migrants: Germany, Israel, and post-Soviet successor states in comparative perspective, edited by R. Münz and R. Ohliger. London: Frank Cass.

Shafir, Gershon and Yoav Peled. 2002. Being Israeli: the Dynamics of Multiple Citizenship. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Shuval, Judith T. 1998. "Migration To Israel: The Mythology of 'Uniqueness.'" International Migration 36(1) 3-26.

Smooha, Sammy. 2008. "The Mass Immigrations to Israel: A Comparison of the Failure of the Mizrahi Immigrants of the 1950s with the Success of the Russian Immigrants of the 1990s." Journal of Israeli History 27(1):1–27.

Spiro, Peter J. 2016. At home in two countries: the past and future of dual citizenship. New York: New York University Press.

Weiss, Erica. 2012. "Principle or Pathology? Adjudicating the Right to Conscience in the Israeli Military." American Anthropologist 114(1):81–94.

Paper Promises:

An analysis of changes in United Nations rhetoric surrounding refugees

Karin Yndestadt
Class of 2017

The UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) is the world's leading protection agency for refugees. Founded in 1951, the program is mandated by the United Nations to oversee the implementation of two key documents. These documents are the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. The Convention and the Protocol form the basis of international guidelines designed to outline the rights that should be accorded to refugees, determine obligations surrounding refugee assistance for countries in the UN, and explicitly define what it means to be a "refugee" ("The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and it's 1967 Protocol" 2011:6). 145 Nations are now parties to the Convention (meaning they have endorsed it fully or with registered reservations) and 146 Nations are parties to the Protocol ("Chapter V" 2013). These documents have long represented a foundational framework for addressing the refugee crisis on a global scale (Cunliffe 1995:279). Over the years, small updates and adjustments to these documents have been made in other international gatherings related to refugee aid. For example, after 2001, some members of the UN fought back against a number of increasingly isolationist nations to argue that refugees could not be discriminated against on the basis of their country of origin, and indeed in many cases, these refugees were those with the most urgent needs ("Refugees Victims of Terrorism, Not Its Perpetrators" 2001). Overall, however, most of these changes have been minor. Then, this past September, the UNHCR hosted the first ever Summit for Refugees and Migrants, designed to "address large movements of refugees and migrants, with the aim of bringing countries together behind a more humane and coordinated approach" ("Summit for Refugees and Migrants" 2016:1). As a result of the Summit, the 2016 New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants was published. This new document offers an updated perspective on the responsibilities that UN countries share in addressing the global refugee crisis. Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 19 September 2016, The New York Declaration will likely shape rhetoric surrounding refugee protection and relocation for years to come. This influence is especially important given recent trends in the number of refugees recorded worldwide.

The publication of the 2016 New York Declaration is significant in light of the global refugee situation in recent years. The UNHCR's 2015 Global Trends report noted a record high of 65.3 million forcibly displaced individuals that year, a number that included 21.3 million refugees, 3.2 million asylum-seekers, and 40.8 million internally displaced individuals (23). This represents a sharp increase in the number of UNHCR identified "persons of concern". In its 2006 Global Trends report, the UNHCR only recorded a total of 23.5 million forcibly displaced individuals, which is a third of the size of the 2015 estimate (5). In conjunction with the escalation of the refugee crisis, many countries are simultaneously facing pressure to supply fewer resources to the UNHCR in order to focus efforts on supplying social services at home. This pressure stems from the aftermath of the 2008 recession as well as from increased nationalism within individual states (McCabe and Meissner 2010: 8).

Given the increased number of refugees as well as the lack of resources to provide support for them, understanding the impact that the New York Declaration will have on global commitments to address the refugee crisis will provide essential insight into the evolving demands of refugee resettlement and protection. A thorough analysis of each of the documents outlined in this essay points towards a more abstract, ambitious, UN-centered approach to the refugee crisis. This shift is representative of general trends seen worldwide, where international organizations are taking the lead while individual states participate only as members of these larger institutions.

Literature Review

In order to understand changing rhetoric around refugees, it is essential to engage with changes surrounding citizenship more generally in the past half of a century. In particular, Christian Joppke of the American University of Paris argues that access to citizenship has experienced substantial liberalization in the past 50 years. Joppke points to the elimination of racial barriers to entry, barriers for female applicants for citizenship, and barriers for semi-permanent residence as a key source of this sense of liberalization (2007:39). As the result of this liberalization, states do not possess the same level of power to manipulate the citizenship process. Because minority rights are being upheld, and even advanced, there is less of an opportunity to refuse to grant individuals citizenship on the basis of discriminatory categorizations. This is of particular relevance to analyzing changes in international approaches to refugee protection and resettlement, as the increased liberalization of citizenship clashes with the limited resources that states have to ensure the well being of their citizens.

As citizenship becomes more universally available, the benefits set aside for citizens are less abundant and carry less weight. Linda Bosniak's book The Citizen and the Alien (2006) points to some of the contradictions inherent in the expansion of citizenship by explaining that, even as citizenship is sometimes seen as taking on a more global meaning, in that terms like "transnational" or "cosmopolitan" citizenship have become increasingly relevant, this has simultaneously contributed to the discrediting of the traditional status of citizen (33). As Bosniak notes, "citizen" is seen as a valuable status, for it affords an individual access to the rights and privileges that a state has set aside for its citizens. At the same time, if more and more individuals are being granted access to these rights, sometimes even from multiple countries (as is the case with dual citizenship) then the impact of this privilege is diluted. This trend plays a role in determining refugee protection and assistance as resistance to the dilution of citizenship privileges makes it harder for states to help resettle refugees. Resistance to allowing refugee resettlement within one's country stems from increased nationalism in addition to fear about resource allocation in the post-recession era. Thus, understanding whether this resistance has altered global attitudes towards refugee resettlement will help to inform the ways in which refugee assistance might be evolving or changing in the future.

After examining the status of citizenship more broadly, one can begin to investigate global responses to refugees more specifically. Refugees are often the most vulnerable individuals in the world, left stranded at the bottom of the hierarchical citizenship tower. With this vulnerability in mind, one can begin to understand why increasing rates of refugees are now being referred to as refugee crises (Global Trends 2015). With a crisis at hand, both individual states and organizations like the UN feel pressure to act. The second half of this literature review will develop two perspectives on the future of rhetoric surrounding refugee aid. The first is that increased isolationism and nationalism, demonstrated most recently by the Brexit vote and the election of Donald Trump, will result in individual state responses to refugee needs, without any large coordinated efforts. The second is that, despite the isolationist actions that have been taken by certain countries in recent years, rhetoric surrounding refugee aid is still shifting towards a more globalized, UN-led approach.

Proponents of the first school of thought argue that an unequal power distribution will prevent some states from feeling that they have adequate control over certain international organizations (Vayrynen 2001). This goes against the tendency for states to protect their autonomy – even if it means there will be a more ineffective solution overall. Thus, individuals who support this ideology about a shift towards isolationism tend to focus mainly on the desires of individual states. These desires, however, can also be used to support the opposing argument – that states actually want a more globalized approach to rhetoric surrounding refugee aid. As Loescher (2001) points out, many states see bowing down to the authority of a larger institution as fulfilling two goals; first, the state appears mature, and deserving of the same treatment on the international scene as any peer states that are also involved in international governance. Second, states may see the assignment of duties to a larger organization as a way to avoid carrying the burdens of addressing issues on their own – particularly if that organization is given little power to complete the tasks assigned to it. With these opposing viewpoints in mind, the paper will now address methodology and analysis, ultimately finding that, although it appears that rhetoric is trending more towards a globalized approach to refugee aid, a lot of

uncertainty still remains in regards to how refugee crises will be handled in the future.

Methodology

To perform the analyses outlined in the findings section below, this research relied on a content analysis of three documents: the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (twenty-five pages), the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (five pages), and the 2016 New York Declaration (twenty-four pages).[1] The coding of these documents centers on an axial approach . This methodology was selected due to its ability to capture changing relationships between key themes that might be causally related. The axial approach, as Strauss and Corbin (1998) explain, involves determining a phenomenon to study, conditions relating to that phenomenon, actions directed towards the phenomenon, and potential outcomes of the actions aimed to address the phenomenon. Then, each document is examined, and references to each theme are noted. Patterns and relationships are then explored between each theme. For example, one document might contain a multitude of references to one theme under examination, and no references to another theme being considered. This emphasis on one theme, combined with a lack of attention towards another theme, can be extremely informative in describing patterns and trends in a body of documents.

The set up of this axial approach is clarified below and summarized in Table 1. In regards to this research, the phenomenon under study is refugee status, which is operationalized as the way in which "refugee" has been defined in the documents mentioned above. In addition, the conditions relating to that phenomenon are defined as the rights afforded to refugees in the documents above. The actions directed towards the phenomenon will be the obligations of states towards refugees and the obligations of the U.N. towards refugees, as outlined in each of the documents. Finally, qualifying statements such as, "We acknowledge also that, while upholding these obligations and principles, States are entitled to take measures to prevent irregular border crossings" will comprise the potential outcomes mentioned by Strauss and Corbin (Declaration: 6). The example of a qualifying statement used above merits further explanation. That sentence, granting states the right to protect their borders, immediately follows this one – "We reaffirm that, in line with the principle of non-refoulement, individuals must not be returned at borders" (Declaration: 6). The sentence about non-refoulement seems to say that states should not turn away refugees at the borders of their countries – and yet, in the next sentence, the UN appears to acknowledge that some countries will continue to do so. Anytime a phrase is identified as a qualifying statement, it is because it contradicts or undermines another statement within the document. This was the general framework used to identify the qualifying statements in each of the documents.

Table 1.

Phenomenon	Definition of refugee
Conditions relating to phenomenon	Rights afforded to refugees
Actions directed towards phenomenon	Obligations of states and UN towards refugees
Potential outcomes of actions	Qualifying statements

In choosing how to define each of these categories, the researcher relied on the original warrant for the 1951 Convention as a document designed to provide a framework for refugee aid after the massive displacements that occurred as part of WWI and WWII ("The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol" 2011). In addition, before beginning the coding process, there was a thorough pre-reading of the documents to assess whether these designations would be appropriate. Following the methodology above, the documents were coded. For examples of the coding designations used, see Table 2 below. In addition, detailed notes were taken in regards to the ways that each key theme was discussed in each document. Using this axial coding, it was then examined how statements related to each theme were used in each document – comparing frequency, diversity, and specificity between all three documents. The analysis walks through some of these general themes and analyzes a few specific points in more detail.

Table 2.

Coding Outline

Example:	Coding outcome
"For the purposes of the present Convention, the term "refugee" shall apply to any person who..."	Definition
"The Contracting States shall apply the provisions of this Convention to refugees without discrimination as to race, religion, or country of origin"	Rights, Obligations
"Nothing in this Convention shall prevent a Contracting state, in time of war or other grave and exceptional circumstances, from taking provisionally measures which it considers to be essential to the national security…"	Qualifying statement

Analysis

A thorough examination of the 1951 Convention, the 1967 Protocol, and the 2016 New York Declaration reveals a distinct shift in the rhetoric that the UN and the UNHCR use to discuss refugee aid. Despite this distinct shift, there are still some commonalities between the earlier documents and the recent New York Declaration. Through the axial coding process outlined in the methodology, each of the four key themes assigned to each aspect of the axial framework was examined in each document. This section will walk through each theme, addressing any changes in rhetoric surrounding each theme and talking about either the potential implications of such changes or the potential implications of the lack of change found in regards to some themes.

The definition of a "refugee"

In the 1951 Convention, a refugee is defined as someone who, "owing to well-founded fear… is outside the country of his nationality… and being outside the country of his formal habitual residence… is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it" (Convention 14). This definition stems from the precedent of a number of earlier documents, such as the 1926 Arrangements, the 1933 and 1938 Conventions, and the 1939 Protocol. Because the 1951 Convention was framed as a foundational document in refugee aid, a considerable amount of space within the document is dedicated to discussing the definition. There are fifteen phrases in the Convention coded as relating to the definition of refugees.

This stands in contrast to the 1967 Protocol, which, although admittedly a short, five-page document, contains only two references to the definition of refugees. This is somewhat surprising given that the goal of the 1967 Protocol is to effectively expand the definition of refugee given in the 1951 Convention, removing temporal limitations ("The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol" 2011). Specifically, the 1967 Protocol eliminates the statement in the 1951 Convention that says refugees are individuals displaced "[a]s a result of events occurring… before 1 January 1951," instead considering any individuals that were considered displaced (whether or not that displacement took place before January of 1951) to be refugees (Convention 14). In addition, in the 1951 Convention, states were given the option to choose whether they wanted the phrase "events occurring in Europe before 1 January 1951" or the phrase "events occurring in Europe or elsewhere before 1 January 1951" to apply to the definition of refugee (Convention 6). Congo, Madagascar, Monaco and Turkey selected the more restrictive definition. In the 1967 Protocol, this option was still available for interested states to declare, but it wasn't explicitly specified as an option in the text of the document. Congo and Monaco opted to drop the geographic restriction, Turkey reaffirmed it, and Madagascar is not yet a party to the 1967 Protocol.

The 2016 New York Declaration essentially reaffirms the definition offered in the 1951 Convention and modified in the 1967 Protocol. Allusions to the definition of refugee are infrequent, occurring just three times. This reaffirmation is significant because it demonstrates continued commitment to serving refugees. Although the definition was not widened, it was also not narrowed in any way, and this sense of stasis shows the UNHCR's continued, steadfast commitment to individuals that they see as refugees.

Rights afforded to refugees

The rights afforded to refugees as outlined in the 1951 Convention include a number of measures relating to non-discrimination, exemption from exceptional

measures, continuity of residence, personal status, property, access to courts, employment, education, housing, social security, freedom of movement, administrative assistance, and the ability to undergo the naturalization process. In regards to the vast majority of these topics, states are asked essentially to treat refugees as individuals deserving of the same rights and privileges as citizens. Only one right is emphasized above all others, and that is the principle of "non-refoulement". By granting refugees the right of non-refoulement, the 1951 Convention declares that "no Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threated on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion" (Convention 30). This right is seen as fundamental, and cannot even in times of war or extreme peril (see Qualifying statements section below) be disregarded. Essentially, under no circumstances whatsoever can a refugee be sent to a territory (whether this is their original territory or not) in which they may be exposed to the fear of a threat to their life or freedom. The Convention also declares that, stemming from Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of human rights, all persons have the right to seek asylum from persecution in other countries (4). This second declaration, in conjunction with the first, helps to assure that any individual who feels that their life is in danger is allowed to flee and that any potential host country is obligated not to return that individual to a place where they may be in continued danger. This assertion comprises the backbone of much of the UNHCR's work in protecting refugees.

In the 1967 Protocol, the only substantive reference to the rights of refugees comes as part of a warrant for updating the definition of refugees. The Protocol states, "equal status should be enjoyed by all refugees" in the opening of the document (27). In reality, this is a way of acknowledging that an adjustment to the definition of refugee would allow for more individuals to be classified as such and receive the support offered to qualifying individuals. As such, it is not as closely related to the rights of refugees as other statements in the Convention and the Declaration, and so it won't be discussed further in the analysis. Finally, in the 2016 New York Declaration, the rights afforded to refugees are generally reaffirmed, although with less of an emphasis on state obligations to see them through (see Obligations section below). Several references are made to international human rights, with a total of fourteen statements made in regards to the rights of refugees. All of the rights declared in the Convention are upheld in the Declaration, a fact that could be hailed as a victory by some contemporary scholars. Lastly, in one relatively small deviation, the New York Declaration specifies the need to pay attention to several particularly vulnerable groups, in the hopes of developing practices to protect the rights of these groups in the event that they are forced to become refugees. The vulnerable groups include women, the elderly, children, ethnic and religious minorities, individuals with disabilities, indigenous peoples, and victims of violence and sexual violence (Declaration 5). If anything, this analysis lends itself to a positive outlook in regards to the rights of refugees. The Declaration affirms existing rights while encouraging a holistic approach to refugee aid that will provide for particularly vulnerable individuals.

Obligations of states and the UN towards refugees

Of each of the four themes discussed in this analysis, this theme has experienced by far the most dramatic change. In the 1951 Convention, twenty phrases were coded as relating to the obligations of states (referred to as "Contracting States") towards refugees. Five phrases were coded as relating to the obligations of the UN. State obligations included assisting refugees with things such as former property, courts hearings, wage-earning employment, self-employment, housing, education, social security, ID papers, the transfer of assets, and general administrative assistance. The obligations of the UN in regards to refugees generally included statements about collecting documentation from Contracting States with regards to their treatment of refugees.

In the 1967 Protocol, only one phrase referencing the obligations of states was recorded. There was also one phrase referencing the obligations of the UN that was recorded as well. In the Protocol, states are instructed to provide the UN with any updated laws or other legislation that relate to the enforcement of the Protocol, and the UN is asked to notify states that wish to become parties to the Protocol of their successful accession. As was the case with the rights of refugees discussed in the Protocol, these obligations don't appear to have much of an impact on the overall conversation about refugee aid.

In the 2016 New York Declaration, the numbers

are drastically different than in the Convention. Thirty-three references to UN obligations were recorded, with only thirteen references to state obligations. This represents a dramatic shift from a previously state-centered approach to refugee aid, with the UN now being asked to provide comprehensive support on a number of seemingly enormous tasks. Some of these tasks include comprehensive education reform, support in gaining skills training for jobs, healthcare, administrative assistance, working in partnership with the IMF to fund various aid efforts, and so much more. This is perhaps the most significant finding of this paper, as it is indicative of a significant shift towards a rhetoric that relies on a strong UN with the ability to provide large amounts of assistance to Contracting States. While in the 1951 Convention almost all of the focus had been on the role of the state in supporting refugees, the 2016 Declaration appears to be establishing a framework for what can only be referred to as an astounding level of support available for countries in need.

Qualifying statements

The analysis of qualifying statements in each of the three documents has yielded perhaps the most intriguing results of the research. In the 1951 Convention, there were a total of seven qualifying statements recorded. Three of these statements qualified state obligations, and four qualified UN obligations. In general, the statements qualifying state obligations were acknowledgments of existing state laws that might affect refugee treatment. The statements qualifying UN obligations related mostly to an acknowledgment that although the UN might suggest that states consider implementing certain practices (such as reevaluating their naturalization process for refugees), these suggestions cannot necessarily be made with the threat of force, and must respect the individual laws of each state. Overall, the qualifying statements in the Convention are fairly sparse and seemingly harmless.

As a reminder, in the 1967 Protocol, only one state obligation and one UN obligation were identified. There are no qualifying statements in the Protocol, meaning that the state obligation to provide the UN with any updated laws or other legislation, and the UN obligation to notifying states that wish to become parties to the Protocol of their successful accession are both unmodified. Given that these are not challenging obligations, it is not surprising that the Protocol does not appear to demonstrate any significant trends or patterns in regards to qualifying statements.

There were many more qualifying statements in the 2016 New York Declaration in comparison to the other documents. Specifically, there were six qualifying statements made with regards to states, and ten qualifying statements recorded with regards to UN obligations. This high number of qualifying statements is not entirely unsurprising given the increase in obligations that the UN in particular is assigned in the Declaration. However, despite the hopes of some that the increased obligations of the UN could lead to more comprehensive and effective refugee aid, there is also the concern that qualifying statements may render some of the rhetoric in the Declaration useless.

Discussion

Examining the 1951 Convention, the 1967 Protocol, and the 2016 New York Declaration with regards to the themes above reveals several important takeaways about the future of rhetoric surrounding refugee aid. First, the Declaration's reaffirmation of the definition of a refugee established in the Convention and clarified in the Protocol suggests that this definition will continue to serve the UN and the UNHCR for a number of years to come. Although the definition was not expanded from the Protocol to the Declaration, it was maintained, meaning that there appears for now to be no risk that individuals currently labeled as refugees could be labeled otherwise.

Second, the Declaration's references to Universal Human Rights when reaffirming the rights afforded to refugees by the Convention offer hope that rhetoric surrounding the rights of refugees will not narrow in coming years. In addition, the Declaration's attention to groups of particularly vulnerable individuals is a welcome sign that the UN intends to focus their rhetoric on a holistic, community-based approach to refugee aid, where no groups of individuals are pushed aside or swept under the rug. This too, is a positive sign for rhetoric concerning refugees.

Third, rhetoric surrounding the obligations of states and the UN towards refugees has shifted significantly since the Convention. In particular, the obligations of states have melted from the forefront, and there is an increased emphasis on the UN's role in refugee aid in the Declaration. This shift in rhetoric aligns with other more general shifts towards globalized governance. However, recent events such as the Brexit

vote and Donald Trump's election indicate that the shift towards a more globalized governance predicted by so many is not a given. In addition, any of the structures and tasks outlined as obligations of the UN are nowhere near completed – the next several years will either bring increased clarity in rhetoric, as the UN has promised, or the continuation of bold claim-making accompanied by qualifying statements and no firm commitments. Fourth and final, the use of qualifying statements within rhetoric about refugee aid has also changed. Perhaps because of the ambitious nature of many of the statements made in the Declaration, it should not be surprising that there appear to be more qualifying statements in the Declaration than in the Convention or the Protocol. The implications of the presence of these qualifying statements are somewhat unclear. On the one hand, these qualifying statements subdue much of the grandeur of the promises made by the UN, because they establish the possibility that the UN may not follow through on its obligations. On the other hand, as an international document adopted by all Member States of the UN, the need for exceptions seems obvious. With the UN expected to convene on the subject of refugees again in 2018, in order to develop a more concrete, comprehensive plan, perhaps only time will tell how rhetoric surrounding refugees will continue to shift in the coming years.

In today's increasingly volatile society, the likelihood of future refugee crises looms in the background of much international policy discussion. The analysis of UN rhetoric included in this paper serves as a starting point to delve deeper into understanding what might be the reality of refugee crisis intervention in coming years. Although certainly not a complete picture of what's to come, understanding the emphasis on paper promises in the UN's most recent published documents relating to refugees can help to equip sociologists and other researchers with the tools to advocate for refugee rights today and in the future.

Notes

1. Many thanks to Professor Casey Oberlin of Grinnell College for her suggestion here, as well as her invaluable insight into the data collection process.

References

Bosniak, Linda. 2006. The Citizen and the Alien. Princeton University Press. Oxford, England.

"Chapter V – Refugees and Stateless Persons". United Nations Treaty Series. 22 July 2013. Retrieved November 20, 2016.

Cunliffe, Alex. 1995. "The Refugee Crises: A Study of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees." Political Studies, 43(2): 278-290.

Global Trends. 2006. The UN Refugee Agency. Geneva, Switzerland: The UN Refugee Agency. Retrieved October 26, 2016.

Global Trends. 2015. The UN Refugee Agency. Geneva, Switzerland: The UN Refugee Agency. Retrieved October 26, 2016.
Joppke, Christian. 2006. "Transformation of Citizenship: Status, Rights, Identity." Citizenship Studies, 11(1): 37-48.
Loescher, Gil. 2001. "The UNHCR and World Politics: State Interests vs. Institutional Autonomy." The International Migration Review, 35(1): 33-56.

McCabe, Kristen and Doris Meissner. 2010. "Immigration and the United States: Recession Affects Flows, Prospects for Reform." Migration Policy Institute. 4 January 2010. Retrieved October 26, 2016.
New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants. 2016. The UN Refugee Agency. Geneva, Switzerland: The UN Refugee Agency. Retrieved October 26, 2016.

"Refugees Victims of Terrorism, Not Its Perpetrators." 2001. The UN Refugee Agency. Geneval, Switzerland: The UN Refugee Agency. Retrieved November 15, 2016.

"Summit for Refugees and Migrants" 2016. The UN Refugee Agency. Geneva, Switzerland: The UN Refugee Agency. Retrieved October 26, 2016.

"The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and it's 1967 Protocol." 2011. The UN Refugee Agency. Geneva, Switzerland: The UN Refugee Agency. Retrieved October 26, 2016.

Vayrynen, Raimo. 2001. "Funding Dilemmas in Refugee Assistance: Political Interests and Institutional Reforms in UNHCR." The International Migration Review, 35(1): 143-167.

1951 Convention. 1951. The UN Refugee Agency. Geneva, Switzerland: The UN Refugee Agency. Retrieved October 26, 2016.

1967 Protocol. 1967. The UN Refugee Agency. Geneva, Switzerland: The UN Refugee Agency. Retrieved October 26, 2016.

Strauss, Anslem. L. and Juliet Corbin. M. 1998. Basics of qualitative research: Grounded theory procedures and techniques (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Electoral Reform in Burkina Faso, Electoral Violence in Burundi:

Issues of Civil Society and Power-Sharing

Vincent Benlloch
Class of 2018

Introduction

In the last decade, constitutional coup d'état attempts made by executives to circumvent, modify, or dismantle their respective constitutions to extend their tenure has threatened the stability of both Burundi and Burkina Faso (Yarwood 52). These executive attempts at power consolidation through the instantiation of third-termism, the en vogue longevity tactic for post-Cold War incumbents and ruling parties (Yarwood 52), were met with massive swells of civic mobilization and unrest. Both states exhibited similar bottom-up groundswell; however, their identical moments of civil resistance led to exceedingly disparate outcomes. The Burkinabe Revolt of 2014 lead to the ousting of Blaise Compaore, the rejection of intermediary military rule, a subsequent coup resistance, and the installment of Roch Marc Christian Kabore --the first elected president without any ties to the military in 49 years. Conversely, protests in Burundi to the third-term election of Pierre Nkurunziza in 2015 were met with heavy state violence and an increased consolidation of executive power despite a publicly popular coup attempt. In turn, this led to the continuation of Pierre Nkurunziza's rule, an executive tenure marked by human rights abuses, suppression of free speech and basic electoral freedoms, and extrajudicial disappearances and executions. At present, 300,000 Burundians are seeking international refuge and over 60,000 are internally displaced, a crisis of growing severity exacerbated by Burundi's recent withdrawal from the International Criminal Court and buffered by Burundi's security involvement in African Union and UN peacekeeping in Somalia (European Commission).

The case of Burundi poses the necessary question of how a once promising and lauded transition from ethnic cleansing and civil war to peace and free elections decayed into crisis. More broadly, in comparing the development of autocratic violence and power consolidation in Burundi to the success of electoral legitimacy and the ousting of military control in Burkina Faso, I seek to illuminate the constraints and successes for civil society actors and organizations (CSO's) against the backdrop of geopolitical history to explicate how power-sharing arrangements could inhibit civil society development. Within that context, I argue that Burundi's descent is directly tied to the failure of the Arusha Accord agreements to create a power-sharing constellation that adequately checked executive power and incentivized non-militarized civil actors. This failure allowed for the pervasive vertical reach of the CNDD-FDD in all facets of governance and in the ranks of security forces, and incentivized elites to circumvent elections as a means of furthering legitimacy. All of the above, exacerbated by Burundi's political history of multiple genocides and the disruptive geopolitics of the Great Lakes Region, contribute to a counterrevolutionary dynamic that limits civil society power through the lack of a model for endogenous civil resistance and the ever-present potentiality for further genocide. Conversely, the successful weathering of an autocratic push for term-limit extension in Burkina Faso is directly tethered to Burkina Faso's lineage of bottom-up civil unrest which has existed from Burkina Faso's independence to the present day, wherein civil society retains greater political legitimacy and equivalent power to the state.

In short, civil society's role as a legitimate combatant and competitor against the state was concretized throughout Burkina Faso's post-independence history, thus making power-sharing arrangements irrelevant due to the simple fact that civil society's power as a legitimate extra-governmental political entity remained viable even if often challenged. In contrast, Burundian statehood was founded on a negation of true civic power. These practices stem from Burundi's history of genocide which led to further Tutsi hegemony, and was crystallized in the failures of power-sharing and the further entrenchment of politicized

ethnicity. This disregard of civil society continues due to insufficient consociational arrangements that perpetuate a bloated, top-heavy state in Burundi. Undergirding my reading of Burundi's power-sharing against the backdrop of the Burkinabe Revolt is an inherent criticism of consociationalism's top-down, elite-focused model of governing social division.

Consociatonalism, An Theoretical Overview

Arend Lijphart, the leading proponent for consociationalism, elicits that the need for consociationalism, or power-sharing, arises when countries that are deeply fractured around ethnic or other divisions attempt to close those divides at the executive and legislative levels. This is done in order to begin the democratization process or ensure that democratic gains do not backslide into older autocratic modes of governance (Lijphart 97). In order to properly institute consociationalism, legislative framers must ensure that representatives of significant communal groups participate in political decision-making, as well as instantiate group autonomy for each body so that they retain control over their endogenous affairs (Lijphart 97). Achieving these conditions, according to Lijphart, is best done through elite cooperation within a grand executive coalition cabinet (Lemarchand [Lijphart] 167). These two broad conditions are meant to entrench legitimacy and stability within the political system based on Lijphart's assumption that legitimacy arises from divided bodies when they each feel included in government and are satisfied that their core interests are protected. This creates a challenge of fostering reconciliation between emergent minority rights against substantiated majority power claims (Cheeseman [Lijphart] 211; Lemarchand 167). Conversely, consociationalism is also predicated on the assumption that majoritarianism in divided societies precludes successful democratization (Lemarchand 167). Other mechanisms or pillars, such as proportionality based on the ethnic or other demographic cleavages, and a minority veto of last resort that is given to minority representatives within the coalition, set the continuation of consociational conditions (Lemarchand [Lijphart] 167).

With these overarching pillars in place, Lijphart explicitly states that there is a general "best fit" model that can be utilized by constitutional writers and other framers "regardless of their individual circumstances and characteristics" (Lijphart 99; Sullivan 78). Lijphart lends the greatest primacy to establishing a proportional representation electoral system within a parliamentary government, as he believes that presidentialist systems are inherently rigid, zero-sum contests (Lijphart 101-102). Also crucial to proper consocational democracies is the communicative transfer of representation between parties and communal groups, with Lijphart stating that political parties provide "the vital link between voters and government," (Lijphart 102). As far as power-sharing outside of the executive is concerned, "broad representation of all communal groups is essential… in the civil service, judiciary, police, and military," yet, rather quixotically, Lijphart deems specific quotas unnecessary and entrusts the security of such diffuse representation to an executive mandated commitment for general broad representation, rather than explicitly delimiting civil and security compositions within the constitution or other arrangements (Lijphart 106). In outlining the assumptions and recommendations of consociationalism, Lijphart's power-sharing theory situates the governance of divided societies within a top-down, elite focused model. Absent from Lijphart's discussion are constitutional protections for civil society, as evinced by his reliance on more general elite consensus for representation without specific constitutional enshrinement of civil protections. The absence of explicit issues of civil society and other bottom-up forms of governance becomes more problematic in the Burundian context as my analysis, in turning to the historical trends and geopolitical contexts of Burundi and Burkina Faso, will show how Burundi suffered from the overbearing presence of elites that was exacerbated and abetted by power-sharing arrangements.

Divergent Civil and Geopolitical Histories:

Before analyzing the failures of power-sharing in the Burundian context, I aim to frame my analysis at the outset by echoing Rene Lemarchand's prescient claim that "Burundi suffers from its inherited history," to which I append the claim that Burkina Faso was in some great way saved, or at the very least directly inspired, by their own history of civil unrest (Lemarchand 159). In historicizing their respective political developments that precede their current electoral moments, I wish to analyze Burundi's and Burkina Faso's histories through a political lens. In comparing their political histories, it becomes clear that there exists a legacy of civil society resilience and resistance against centralized and often

military imposed power consolidation in Burkina Faso, as evinced by consistent trade union mobilization and the symbolic currency of Thomas Sankara. Conversely, the acceptance of an intractable civil society force that remains outside of government patronage or military acquisition is absent in Burundi, which I contend is one factor for the absence of power sharing in Burkina Faso and why power-sharing became a last-ditch necessity in order to lessen the degree of ethnic violence and division in Burundi. On a general level, Burundi and Burkina Faso share much in the way of tumultuous and disruptive political histories. Burundi had the highest rate of assassination of government officials and heads of state of any African country, as well as suffered through the disruptions caused by internal ethnic violence and the surrounding geopolitical conditions of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Lemarchand 141). Similarly, since its independence, Burkina Faso has never witnessed a fully peaceful transition from one competitively elected regime to another, dealing with turbulent military coups and counter-coups and the dissolution of multiple governments (Englebert 43). An even greater similarity arises in the fact that both states have been defined, led, and thrown astray due to an entrenched militarism within basic state function, as both Burkina Faso and Burundi have retained top-down collusion between ethnically-driven military interest, security forces, and local police forces at various points in their institutional histories (Lemarchand 159; Englebert 43).

Despite these prima facie similarities, shocks, disruptions, and turbulences to consistent state building and democratization have produced divergent trends in their respective civil societies and state violence profiles. A chief catalyst for the absence of civil society power in Burundi is the oft-forgotten genocide of 1972, wherein a Tutsi-dominated army massacred 200,000 to 300,000 Hutus, leaving "virtually every educated Hutu element, down to secondary school students… either dead or in flight" (Lemarchand 136). The killings occurred in response to a Hutu-led insurgency that massacred hundreds to thousands of Tutsi civilians as a means of combating the growing Tutsi-hegemony within the army and state ranks (Lemarchand 134). The initial insurgency provided a strategic moment of unity between an internally divided Tutsi government that perpetrated genocide through its military, ruling party apparatus of Uprona, and other party affiliated youth groups (Lemarchand 135-137). The genocide ushered in an era of Tutsi state domination by eliminating a generation of potential Hutu elites, monopolizing security forces, and setting the presiding goal of every subsequent Tutsi-dominated government since independence: "to prevent a Rwanda-type revolution from happening" (Lemarchand 137-138). The genocide incited the rise of a respondent Hutu radicalism among exceedingly militarized parties and rebel groups that normalized state violence as the preferred method of control and response, setting the stage for the 1993 crisis that birthed the CNDD-FDD and set the stage for someone like Nkurunziza to rise and remain in power (Lemarchand 161).

In essence, from 1972 to 1993 "Burundi was the archetype of the counterrevolutionary state," while Burkina Faso, especially during the 1980s, could be labeled a revolutionary state in both the positive populist and more pejorative authoritarian sense (Lemarchand 135). Even though Burkina Faso has been plagued by the fact that "there has never been any social consensus on the state, much less on the form of government" since its independence, trade unions and civil society organizations have remained at the center of political discourse and action (Englebert 43; Chouli 325). In 1966, despite the disbanding of political parties, union leaders caused civil unrest and ushered in a military takeover that toppled the despotic First Republic (Chouli 325). When the purported transitional nature of military rule was shown to be a ruse, unions mobilized once more to demonstrate against Sangoule Lamizana's militaristic regime and forced the failure of National Renewal, pushing once more for a reinstatement of civilian rule (Englebert 47-49). When Thomas Sankara and Blaise Compaore came to power in the early 1980's, their platform was one centered explicitly on civil society, couching themselves in a rhetoric of pro-unionism, popular democracy, and the establishment of the Conseil de Salut de Peuple (CSP), an "army of the people" that sought to couch the military as true civic representatives (Englebert 54). Even as Sankara's regime devolved into further totalitarian practices, such as mandatory civilian patrols, repression of dissident voices, and use of raw violence, executions, and show trials, it could still not swallow the unions nor remove them through intense violence. Rather, Burkinabe civil actors proved themselves to be a resilient force, as they have done consistently since independence, which in turn highlights a spirit of unrest and resistance that revisionist popular histories now attribute to Sankara

himself (Englebert 59-60).

Without valorizing the totalitarian aspects of Thomas Sankara, it is necessary to show that Burkina Faso has nevertheless consistently retained a "tradition of struggle" between civil society and state that all subsequent governments have confronted since the toppling of the First Republic in 1966, and that arose in the Sankarism against Compaore (Chouli 325; Englebert 69; Hagberg 118). So endemic is civil society as an equivalent actor contra the state that it is said to dictate a militaristic pendulum swing between confrontation and cooperation that deeply roots its role as the legitimate site for political voice in Burkina Faso (Englebert 69). Executives, whether civil or military, have come to define their most central platforms around the issue of civil society, either intending to swallow it in its entirety or engage in clientelistic and cooperative arrangements with unions, informal alliances, and civic groups. In this, the executives use democracy as an empty and formal pretext for engaging in the type of bottom-up politics that is nonetheless ignored by formal power-sharing arrangements (Englebert 70).

Conversely, in the Burundian context, the construction of "a public oppositional space" that stretched fascia-like over the country was never established; the use of genocidal force that exterminated the overwhelming majority of potential Hutu elites from established politicians down to secondary school children severely stunted the possibility for any sort of civil society entity that could survive the turbulence of ethnic violence and military control without co-optation or collapse (Chouli 325; Lemarchand). The Tutsi often found their access to power through established state and military channels, while the surviving Hutu consolidated their counter-response in refugee camps and on state peripheries and margins through armed and increasingly radicalized rebel groups (Lemarchand 144-146). In toto, "national political histories matter" and in the case of Burundi, its political history has been one of genocide and the normalization of state violence, whereas Burkina Faso's has been explicitly defined by the resilience and constancy of an irrevocable civil society space (Daley and Popplewell 9; Chouli 325; Hagberg 118).

Consociationalism, Elite Socialization, Civil Society Blindness

Moving from broad politicized trends to more recent developments, it is now possible to see how the power-sharing arrangements of 1993 and 2005 in Burundi were insufficient for combating the state's long history of civil society repression by focusing solely on top-down elite relationships. Since both Burundi and Burkina Faso utilize presidential systems, and in turn retain the possibility for zero-sum executive exercises, it becomes clear that civil society potential is the key decisive factor in determining success or failure against autocratic executives.

Burundi's first experiment with power-sharing in 1993 was a key causal factor in the ensuing civil war that would plague the country until the election of Nkurunziza in 2006, as the peaceful transfer of power from former Tutsi President Buyoya to Hutu President Ndadaye ended in Ndadaye's assassination by a group of Tutsi soldiers looking to retain military control (Sullivan 77). Ndayaye attempted to set up a consociational government that granted Tutsi and Uprona members high legislative positions at the cost of reforming the Tutsi-dominated military forces (Sullivan 78). Ndadaye had satisfied the initial prerequisite for consociational democracy by establishing a grand elite coalition, bringing together key party members of both ethnic constituencies to the table for executive positions while at the same time invoking a "Frodebisation" effect at lower level governmental positions by circulating the spoils of victory to his Hutu Frodebu party members (Sullivan 86). Not only was this key to Ndadaye's assassination as it elicited massive public fear and anxiety amongst security forces who feared a "Frodebisation" of the military in the context of the burgeoning Rwandan genocide, but it also demonstrated the weakness of power-sharing arrangements in divided societies by highlighting how easy it is for ruling executives to reward their own constituents while at the same time occupying a position of broad representation. (Sullivan 87). Ndadaye's ability to practice consociationalism by adequately achieving parity at the executive level while simultaneously filling lower-level positions with Hutu party aligners points to a need for overt constitutional constraint on executive discretion over how broad representation can be achieved, something Lijphart states is irrelevant (Lijphart 106). Furthermore, it also demonstrates how power-sharing arrangements that ignore civil actors and mass sentiment fail to assuage civic unrest, as Ndadaye was assassinated for a potential re-alignment of military forces dictated by a trend in lower-level appointments despite over-representing the Tutsi community in actuality through

high-level executive positions, including that of prime minister (Lemarchand 208).

An arguably greater yet creeping instance of the negative consequences of elite-focused power-sharing is derived from Burundi's 2005 constitution. Lauded as a great success of the Arusha Accords, the 2005 constitution, coupled with a 2004 power-sharing agreement, has been championed for its capacity to ensure systematic ethnic balancing while simultaneously concretizing Tutsi minority power through a legislative veto (Cheeseman 209). Prior to Nkurunziza's successful bid for a third-term, , many political scientists painted Burundi as the model for consociational democratic success, going so far as to label Burundi's new arrangement as "the most inclusive political system ever realized in Africa" (Cheeseman 209). Burundi was initially deserving of this praise because at that time the constitution limited executives to pursue a maximum of two five-year terms, doubled the demographic weight of the Tutsi minority in the legislature, institutionalized ethnic parity in the military as well as the police and intelligence services, and on the whole reduced the costs of losing an election on ethnic grounds (Cheeseman 210; Vandeginste 625; Lemarchand 167-169).

Yet cracks and unforeseen consequences in both the practice of power-sharing and the early stages of Nkurunziza's tenure as president in the early 2000's points to a "dark-side of power-sharing" in the Burundian context that is now inarguable in the wake of the 2015 electoral crisis (Vandeginste 634). Stef Vandeginste points to the creation of a new incentive structure for elites in Burundi that does away with a focus on ethnic parity and instead places focus on placating factions based on government appointments and the rewarding of party, and not ethnic, allegiance (Vandeginste 634). Vandeginste goes on to argue that elites view stability, and thus peace, as "the equilibrium in the allocation of power, state resources, and privileges," leading to an intense aversion from inherently destabilizing elections (Vandeginste 634). In turn, Burundian elites have been socialized by repeated power-sharing experiences to utilize neopatrimonial and party politics channels as means of legitimating themselves and substantiating power, leaving civil actors to be ignored or marginalized (Vandeginste 635). Incumbent Pierre Nkurunziza is a prime example of elite socialization Nkurunziza came to power by party appointment during Burundi's first post-conflict election, with the party victory of the Conseil national pour la defense de la démocratie—Forces pour la defense de la démocratie (CNDD-FDD), a Hutu radical offshoot from Frodebu. Per Article 302 of the post-conflict constitution, "the first post-transition president shall be indirectly elected by the national assembly and the senate," with Nkurunziza being initially well-received due to his platform of ethnic reconciliation, political stability, and policy focus on improving general quality of life for all Burundians (Vandeginste 626; Lemarchand 171). Within the first two years of his rule, however, human rights violations conducted under the false pretense of crushing potential coups became endemic, perpetrated by state security, intelligence, and police forces operating along older rebel lines: "the integration of former CNDD-FDD rebels into the police, the FDN, and the security apparatus has produced a symbiosis of sorts between the party and instruments of force" (Lemarchand 178). The state as such became solely the CNDD-FDD, as the party began to intervene in all aspects of state affairs pointing to a breakdown of the grand coalition principle at the heart of power-sharing. This deterioration of power-sharing was exacerbated by a machine politics of endemic neopatrominalism that further disabled civil society potentials, either through incorporation into the party structure, the shutting down of major media and radio outlets, or the leveling of false plot accusations that would lead to torture, disappearances, or executions (Human Rights Watch).

Despite the fact that Burundi retains a variety of power-sharing mechanisms that should limit what is outlined above, consociationalism does little to constitutionally check power locality when presidentialism or semipresidentialism couples with proportional representation (Cheeseman 212). Though Lijphart accounts for this, even going so far as to say that "semi-presidential systems actually make it possible for the president to be even more powerful than in most pure presidential systems," consociational agreements such as the once universally praised one in Burundi still face a blaring weakness due to a theoretical ignorance of civil society actors, typified by constitutional blindness or ambiguity to textually check executive discretion and an overall focus on organizing governance based on elite cooperation (Lijphart 102). In countries such as Burundi, where civil society power has long been oppressed, power-sharing arrangements continue to pamper executives and elites while undermining grassroots movements. The counter example of Burkina

Faso, wherein a heavily militarized, presidentialist-cum-autocratic system nonetheless fell to a long-running history of civic activism leads as much to an optimism for the power of protest as to pessimism for consociationalism to adequately ensure peace-building in systems without empowered civil societies.

In sum, my analysis has set forth to argue two interwoven claims. The first argument has to do with Burundi's own post-independence history, set against a comparative backdrop to Burkina Faso's history, one marked by episodes of intense ethnic violence and genocide as well as the unstable geopolitics of its Great Lakes neighbors. I argue that the development of a consistent realm of revolutionary or reactive civil society was arrested by conflict as well as co-opted by heavily-militarized groups, which purposefully suppressed Burundian civil actors from ever developing a fortified sector of resistance against their government in times of crackdown or autocracy. With this established history, my second argument pushes against the merits of power-sharing, otherwise referred to as consociationalism, in general, and especially in the case of Burundi. I claim that repeated power-sharing arrangements and exercises in Burundi privileged elite stability as the working definition for peace at the expense of civil society, as a top-down peace-building model missed the opportunity to finally instantiate those most affected by conflict, namely civilians and civic opinion, into political life and in turn abetted the further consolidation of power within the hands of elites. In bringing Burkina Faso's divergent political history to the fore, it is my intention to show how a state rocked by similar levels of conflict, instability, and top-down executive disavowal for constitutional integrity can nonetheless retain a powerful and robust civil arena separate from co-optation by the state. In making this comparison, I claim that power-sharing arrangements, such as those implemented in Burundi, arrest the development of bottom-up civil resistance and strength in post-conflict settings, and instead ensure that elites can continuously be rewarded and entrenched in power, while previously excluded civil actors continue to be absent from the table.

Works Cited

Cheeseman, Nic. Democracy in Africa: Successes, Failures, and the Struggle for Political Reform. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015.

Chouli, Lila. "The popular uprising in Burkina Faso and the Transition." Review of African Political Economy 42.144 (2015): 325-333

Daley, Patricia and Rowan Popplewell. "The Appeal of Third Termism and Militarism in Burundi." Review of African Political Economy (2016): 1-10.

Englebert, Pierre. Burkina Faso: Unsteady Statehood in West Africa. Colorado: Westview Press, 1996.

European Commission, Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection. "ECHO Factsheet—Burundi Refugee Crisis." 2016

Hagberg, Sten. "Thousands of New Sankaras": Resistance and Struggle in Burkina Faso." Africa Spectrum 50.3 (2015): 109-121.

Human Rights Watch. "Burundi's Human Rights Crisis." 2016.

Lemarchand, René. The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006.

Lijphart, Arend. "Constitutional Design for Divided Societies." Journal of Democracy 15.2 (2004): 96-109.

Sullivan, Daniel P. "The Missing Pillars: A Look at the Failure of Peace in Burundi through the Lens of Arend Lijphart's Theory of Consociational Democracy." The Journal of Modern African Studies 43.1 (2005): 75-95.

Vandeginste, Stef. "Briefing: Burundi's Electoral Crisis—Back to Power-Sharing Politics As Usual?" African Affairs 114.457 (2015): 624-636.

Yarwood, Janette. "The Power of Protest. Journal of Democracy 27.3 (2016): 51-60.

Evolving Social Norms,

Disincentivized Families, and the Persisting Gender Gap in Education

Eveleyn Wideman
Class of 2017

INTRODUCTION

As the old adage goes, "Educate a man, and you educate an individual; educate a woman, and you educate a whole nation." Education is one of the single most effective investments for developing countries, and female education in particular creates effects far beyond the economic prosperity of the educated individual. As the role of primary caregiver remains predominantly filled by women across the world, the educational opportunities available to girls results in better-educated mothers having fewer but healthier children who will also go on to attain higher levels of education. Thus, the education of girls today is doubly important for a nation's prosperity tomorrow.

Despite international efforts toward realizing gender equality in education, such as the UN's Millennium Development Goals, Sub-Saharan Africa still lags behind other developing regions in school enrollment gender parity indices. The region has consequently felt the impact of this gender gap—slower economic growth, higher fertility and infant mortality rates, shorter life expectancy, and fewer educational opportunities for the next generation. To understand the phenomenon of the gender gap, it is critical to first consider the factors that inhibit girls from attending and finishing school—such as traditional norms and expectations for women as well as the incentives faced by families when choosing to allocate funding toward their children's education.

This global issue can be framed with political economic theory and analyzed as a collective-action problem (CAP). Previous research asserts that countries with large Muslim populations have significantly larger gender gaps in education and the accompanying adverse economic effects. While many researchers have attempted to rationalize how religion can affect female education opportunities, this paper aims to distinguish between embedded social norms and broader religious practices. Using political economic theory and game-theoretic modeling, this paper will frame persisting education gender inequality as a positive externality good with underlying social norms, social sanctions, and disincentives for families' education investments. Employing panel data from the World Bank and World Values Survey, the empirical analysis section will test the hypothesis that social norms play a significant role in perpetuating the gender gap in education and its resulting suboptimal economic effects.

BACKGROUND

Reducing gender inequality in education is a crucial component of economic development. Primary education has been shown to have the highest rate of return on investment for developing economies; more specifically the rate of return for women's education is higher than that of men (Psacharopoulos, 1994). Educating girls not only translates to increases in human capital and economic growth, but also creates future benefits for educated mothers. Maternal education is linked to lower fertility and infant mortality rates, better health and education of children, and increased life expectancy (Norton and Tomal, 2009). Considering both the direct effects on current economic growth as well as these positive lagged effects resulting from increases to the next generation's human capital, gender equality in education should be an international priority.

Key human development indicators that are correlated with female education quantify the impact that maternal education has on future generations. In a cross-sectional study of Sub-Saharan African countries, Browne and Barrett (1991) find a -0.627 correlation coefficient between infant mortality and female literacy as well as -0.677 correlation coefficient between under-5 mortality and female literacy, both values being significant at the 99 percent level. Furthermore, Browne and Barrett find a 0.734 correlation coefficient between female literacy and child immunization uptake rate, also significant at the 99 percent level. Hill and King (1995) find that a 10 percent increase in the female primary enrollment

rate corresponds with a reduction of 4.1 deaths per 1000 lives births in the infant mortality rate while a 10 percent increase in the female secondary enrollment rate corresponds with a reduction of 5.6 deaths per 1000 live births in infant mortality. Examining fourteen Sub-Saharan African countries, Ainsworth, Beegle, and Nyamete (1996) find that the higher the education level of a couple, the lower their fertility rate. However, isolating the mother's educational attainment proves to have a significantly larger negative effect on fertility than the schooling of the father. Together these studies support that better-educated women are more likely to make use of contraception and modern preventative health services, and thus ultimately raise healthier children with greater economic potential.

Moreover, a lack of female education opportunities can have grave implications for not just the wellbeing of a country's next generation but also its economy. Hill and King (1995) find countries with female-to-male enrollment ratios less than 0.75 to have roughly 25 percent lower GNP levels, holding constant female educational level, size of labor force, and capital stock. Research conducted by Klasen (2002) supports that improvement in educational gender equality has a significantly positive impact on economic growth, but further asserts that the magnitude of this effect is significantly higher in Sub-Saharan Africa relative to other regions. Klasen rationalizes these findings by proposing that Africa's agrarian economies suffer significantly more from undereducated female populations because women play such a pivotal role in African farming. Various World Bank studies affirm that educated farmers are, not surprisingly, more productive farmers. Thus the heavily agriculture-based economies of Sub-Saharan African countries would realize substantial gains from improving the education opportunities available to their largest demographic of farmers—women.

Promoting gender equality and empowering women have been key focal points for the agendas of many international organizations; the United Nations addressed both of these initiatives in their third Millennium Development Goal established in 2000. From UNICEF to the White House's Let Girls Learn initiative, countless international organizations fight for progress in female education. Despite these initiatives, Sub-Saharan Africa has lagged behind other developing areas in reaching gender parity in education, and women in Africa remain the most undereducated in the world (Shabaya and Konadu-Agyemang, 2004). Historically, African women have experienced the lowest average annual increase in total years of schooling. Between 1960 and 1990, the average years of schooling for African women increased by a mere 1.2 years, which equates to a 0.04 per year increase over the thirty-year period (Klasen, 2002). As of 2013, enrollment ratios in Chad and the Central African Republic had flat-lined at less than 70 girls per 100 boys while in Niger the rate remains even lower at 41 girls per 100 boys. In total, fourteen Sub-Saharan African countries had fewer than 90 girls per 100 boys at school (The Economist, 2013). While this number suggests near parity in some countries, the statistics pale in comparison to countries like Sweden and India where 110 and 106 girls respectively per 100 boys were enrolled in school (World Bank, 2014).

Considering the heavily documented benefits of female education, the persistence of the education gender gap in Sub-Saharan Africa clearly has adverse implications for human development and economic growth. As President Barack Obama stated at the United States of Women Summit in June 2016, educating girls is an issue of national security. Societies that inhibit half the population from gaining an education and joining the workforce are more likely to experience instability, violence, and terrorism in the long run in addition to slower economic growth. Thus, gender equality in education has become an increasingly high priority for foreign policy and international organizations over the past two decades. However, to better understand how to address the problem and incite positive change, it is critical to first identify its root causes.

Previous economic literature on the education gender gap has examined the relationships between culture, religion, and female education. Norton and Tomal (2009) analyze cross-sectional data on 97 countries from an earlier study by Barro and Lee (1993) to investigate the link between major religions and female educational attainment. Their study reports Buddhism, Protestantism, and nonreligious factors have no significant effect on female education; Catholic, Orthodox, and Hindu affiliations have negative effects on female secondary educational attainment; and ethnoreligions and Islam have significantly negative effects on female educational attainment at every level. In a similar study, Daun (2000) categorizes Sub-Saharan African countries by economic level, percentage of Christians, percentage of Muslims, and type of state (growth-oriented, equality-oriented, other). He finds strongly Muslim countries to have significantly lower female school enrollment rates in

every economic category in every type of state relative to strongly Christian countries.

While the cited research supports a link between Islam and lower female educational attainment, Cooray and Potrafke (2010) investigate whether religion and culture or rather political institutions truly underlie gender inequality in education. Their study examines 2006 data on 157 countries, finding Islam to have a significant negative effect while democracy has no effect. As these results further support, democratic political institutions may have no effect on gender parity in education, but the relevant economic research consistently supports that there is a negative relationship between the prevalence of Islam and gender equality in education.

Previous literature might assert the significant role that religion plays in the education gender gap, but political economic theory provides a framework to further analyze its root causes. Elements of political economy as well as game-theoretic modeling can help deconstruct the education gender gap and provide insight on its complexities. As outlined in the following section, the dynamics of positive externality goods and social norms interacting with first- and second-order collective-action problems help frame the phenomenon of education gender inequality.

POLITICAL ECONOMIC THEORY

Educational gender inequality in Africa is an undeniably complex problem; religious beliefs, child labor, rural location, as well as other factors are all likely to aggravate its pervasiveness. While previous literature has found countries with certain religions—particularly Islam—to have significantly lower female enrollment rates (Daun, 2000; Norton and Tomal, 2009), there is little research to confirm whether or not social norms that oppress women lie at the heart of the problem. Cooray and Potrafke (2010) assert that culture and religion play a larger role in gender inequality in education than formal political institutions. However, as political economic theory would suggest, informal institutions can play fundamental roles in creating and/or resolving suboptimal economic conditions. The application of political economic theory and game-theoretic models can help explain the economic as well as social aspects of gender inequality in education and distinguish social norms from broader belief systems like organized religion.

Gender inequality in education can be modeled as a collective-action problem because the female enrollment rate is lower than the socially optimal outcome—full or nearly full enrollment, or at least parity with the male rate. In the most general sense a collective-action problem occurs when there is a disparity between the interests of the rational individual and the wellbeing of society as it pertains to the allocation of a resource. Considering that female education has many positive externalities for society, low female enrollment rates are first-order CAPs because they deal directly with the underproduction of a resource—in this case female education.

From a theoretical perspective, resolution of the education gender gap as a first-order CAP requires a firm understanding of the second-order CAPs[1] surrounding it. Traditional attitudes perpetuating the limited rights and abilities of women still persist in many cultures and serve as a bedrock for this first-order CAP. This informal institution, social norms deterring female education, also generates a large obstacle to realizing gender parity in enrollment rates[2] through effective coordination and enforcement of arrangements to solve the problem. Even if a formal institution like the national government tried to enforce the equal enrollment of boys and girls in school, families might still be incentivized to violate any legislation put in place and prioritize the allocation of school funds for their sons. Moreover, the expectation that other families will neglect their daughters' education only further discourages a family—acting as a reciprocal player in the marriage pool—from investing in their own daughter's education.

Before analyzing the second-order CAPs surrounding gender inequality in education, it is necessary to first consider the driving factors of the first-order CAP, namely social norms. One interpretation of traditional norms or attitudes suggests that girls are meant to work in the home, get married off at a young age and have children, and/or simply should not be given as many freedoms as boys. While many cultures have adopted much more progressive ideologies over the past century, these attitudes still persist in parts of the world and are often associated with more conservative religious beliefs, like those of Muslims. These attitudes and their resulting behaviors, such as parents failing to allocate funds for, discouraging, or forbidding their daughter's education, can be considered one type of informal institution.

Ferguson describes informal institutions are "expected, mutually understood, and context-dependent behavioral prescriptions that emerge from repeated social interactions, rather than from formally designated deliberation" (2013, p. 166). Where these traditional

attitudes regarding female education still persist, it is mutually understood and expected that a girl's place is in the home. Filling her role as a bride and mother does not demand the costly investment in her education. However, there are likely no formal rules in place that actively forbid families from enrolling their daughters in school. Framing these attitudes as an informal institution explains how they systematically influence societal outcomes.

Within the typology of informal institutions, gender inequality in education can be attributed to a typical social norm. The syntax of institutions developed by Crawford and Ostrom (2005) explains this categorization through the ADICO framework, which identifies five components of institutional prescriptions: attributes (A), deontics (D), aims (I), condition (C), and or-else (O) (Ferguson, 2013, p. 168). With regard to female education, traditional attitudes assert that children (A) are not permitted or entitled to (D) attend school and pursue an education (I) if they are girls (C). There is not an or-else (O) component of the prescription because there would not usually be specified consequences and specified enforcers to apply sanctions. While the applicable ADIC components illustrate how educational gender inequality corresponds to the typical social norm category, the role of social sanctioning and internalization reasserts this typology.

A typical social norm relies on internalization as well as social enforcement, that is A) people believe in the norm (have internalized it) so they will follow it even without others watching and B) if someone breaches the norm, those around them would impose a social sanction (Ferguson, 2013, p. 167). Pertaining to female education, some families may choose not to send their daughter to school regardless of whether or not there are neighbors nearby to observe their choice (internalization). On the other hand, for families who are considering educating their daughter, observers might look down upon or ostracize (social sanctioning) the family for allowing their daughter such a freedom or express that they are foolish to invest their money in her education, thereby altering the family's decision.

It is critical to note that this is only one interpretation of gender discrimination in education. Different communities might experience iterations of this informal institution. In some extremely conservative communities or in the past, the education gender gap could be attributed to a rationality-limiting norm[3] because educating girls was completely out of the question. However, globalization makes it increasingly unlikely that a community would be unaware that female education is at least a viable possibility.

Ferguson (2013) proposes that as informal institutions endure and acquire broader compliance mechanisms, they can shift from a loose coordinating convention[4] to a socially enforced convention, to a typical social norm, and possibly all the way to a rationality-limiting norm. In the case of traditional attitudes about female education, this paper proposes that norms can actually shift the opposite way along the spectrum, as illustrated by Process 2 in Figure 1. At one point the idea of educating women was not even considered. However, in various times and places since then people have actually considered the feasibility of female education. Yet, that consideration was met by internal conflict for not abiding by the internalized norm as well as by disapproval from others who have internalized the norm (social sanctioning).

On a global scale, traditional attitudes discouraging female education are quite likely to eventually shift to a socially enforced convention—upheld only through social sanctions and no longer internalized by anyone—before completely phasing out. This norm would not shift to a coordinating convention, but its antithesis of educating girls and boys equally could become its own coordinating convention. Thereafter gender equality in education could shift along the spectrum toward a rationality-limiting norm (Process 1 in Figure 1), which would ultimately completely invert the original social norm. Arguably, in places like Sweden and Belgium where the number of girls enrolled in school per boy enrolled is greater than or equal to 1.10, this norm reversal has already taken place.

Figure 1.



Returning to the framing of the persisting education gender gap as a typical social norm, upheld through internalization and social sanctions, merits discussion of identity. As described by Ferguson (2013), people often identify with the behaviors prescribed by norms that they have internalized. When they abide by norm-prescribed behavior, they are also abiding by their own conceptions of appropriate behavior and thus

affirming their identity. Interaction between individuals with distinctly different identities can either support or challenge their identity concepts (Ferguson, 2013, p. 191-193). Identity can be better understood with the two following functions. First, here is a more expansive utility function:

$$u_i = u_i(a_i, a_{-i}, I_i) = u_i(a_i(\pi, I_i), a_{-i}(\pi, I_{-i});\ I_i)$$

As the function illustrates, agent i's utility is dependent upon their own actions, the actions of relevant others, and their own identity. Actions undertaken by both agent i and relevant others take into account both material payoffs (ϖ) as well as identity payoffs (I_i and I_{-i}). Identity payoffs are further dependent upon whether or not actions are consistent with the individual's identity concept. The second equation better illustrates the determinants of identity payoffs:

$$I_i = I_i(a_i, a_{-i}, C_i, \varepsilon_i, \Psi)$$

As previously stated, identity payoffs are largely dependent upon the actions of both agent i and other relevant individuals. C_i represents agent i's conception of social categories that they and relevant others fall into. ε_i represents agent i's personal characteristics and Ψ represents applicable social norms.

In the case of female education in a male-dominant society, there are resulting negative identity externalities. Where strict gender roles prevail, norms prescribe that boys exclusively pursue education and girls remain in the home (housekeeping). Thus if a girl enrolls in school, she is theoretically threatening the identity of boys as well as experiencing an identity loss for not abiding by the internalized norm.

Shabaya and Konadu-Agyemang (2004) theorize that European colonists brought Victorian-era values about girls to Africa, only further reinforcing the preexisting African values that designated gender roles. Girls were expected not to participate in certain activities, especially those that might enlighten them and encourage them to challenge male dominance and hegemony (Shabaya and Konadu-Agyemang, 2004, p. 414-415). Consequently, female education was generally frowned upon with the exception of the elite class. Patriarchal societies shaped their education opportunities to cater to boys, which further discouraged parents from investing money in their daughters' education when they would be married off into another family and provide no return on investment for their birth family.

Returning to the idea of negative identity externalities[5] resulting from female education, Figure 2 illustrates the interaction between genders as they navigate the allocation of education. Assume that there are two players: boys and girls. While this example is significantly simplified, the interactions between genders aggregate to form macro-level outcomes. There are two available strategies: enrolling in school and staying home to work in the household. There are two identities: the male identity, which prescribes exclusively boys to enroll in school, and the female identity, which prescribes girls to stay at home. Both boys and girls prefer enrolling in school (payoff X), but girls experience a slight identity loss when they go against the prescribed norm of staying home (I_G) and boys, experiences an identity loss when girls enroll in school (I_B). If the girl chooses to enroll in school, the boy has the option to impose some kind of social sanction on the girl at a cost c, resulting in loss of –p for the girl.

Figure 2.



As illustrated in Figure 2, the equilibrium outcome will depend on the relative values of the original payoff from enrolling, the identity losses to both boy and girl when the girl enrolls, the cost of social sanctioning inflicted on the girl for enrolling, and the cost of sanctioning incurred by the boy. If $c_p < I_g$ and $I_b < X < I_g + p$, the boy would sanction so strongly that the girl chooses to stay home $c_p < I_g$ (scenario i). If and $I_b + p < X$, the boy would sanction but it is not strong enough to deter the girl from enrolling (scenario ii). If $c_p > I_g$ and $I_b < X$, the boy would not sanction and

the girl would enroll (scenario iii). If $I_i > X$, the girl has internalized the norm so strongly that she always chooses to stay home regardless of the boy's incentives (scenario iv). Large education gender gaps in Sub-Saharan African countries suggest that either scenario i or iv is occurring. It is not important that the figure provides more than one possible equilibrium because as a typical social norm suggests, internalization and social sanctioning need not apply equally to every agent for the norm to influence aggregate societal outcomes. For those who have fully internalized that girls should stay in the home, scenario iv occurs. For those who are influenced by social sanctions, scenario i occurs. Regardless, girls do not enroll and gender inequality in education persists.

To better understand the role of social sanctions and internalized norms, it is critical to provide a brief background on the origins and influences of power in communities with large education gender gaps. This essay defines power as the ability of an individual to influence another to take an action that they would not otherwise do, via the use of sanctions[6] or manipulation (Ferguson, 2013, p. 66). Pertaining to gender inequality in education, a male-dominant society executes power over girls by influencing them to stay at home rather than pursue a more rewarding education. As described by Ferguson (2013, pp. 69-73), power can be embodied in three distinct domains: 1) behavior, 2) rules and expectations, and 3) manipulation of inclinations, preferences, and beliefs. Utilizing well-understood and observable sanctions, a player with access to the sources of power[7] can influence the outcome of the situation. As described by Basu (2000), straightforward sanctions (Power1) can be considered either condign power (winning submission through a threat of punishment) or compensatory power (submission through offering rewards) (p. 134). A male-dominant society uses condign power through the use of social sanctions—shunning, disapproval, etc.—if a girl or her parents enroll her in school (Power1) and the threat of social sanctions (Power2).

The third domain of power, beliefs and preferences, also plays a pivotal role in the persistence of the education gender gap. As described by Ferguson, Power3 influences outcomes by altering either immediate preferences, conceptions of appropriateness of action, deep-seated beliefs concerning one's ability to influence, or beliefs concerning how to affect change (2013, p. 72). Internalization of a social norm suggests the use of Power3 for its ability to influence immediate preferences. When a girl identifies with her prescribed gender role, she feels some positive feedback for acting in such a way that reaffirms her identity. Thus, the patriarchal society has conditioned her to accept and even prefer her suboptimal outcome. This scenario can be considered an example of conditioned power, when "the oppressed are so habituated to their situation that they are unaware of being oppressed" (Basu, 2000, p. 134). Ultimately, the typical social norm that perpetuates gender inequality in education relies on male-dominant society's use of Power1 (social sanctions), Power2 (threat of social sanction), and Power3 (manipulation of preferences to internalize oppressive gender roles).

Just as political economic theory can be applied to the micro foundations of gender inequality in education at the level of interaction between individual girls and boys, theory can provide a helpful framework for understanding the role that the family unit plays in perpetuating low female enrollment rates. This applied theory also provides valuable insight on the second-order CAP surrounding the education gender gap, namely families disregarding any formal legislation on gender equality in school enrollment.

Consider a societal structure where families presume that when their daughter gets married she becomes a member of her husband's household and all income she earns goes toward her husband's family's household. Conversely, when the family's son gets married his wife becomes a member of their household and all income she earns goes toward their own family. If both families invest the money to educate their daughters, both will realize larger household incomes in the future when their children are married and their educated daughters earn more money than they would have otherwise. Evidently, the future household incomes of families with both daughters and sons are interdependent because the birth family's investment in female education affects the family that the girl marries into. Ferguson's (2013) two-player strategic reciprocity model[8] can provide valuable insight on this scenario. Consider the following utility function for a family:

$$u_i = -c_i + \alpha \sum_{j=1}^{N} c_j + z_s\beta - z_o\psi$$

In the above equation c represents the cost of contribution or in this case the cost of educating the daughter. The second term represents the marginal return from contribution with the assumption that $\alpha<1$[9]. z_s is

the proportion of families who take the same action as family i, while z_o is the proportion of families who take the opposite action. $z_s\beta$ is the positive feeling from acting in a reciprocal manner, that is either both contributing (investing in daughter's education) or both defecting (not investing). $z_o\psi$ is the negative feeling realized from non-reciprocal actions.

Refer to Figure 3 for a representation of two-player simultaneous[10] strategic reciprocity. So long as $\beta + \psi \geq c(1-\alpha)$, there is a game of assurance with Nash equilibria where either both families invest or both families do not invest. Since female education has not historically been the common practice, a family will have little trust in their opponent's credibility in cooperating and educating their own daughter. Thus, where gender inequality in education persists, it can be argued that the currently realized Nash equilibrium is the suboptimal outcome where both families do not invest. It is critical to note that this is just one interpretation for how reciprocity can inform a family's choice to allocate funds for their daughter's education. It can be argued that some families might be motivated to punish others, via social sanctioning, who do not educate their daughters or would experience shame and/or guilt if they did not educate their daughter. There is clearly vast variation between different families situated in different cultures at different points it time, and the role of reciprocity certainly informs their payoffs and choices in different ways.

Figure 3.

		Family B	
		Invest	**Don't Invest**
Family A	**Invest**	$(2\alpha-1)c+\beta, (2\alpha-1)c+\beta$	$(\alpha-1)c-\psi, \alpha c-\psi$
	Don't Invest	$\alpha c-\psi, (\alpha-1)c-\psi$	β, β

Applying political economic theory to the societal problem of gender inequality in education demonstrates that social norms—of varying degrees of societal embeddedness, in different parts of the world and different points in time—perpetuate gender roles designating girls to remain in the home and boys to pursue education. The male-dominant society utilizes different sources of power to impose or threaten social sanctions for deviating behaviors and even alter individuals' preferences to abide by the status quo despite the socially optimal outcome would be gender parity in education. This framework can illustrate how to address the problem and move towards positive change. First however, an analysis of real-world data will determine whether or not political economic theory in fact correctly represents the issues and forces at play.

DATA AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

As discussed in the background section of this paper, there has been ample research examining the driving factors of the persisting gender gap in education. While previous studies assert that culture, religion, and more specifically Islam have negative effects on female educational attainment in relation to the attainment of their male counterparts, little work has been done to distinguish between the effect of broad religious practices and the effect of specific oppressive social norms. This paper aims to isolate the effects of a society's social norms regarding the rights and responsibilities of women from other societal characteristics—most purposely from the prevalence of Islam in a country.

Using panel data from the World Bank, World Values Survey, Pew Research Center, and Economist Intelligence Unit, this paper will examine the effect of social norms on gender parity in education—holding constant influential variables such as urban population, gross domestic product per capita, unemployment rate, and prevalence of Islam. Refer to Table 1 for a complete list of this study's independent variables, their designated symbols for the regression equations, and brief explanations for how each was calculated.

Table 1.

STATISTIC	SYMBOL	CALCULATION
Education Gender Parity Index	GPI	# of girls enrolled in primary and secondary school for every boy enrolled
Social Norm Agreement	SN	% of those surveyed that agree with statement on men's right to scarce jobs
Urban Population (% of total)	UP	Urban population as a percentage of total population
GDP per capita	G	GDP divided by total population
Unemployment Rate	UE	Percentage of labor force that is unemployed but actively seeking employment and willing to work
Muslim-dominant country	M	Dummy variable; if Muslim percentage of total population >/= 70
Democracy	D	Dummy variable; if country scores >/= 6.0 on Democracy Index
African country	A	Dummy variable; if country is within African continent

The World Bank's gender parity index for primary and secondary school enrollment will be employed as a proxy for gender equality in education and thus serve as the

dependent variable. As presented in the basic regression model below, this paper proposes that the gender parity index is a function of the strength of traditional social norms regarding the rights and responsibilities of women, urban population as a percentage of total population, GDP per capita, and unemployment rate—with dummy variables in place to account for the basic differences between Muslim-dominant countries, democratic countries, and African countries:

$$GPI_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1(SN_{it}) + \beta_3(UP_{it}) + \beta_4(G_{it}) + \beta_5(UE_{it}) + \beta_6(M_{it}) + \beta_7(D_{it}) + \beta_8(A_{it}) + \varepsilon_{it}$$

The regression will employ panel data; more specifically a singular observation is one country in a specific year. The dataset includes 144 observations spanning 78 countries over four years. The years observed align with the waves of the World Values Survey—1994, 1999, 2004, and 2014. Before analyzing the outcomes from this regression, it is critical to first establish a basic rationale for why each variable is included, how each is measured, and what predicted relationship each will have with the dependent variable.

First, to consider the independent variable of foremost interest in the study: social norms. While there is no agreed upon measure for the pervasiveness of social norms in different countries, the World Values Survey (WVS) examines various aspects of societies' values and beliefs that provide valuable insight on the perception of gender roles and gender equality. One such WVS survey question employed over four waves of the global research project is the agree/disagree statement, "When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women." While this is an imperfect measure of social norms regarding a woman's role in a society, the statement serves as an effective proxy. If oppressive social norms influence families to value the education of their sons greater than that of their daughters, it is reasonable to expect that within the same society people would value the employment of men greater than the employment of women. Thus, countries that show strong levels of agreement with the statement "When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women" would be expected to show strong levels of agreement with the traditional social norms relevant to this study.

To better understand the WVS data for this social norms proxy, refer to Figure 4. The histogram presents the proportion of individuals surveyed in each country/year observation that agree with the statement about male entitlement to work when jobs are scarce. As the figure illustrates, the recorded magnitude of agreement ranges from 2 percent (Sweden in 2014) to nearly 90 percent (Egypt in 2004) with a median level of agreement at 37 percent. With regard to the regression model presented above, this paper predicts that agreement with traditional social norms will have an inverse relationship with the education gender parity index.

Figure 4.



The next three independent variables—urban population, GDP per capita, and unemployment rate—have their data sourced from the World Bank. As summarized in Table 2, urban population (as a percentage of total population) and GDP per capita are both predicted to have positive relationships with education gender parity. As a country becomes more urban, it will become easier for the average girl to attend school because her commute is shorter and she likely has fewer household chores to balance her education with than she would in a rural household. As a country's GDP per capita increases, the average household's ability to allocate funding to their children's education increases. Conversely, unemployment rate is predicted to have an inverse relationship with education gender parity. This variable serves two purposes: to account for 1) noise created by the social norms proxy that frames gender equality in terms of job scarcity and 2) the demand of chores the average child must complete to contribute to their household's income in the informal economy—if their parents cannot find employment and must instead resort to subsistence farming or other informal work.

Table 2.

VARIABLE	+/-	JUSTIFICATION
Education Gender Parity Index	DV	Dependent variable.
Social Norm Agreement	-	The more prevalent the social norm, the less accessible education will be for girls.
Urban Population (% of total)	+	The more urban a country is, the easier it is for children (especially girls) to commute to school and they have fewer household chores.
GDP per capita	+	The wealthier the average family, the more funding they can allocate toward their children's education regardless of gender.
Unemployment Rate	-	The higher the unemployment rate, the more chores the average child will have to contribute to their household's income in the informal economy; accounts for noise that might occur in social norm proxy because variable pertains to job scarcity.
Muslim-dominant country	-	The more prevalent Islam is, the more internalized traditional social norms will be. Predicted to be less significant that social norms proxy variable.
Democracy	+	Democratic countries will have more gender equality, including in education.
African country	-	African countries lag behind other regions in education enrollment and more specifically female education enrollment.

The regression includes three dummy variables: Muslim-dominant country, democratic country, and African country. Countries were classified as Muslim-dominant if the Muslim population was greater than or equal to 70 percent of the total population, as reported by Pew Research Center (2011). As supported by previous research, the dominance of Islam is predicted to have an inverse relationship with education gender parity. However, this paper predicts that the social norms proxy variable will have a more significant inverse relationship with the dependent variable than the Muslim-dominant dummy variable. The second dummy variable, democratic country, was applied to all observations that scored 6.0 or above on the Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index[11]. Democratic countries are predicted to have greater gender parity in education because democracy facilitates equality in many different realms. The third dummy variable, African country, was straightforwardly applied to all countries located on the African continent. As Klasen (2002) and other previous research asserts, African countries do not always follow neatly with trends observed in other regions. Thus, it is best to proactively account for quirks that may differentiate this region. The African country variable is predicted to have an inverse relationship with education gender parity because the region has historically lagged behind other developing areas in education gender equality. Table 3 provides descriptive data for the eight variables introduced in Table 1.

Table 3.

VARIABLE	N	MEAN	SD	MIN	MAX
Education Gender Parity Index	144	0.99	0.06	0.74	1.15
In Agreement with Norm (%)	144	39.35	19.20	2.00	89.60
Urban Population (% of Total)	144	64.74	19.92	12.76	100.00
GDP per capita	144	10516.31	15035.07	161.01	96732.53
Unemployment Rate (% of Labor Force)	144	9.66	6.48	0.90	37.20
African Country	144	Dummy		0	1
Muslim-Dominant Country	144	Dummy		0	1
Democratic Country	144	Dummy		0	1

After establishing a firm understanding of each variable included and rationalizing predictions for how each relates to the education gender parity index, it is appropriate to test this paper's hypothesis by running a regression and analyzing results. The first two regressions tested are ordinary least squares (OLS) models. Both include all seven of the independent variables presented above, but the second regression also includes dummy variables for the years 1999, 2004, and 2014 (1994 serves as the base year). The coefficients for the year dummy variables are all expected to be positive because gender parity is expected to improve over time. Both regressions adapt GDP per capita by taking the natural log of the variable to make the regression coefficient more meaningful and generalizable—showing proportional change rather than a simple dollar amount. Refer to the following equations for the OLS models tested, Regression 2 including additional dummy variables for years.

Regression 1:

$$GPI_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1(SN_{it}) + \beta_3(UP_{it}) + \beta_4(\ln(G_{it})) + \beta_5(UE_{it}) + \beta_6(M_{it}) + \beta_7(D_{it}) + \beta_8(A_{it}) + \varepsilon_{it}$$

Regression 2:

$$GPI_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1(SN_{it}) + \beta_3(UP_{it}) + \beta_4(\ln(G_{it})) + \beta_5(UE_{it}) + \beta_6(M_{it}) + \beta_7(D_{it}) + \beta_8(A_{it}) + \beta_9(Y_{it}^{1999}) + \beta_{10}(Y_{it}^{2004}) + \beta_{11}(Y_{it}^{2014}) + \varepsilon_{it}$$

Refer to Table 4 for regression coefficients and p-values for OLS models Regression 1 and Regression 2. For an interpretation of the statistically significant coefficients in Regression 1, a 10 percent increase in the number of people in agreement with the social norm corresponds with a reduction in the gender parity index by 0.0119. That is, an increase of 10 percent more people agreeing with the social norm aligns with 1.19 fewer girls enrolled in school per 100 boys in school. This is

significant at the 1 percent level. With regard to urban population, a 10 percent increase in urban population as a percentage of total population corresponds with an increase in the gender parity index by 0.01—or exactly one additional girl enrolled in school per 100 boys. This is also significant at the 1 percent level.

Table 4.

	(3) Education Gender Parity Index
In Agreement with Norm (%)	0.00189
	(1.98)
Urban Population (% of Total)	0.00334*
	(2.29)
Unemployment Rate (% of Labor Force)	0.000890
	(0.65)
Log of GDP per Capita	-0.0147
	(-1.60)
Year=1999	0.0182
	(1.46)
Year=2004	0.0235
	(1.07)
Year=2014	0.0505
	(1.32)
Constant	0.786***
	(7.08)
Observations	144
Adjusted R^2	0.314

t statistics in parentheses
* $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$

In Regression 2, the same two independent variables prove to be significant in addition to the dummy variable for 2014. A 10 percent increase in the number of people in agreement with the social norm proxy corresponds with a reduction in the gender parity index by 0.00993, or just shy of 1 less girl enrolled in school per 100 boys. This is significant at the 5 percent level. A 10 percent increase in urban population as a percentage of total population corresponds with an increase in the gender parity index by .0105—or 1.05 additional girls per 100 boys. This is significant at the 1 percent level. The dummy variable for 2014 suggests an increase of 0.0402 in the gender parity index since the base year of 1994. This suggests that 4 more girls are enrolled in school per 100 boys in 2014 compared to in 1994. This is significant at the 5 percent level.

For the three independent variables that showed significance in Regressions 1 and 2, their coefficient signs are all as were predicted. The statistical significance for the social norms proxy—and the simultaneous lack of statistical significance for the Muslim-dominant country dummy variable—supports this paper's hypothesis. Perhaps the previous research that asserts Islam to correspond with lower female educational attainment was picking up traditional social norms oppressive toward women that often overlap with the Muslim religion but are by no means representative of the entire religious community in all of its iterations. As this panel dataset illustrates, there is a 0.64 correlation coefficient between Muslim-dominant country and social norm agreement. While this is a positive correlation, there is not a strong enough relationship to suggest that the two are indivisible. With regard to the remaining independent variables in both Regressions 1 and 2, it is not overly concerning that some of their coefficient signs are not as were predicted because they were not statistically significant.

This paper assumes that the classical assumptions are met for the above OLS models. A basic analysis of the correlation coefficients between the independent variables suggests that there is not multicollinearity. The OLS models are most likely not affected by reverse causality; for instance, gender parity index does not affect urban population or GDP per capita (at least not within the same period). While there are no outright problems with the two regressions above, it is evident by the low R^2 value that the OLS model is not fully capturing external factors influencing the gender parity index. Thus, a more econometrically advanced regression model can offer much needed control over external influencers. While the OLS models do support this paper's hypothesis, Regression 3 engages a fixed effects model to better analyze the true relationships between the dependent and independent variables.

Regression 3:

$$\theta GPI_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1(\theta SN_{it}) + \beta_3(\theta UP_{it}) + \beta_4(\theta G_{it}) + \beta_5(\theta UE_{it}) + \beta_6(\theta M_{it}) + \beta_7(\theta D_{it}) + \beta_8(\theta A_{it}) + \theta\varepsilon_{it}$$

Regression 3 employs the same seven independent variables, with θ representing the mean of the variable subtracted from the unique observation, i.e. $SN_{it}-\overline{SN}_i$. There are not explicit dummy variables for different years because the fixed effects model will automatically compare observations by year. Refer to Table 5 for coefficient and

p-value results for the fixed effects model. Unlike the OLS models, Regression 3 only shows statistical significance for urban population as a percentage of total population. A 10 percent increase in urban population as a percentage of total population corresponds with a 0.0334 increase in the gender parity index, or an additional 3.34 girls enrolled per 100 boys. This is significant at the 5 percent level. Thus, the fixed effects model does not support the hypothesis that strong agreement with the social norm proxy regarding the rights and responsibilities of women corresponds with greater gender inequality in school enrollment.

Table 5.

	(3) Education Gender Parity Index
In Agreement with Norm (%)	0.00189
	(1.98)
Urban Population (% of Total)	0.00334*
	(2.29)
Unemployment Rate (% of Labor Force)	0.000890
	(0.65)
Log of GDP per Capita	-0.0147
	(-1.60)
Year=1999	0.0182
	(1.46)
Year=2004	0.0235
	(1.07)
Year=2014	0.0505
	(1.32)
Constant	0.786***
	(7.08)
Observations	144
Adjusted R^2	0.314

{ statistics in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

While panel data can be vulnerable to multicollinearity and heteroskedasticity, the fixed effects model utilized robust standard errors to help control for heteroskedasticity. Moreover, a basic analysis of the correlation coefficients between the independent variables suggests that there is not multicollinearity considering the strongest coefficient in 0.644. However, it is also critical to note that the dataset of only 144 observations is rather small to extrapolate results from. Moreover, the dataset did not include key observations for Sub-Saharan African countries with low gender parity indices where these results would be most informative.

CONCLUSION

Gender inequality in education is an undeniably complex problem with severe consequences for human development and the economy. Previous economic literature has thoroughly documented both the benefits of maternal education for the next generation as well as the current economic growth possible with a better-educated workforce. While the gender gap has closed in many countries, even reversing in some instances, Sub-Saharan Africa still lags behind other developing regions in this metric. Many scholars have studied the causes of low female educational attainment, and their findings consistently attribute the gender inequality to the prevalence of Islam in a society.

This paper engages ideas and frameworks from political economic theory to propose an alternative explanation. Social norms that support oppressively limited rights and responsibilities of women truly underlie the first-order CAP of a persisting education gender gap. While these norms often overlap with Muslim communities, they are not one and the same. At one point in time female education may not have even been considered, what is called a rationality-limiting social norm in political economy. Conversely, in countries where there are currently more girls than boys enrolled in school, this norm has clearly been completely phased out. Perhaps its antithesis of equal education for boys and girls has become its own rationality-limiting norm. For countries where a gender gap still persists, like in Sub-Saharan Africa, this paper proposes that a typical social norm is in effect. However, with the passage of time and globalization, the norm may slide along the spectrum presented in Figure 1. The employment of an additional political economic concept provides a better understanding of the second-order CAPs surrounding the education gender gap; strategic reciprocity illustrates how the incentives of families choosing to allocate funds toward their children's education can be altered.

An empirical analysis of panel data tests the hypothesis that agreement with social norms supportive of traditional roles for women has a statistically significant inverse relationship with gender parity in school enrollment. While the OLS models employed find statistical significance for the social norms proxy, urban population as a percentage of total population, and the 2014 year dummy variable, the low R^2 value suggests that there are external factors that are not fully controlled for. Introducing a fixed effects model to better control for external factors, the only remaining statistically significant variable is urban population. While these results do not

support this paper's hypothesis, they most likely do a better job of capturing the variables' true effects. However, it is critical not to overlook the fact that the dataset is small and omits key Sub-Saharan African countries of interest.

Notes

1. Second-order CAPs are problems of orchestrating the coordination and enforcement needed to render agreements for resolving first-order CAPs credible (Ferguson, 2013, p. 5).
2. Gender parity in education, rather than full female enrollment, will serve as the socially optimal outcome because at least boys and girls of the same aptitude would have the same opportunity to pursue an education. For both genders, reaching full enrollment is difficult for reasons outside of gender equality—such as rural location.
3. A rationality-limiting norm is a behavioral regularity within a group that is so strong that alternatives to its prescription are not even considered. Social sanction is not necessary because the ethical message of the norm is so deeply internalized (Ferguson, 2013, p. 167-169).
4. As described by Ferguson (2013), a coordinating convention is a "shared, expected, and ethically neutral behavioral regularity observed among the members of some group that, once established, is self-enforcing without recourse to sanctions or internalized sentiments" (p. 168).
5. Negative identity externalities include both individual and group discomfort or conflict that results from the activities of an individual that challenge the preexisting identity concepts of those they interact with as well as the internalized norms.
6. Sanctions include both punishments and rewards contingent upon the behavior of a player.
7. The sources of power include position, access to resources, and an ability to resolve CAPs associated with mobilizing support (Ferguson, 2013, p. 69).
8. This paper makes the assumption that families are reciprocal players employing strategic reciprocity. That is, their payoffs do not solely depend on the material payoffs of the game but also depend on some internal benefit realized when they behave reciprocally or some internal loss realized when they do not behave reciprocally.
9. α is assumed to be less than 1, although in this scenario it might be quite close to 1, because the average family would not receive more than the amount they invested in their daughter's education.
10. This paper assumes that this game is simultaneous because when a family is choosing whether or not to invest in their daughter's education they do not know if their future daughter-in-law will be educated, i.e. not sequential.
11. Scores range from 0 to 10; index is based on 60 indicators assessing pluralism, civil liberties, and political culture.

References

Ainsworth, Martha, Kathleen Beegle, and Andrew Nyamete (1996), "The Impact of Women's Schooling on Fertility and Contraceptive Use: A Study of Fourteen Sub-Saharan African Countries," The World Bank Economic Review, 10(1), pp. 85-122.

Basu, Kaushik (2000), Prelude to Political Economy: A Study of the Social and Political Foundations of Economics, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Browne, Angela W., and Hazel R. Barrett (1991), "Female Education in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Key to Develop ment?" Comparative Education, 27(3), pp. 275–285.

Cooray, Arusha, and Niklas Potrafke (2011), "Gender Inequality in Education: Political Institutions or Culture and Religion?" European Journal of Political Economy, 27(2), pp. 268-280.

Daun, Holger (2000), "Primary Education in Sub-Saharan Africa-A Moral Issue, an Economic Matter, or Both?" Comparative Education, 36(1), pp. 37–53.

The Economist Intelligence Unit, Democracy Index (2015), Democracy index by country. [Data File]. Retrieved from http://www.eiu.com/public/topical_report.aspx?campaignid=DemocracyIndex2015.

Ferguson, William (2013), Collective Action and Exchange: A Game-Theoretic Approach to Contemporary Political Economy, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Hill, M. Anne and Elizabeth M. King (1995), "Women's Education and Economic Well-Being," Feminist Econom ics, 1(2), pp. 21-46.

Klasen, Stephan (2002), "Low Schooling for Girls, Slower Growth for All? Cross-Country Evidence on the Effect of Gender Inequality in Education on Economic Development," The World Bank Economic Review, 16(3), pp. 345–373.

"Let Girls Learn - A Comprehensive Investment in Adolescent Girls Education (2016, October 11)," The White House Office of the Press Secretary.

Norton, Seth W., and Annette Tomal (2009), "Religion and Female Educational Attainment," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 41(5), pp. 961–986.

"Making Room for Girls (2013, November 5)," The Economist Newspaper.

Pew Research Center, The Future of the Global Muslim Population (2011), Muslim-Majority Countries. [Data File]. Retrieved from http://www.pewforum.org/2011/01/27/future-of-the-global-muslim-population-mus lim-majority/.

Psacharopoulos, George (1994), "Returns to Investment in Education: A Global Update," World Development, 22(9), pp. 1325-1335.

Shabaya, Judith, and Kwadwo Konadu-Agyemang (2004). "Unequal Access, Unequal Participation: Some Spatial and Socio-economic Dimensions of the Gender Gap in Education in Africa with Special Reference to Ghana, Zimbabwe and Kenya." Compare: A Journal of Comparative and International Education, 34(4), pp. 395-424.

The World Bank, World Development Indicators (2016), GDP per capita; School enrollment, primary and second ary, gender parity index; Urban population; Unemployment. [Data File]. Retrieved from http://data. worldbank.org/indicator.

World Values Survey (2014), When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women. [Data File]. Retrieved from http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSOnline.jsp.

Not Your Mother's Profession:

An Exploration of Computing Women in Madurai, India

Kathryn Yetter
Class of 2018

Introduction:

The air conditioner rattles loudly in the corner to provide a reprieve from the constant heat of Madurai, India. As much as each woman who enters the room enjoys the chill, the AC exists for the sole purpose of keeping the rows of computers at operating temperature. The room is full of women in their final year of undergraduate schooling; some wear colorful salwar kameezes, others opt for jeans. One woman stands at the front of the room, exemplifying the "yo-pro" vibe with a suit jacket and pants to match. She presents a calm front while telling her peers, "We all know, women are better at the bargaining and the trading, so we decided to make an all women e-commerce application for female empowerment." Her colleagues nod appreciatively and applaud when she goes to sit down. She is replaced by another woman who speaks on her team's development of a breast cancer awareness app. Their invention is aimed at women who are too embarrassed to raise concerns about breast abnormalities with a male doctor. The app would let the user check symptoms and seek advice in the privacy of their own home, no men involved. Lastly, a girl speaks about her dream of developing the Indian version of Indigogo, a crowd funding platform, which she plans to call "Indicome."

All of these projects are to be completed in the upcoming semester where students continue their partnership with a local NGO to create useful web applications. Each project is designed, overseen and completed by students in order to simulate the work flow of a software engineer in the IT industry. While a noble goal, this exercise does not remotely match the current state of technology. Nowhere in India's formal, commercial IT industry can one find applications being designed by Indian women, for Indian women, and yet these students approach the task as if it was the most natural idea in the world.

It is no secret that the tech workforce can be unwelcoming towards women. In the U.S there is a formal movement aided by workshops and self-help books like "Lean In" to entice women into the computing field. These initiatives have had marginal success. Here in India there is no parallel movement, yet women are enrolling in computer science courses at rates which put their American counterparts to shame. This dissonance between an industry stereotypically hostile to women and women's high rates of enrollment in computer science inspired this paper. Through observations, conversations, and surveys, this paper seeks to discover what roadblocks and incentives exist on young women's path to entering the computing profession, how they interact with the subject, and how they perceive the workforce. This paper concludes that while the computing profession is inexorably entwined within the forces of globalization and patriarchy, women still seek to navigate, engage with, and benefit from the topic. And, through taking ownership of the subject, they are able to expand the space for other women in Madurai.

Background:

The concept of an educational pipeline is a common tool used when discussing strategies to increase the number of underrepresented groups in computing. Four points on the pipeline are important for this paper. The first is when perceptions of computer science are forming, typically in high school or middle school. Positive relationships with computing necessitate breaking existing cultural stereotypes about the field; primarily, that it is only for geeky, anti-social, white, men who hate fun and collaboration. Next, assuming the individual makes it to college, is matriculation in a computing field. In this step, introductory classes must be accessible, welcoming, and not allow those with previous computer science experience to trample those who do not. After matriculation, the student must continue within the field of computing to either higher

education or to a job in the industry. Lastly, the hope is that the student will remain within the computing field and welcome in others from under represented backgrounds (Educational Pipeline FAQ 2006). My background research was structured to parallel the pipeline in the U.S. while examining the flow to industry in India. Many pieces will discuss the tech boom in India, but few focus on the Indian workers who helped facilitate that change. At times, I had to contend with gaps in the available academic literature. As such, I've attempted to synthesize different resources, including scholarly articles and interviews with industry professionals, to paint a picture of computing for women in India.

The role of women in computing in India is inevitably shaped by prominent gender ideologies. Partha Chatterjee (1989), an Indian scholar, explores the history of the woman in Indian society, and the effect that legacy has on them today. Chatterjee specifically explores the role of 19th century nationalist thinking in creating an ideological and spatial dichotomy between the 'home' and the 'world. The 'home' is considered to be the domain of the wife, and the outside world belongs to the man; however, this split was not always present. Colonization of India and India's subsequent nationalist movement are among largest factors in shaping women's role in society. Upon arrival, the Europeans reported a "long list of atrocities perpetrated on Indian women" not by a group of people, but by "the entire body of scriptural canons and cultural practices" (1989:622). This in turn served as a justification of European rule, and India's national identity was formed in many ways, in opposition to this rule. Which elements of western culture to accept and which to reject became a central question immediately following independence. General consensus became that material goods may be adopted, but the spirituality of India should remain untouched. Herein developed the separation between the outside world (material goods) and the heart or the home (spirituality). Thus, as domesticity evolved, the realm of the house and spiritual life became the woman's, and the outside world went to men.

Today many women are challenging their role in the home and are stepping out into the workforce. However, this transition is not easy. The New York Times did a series exploring India's female workers and found a drop in participation from 2005 to 2012, sliding from 37% to 27% (Barry 2016). Some of this drop is attributed to barriers put up as rural women are forced out of work by their village leaders. Barry discusses one village where seven working women became "outcasts" to the village; they were "symbolically denied the hookah" and "water from the shared pump" (Barry 2016). As outcasts, they were not welcome at village functions such as marriages or funerals, and all members of their families refused to speak with them, scared of becoming outcasts as well. One group of women chose not to give in and continued working. As they trekked to work, "men lined the roadway" and jeered "Are you going to star in a pornographic movie?" (Barry 2016). Though these women persisted and fought back against their village, it is easy to imagine why many may not. Through this example, it is clear that traditional gender roles have a strong grasp on some communities, and women who attempt to work outside that system face punishment. While many women do not face this kind of roadblock on the way to the IT industry, the sentiment and value system this example exposes makes apparent the uphill battle women have in entering the workforce.

While seeking paid labor, women's unpaid labor is a continued expectation in the home that may not be lifted to ease the struggle. In 2008 the IT workforce was 36% female, though women are not distributed equally throughout the sector (Bhattacharyya and Ghosh 2012:46). Most women in industry must perform both their jobs in the workforce and all the traditional jobs of home maker. This double duty is expected as they seek to break down their gender role. By continuing to perform the same tasks as before but with decreased responsibilities, the transition would be smoother. Some tech companies are providing accommodations for employees involved in maintaining a household, and notably some husbands are stepping up to the plate to help with childcare. In one published case, the man runs the home while the wife works, which is an enormous shift from the village life outlined in the previous paragraph. The IT industry cannot be solely credited for this shift; women who can enter the industry are likely to have better access to education and resources than women seeking work at garment factories. In turn, women and families with more resources are likely to have more positive associations with computing due to exposure.

The associations families and students form with computing play a role in which field women matriculate into. Regrettably, there is no study which

examines if this is the case for women in India. One piece by Hewner and Mishra (2016) works from the Indian context, speaking with engineering students. The research team does not publish a gendered breakdown of the participants and thus one can assume mostly men answered because of their predominance in the tech field. The article reports that, in India, prospective college students apply to a major program within a college only after receiving their test scores. Many students do not know what kind of school they will be admitted to or what they will major in until their test scores are released. Thus, the decision of major and college is undergone with little research or trepidation, most students simply apply for the school that matches their test score. Parental influence and monetary pay-off post-graduation are listed as a large factors in choosing a computer science major, but even more common is the perception that computer science is "the best major" (Hewner and Mishra 2016:3). To supplement this information, I looked to Serapiglia and Lenox (2010), who provide female-specific research in a U.S. context. Through surveys and follow up interviews, they found four main factors which influence choice of major. The four groups are; positive influence of male role models (i.e. family, community members, teachers); positive associations with computers either in the home or at school (typically during early development); enjoyment of puzzle solving; and monetary incentive of an industry salary (Serapiglia and Lenox 2010). Of these factors, influence of a male role model was the most common, with 92% of respondents citing it as a reason they chose the computer science major. Serapigilia and Lenox argue that, because men are assumed to be more competent when using computers, their excitement and confidence could be transferred to the female when she is discovering computing, creating a positive association with the field. Whether this study has any bearing on Indian women, however, remains to be seen.

Once women enter the computer science major the question becomes what will they do in their post grad careers. After all, having a lot of female computer science majors will mean substantially less if none of them enter the industry post-graduation. Hewner and Mishra's study is closest to answering this question. Once enrolled in classes, the study finds that most CS students are engaged in and enjoying their class material. Despite pleasure in the subject, very few students want to pursue a career in the industry, believing that career path to be uncreative and dull. Reasons cited by the paper include "no say in the design or feature set," only solving "trivial problems," "work long hours," and "conservative environment" where students would be forced "to work regular business hours or have a dress code" (Hewner and Mishra 2016:7). Most students were seeking alternatives like startups, grad school, or government positions (CS is a common background for politicians). The lack of interest in the industry may stem from bias encouraged by professors, few of whom have exposure to industry. Another possible cause is that many IT jobs are writing out the code designed by someone else, rather than inventing it on your own. Despite the perception of the industry's work being dull, many companies in India find that graduates are ill-equipped to handle the jobs' demands. Only a quarter of technical graduates are considered employable immediately following college completion. As a result, the IT sector in India spent $438 million in 2008 to train entry level employees (Garg and Varma 2008:2). One issue is the lack of standard curriculum across the country. Employers train all recruits to ensure they have a shared knowledge base. Another is the traditional, lecture-based classroom setting. While this set-up is beneficial for conveying more conceptual, abstract principles, it does not provide students with the hands-on experience of dealing with complex issues that they need as software engineers. Another obstacle is the rarity of software engineering (SE) concentrators, as there is minimal course work available on the topic. The SE class is often taught by a teacher with little software engineering experience apart from when the course they took in college, mainly because of the deficit in SE teachers (Garg and Varma 2008). The subject suffers from a lack of research. If software engineering is an interest, most students would rather work in the higher-paying software development jobs than to do research in software engineering. Many students choose not to lean SE tools or techniques because it is not part of the final examination. The skills which "experts from industry" wished most to see improved in new recruits are problem solving skills and self-learning (Garg and Varma 2008:3).

If the students are imperfect for the job market, the question remains if the job market is beneficial for the students. One researcher, Nitya Rao (2014), challenges the prevailing assumption that women in the workforce gain autonomy within their social structure because of their increased economic power. Through a series of interviews with Dalits and members of the

backward caste, two lower caste groups, in a 5 villages cluster in Tamil Nadu, Rao asserts a different narrative. She finds that women are able to move more freely in the social structure and have a larger say in household decisions by filling the housewife role and being a good mother rather than seeking work. The work being referred to here is paid labor, typically in the garment business. In conclusion, Rao speaks of the people she interviewed who view their work as more of a "burden" than a "source of agency" (Rao 2014:97). The pervasive narrative that women's importance is determined by their economic participation is complicated by the pre-existing power structures.

While Rao's study raises a valuable question, I do think it is beneficial to lay out some of the key differences between her study and mine. Rao's women are mostly Dalits and Backwards cast in smaller rural villages and I am looking at the women on Lady Doak College, an elite institution in Madurai. Access to a school like this is more likely among higher class members of society, and while I did not ask students or teachers what their background was, many people were from Madurai and many professors had gone to Lady Doak for their undergraduate educations. Another obvious difference is that the labor in question here is non-manual, and occurs in a private space with a high salary. The garment industry involves physically demanding work with few to no benefits for little pay. Unfortunately, I don't have the resources to ascertain how women in more rural locations choose majors, at what rate they go to college, or what percentage pursue any kind of computing career.

Rao's study also serves to underline another important point: the bias in my research. I have approached this question with the underlying assumption that having more women in tech is a positive change that leads to improvements within those women's lives and society as a whole. This assumption stems from my positionality. I am an upper middle class white woman from the United States. I study computer science at Grinnell College, an elite liberal arts college in the Midwest. One day I hope to enter into the computer science workforce in the states. While I have many worries about working in the IT field, undoubtedly the most prominent is being the only woman in my department and having to deal with exclusion, discrimination, and harassment on a daily basis. This fear has lead me to become an advocate for women in computing both in the U.S., and now in India. While I tried to approach the education system, my research, and my interviews with an open mind, I'm sure some of my ardent belief that there needs to be more women in computing slipped into my analysis.

Methods:

The data for this paper is the result of conversations, observations, and surveys conducted at Lady Doak College. This college is an elite, all-women's, arts and science university in Madurai. Many strong computer science programs are housed in engineering colleges. Lady Doak does not fall under this umbrella, but retains a respected department and offers both under graduate and post-graduate coursework. This institution fit my needs as a researcher because it was an obvious source of women in computer science where all classes are conducted in English. To study how women interact with computing, I felt there was no better location for study than an all-women's environment. It is possible that this has biased my results because most workplaces and colleges are not single gender.

During my observation period at Lady Doak College I sat in on a few classes, both as an observer and as a presenter. Classes included; discrete structures, a chemistry computer science cross over, software development and a biology computer science crossover. I designed a questionnaire which inquired about the student's interest in computer science, their plans post graduation, and if they would be willing to meet for further interviewing (see Appendix 1). This questionnaire was distributed to 2nd and 3rd year undergraduates and first year post-graduate students during their normal class time. From that sample I had hoped to receive a number of students for interview. However, this proved more difficult than anticipated, as Lady Doak was in their last week of classes, which was then followed by finals and a break where many students go out of town. The timing of my study could not have been less ideal. While I was able to speak with some students, the majority of my interviews took place with faculty members. In addition to my conversations with faculty, I was able to work often in their teachers' lounge and gained insight into their work environment from my interactions and observations there.

Designing and administering surveys were new practices for me. This methodology seems to be newer to SITA's research library as well, thus before the piece continues I'd like to make note of what I observed while administering and logging the surveys. Some of

the questions seemed to be difficult for the students to understand. Particularly "what are five words you associate with the computer science industry?" and "what are five words you associate with computer science academia?" While this word-association question format is familiar to me, it is not one I think the students had encountered before. This confusion lead to a lot of discussion amongst neighboring students about what to write. Before administering each survey, I made sure to stress that there was no correct answer to any of the questions, and that I only wanted to know what participant's thought. The first time I distributed the questionnaire I fielded many queries on the word-association questions. For the subsequent classes I made sure to elaborate on the two questions before passing out the survey. Regardless, I think there was still a sense or fear of misrepresenting oneself on the survey in a non-native language which lead to collaboration with classmates.

While this behavior compromised the quantitative merit of the surveys, I allowed it for two reasons. The first is that I wanted the survey and myself to be presented as non-threatening and informal to the students. To demand that they complete the survey in silence, I felt, would undermine that tone. The second is that if someone truly did not understand the question, perhaps their neighbor could explain in a way that I, with my limited Tamil, simply cannot. The collaboration among the students is evident when looking at the papers. Runs of five or six papers all contain the same, or variants of the same, answers. Particularly in response to the word association questions, where I was hoping to receive more information about how the students felt about each subject, I got words, like "software," "hardware," and "cloud computing" in almost every survey. For these word association questions I have only reported the results for words that are unique within the dataset, or speak to the respondent's emotional relationship with the topic.

While each student would ideally be able to understand and articulate themselves honestly on the survey, that is not a realistic expectation. Because all classes and tests at the college are conducted in English, I felt that translating the survey into Tamil was unnecessary, but perhaps having a Tamil version would have been beneficial. On the other hand, the group answer approach in some instances, I believe, played to my advantage. Only in one class did students report that they were dissatisfied with their computer science education and would not have picked the major if it had not been for their parents' prompting. No other class gave me that result, and I happen to know that of the seven surveys I received with that response, five of the students were sitting by each other. To undertake the small act of rebellion of stating that you did not choose computer science, especially to myself a researcher who is very enthusiastic about the importance of computer science, would be tough, and undoubtedly easier to speak truthfully if you know your friends will be as well. For future research, I want to spend more time exploring literature on survey creation and proctoring. My surveys still proved extremely useful in opening dialogues with students and professors on my research, developing a general sense of the department, and gathering contact information for future participants.

Results:

During my interviews with professors, many agreed that the IT industry was not suited for women, but each approached their initial career decision from a different background. Some professors chose both their career and their major based entirely on their parents' advice or wishes. While others had parents who wanted them to be in industry and travel abroad, but decided to teach instead. All of the women saw issues with the IT industry that made it suboptimal for women; primarily working night shifts or working late, demanding workload, and difficulty balancing the expectations of both work and home. This section explores the narratives of three women, each of whom has been deterred from working in the IT industry by some aspect of the patriarchal system. While their work in the IT industry was discouraged, none of them have given up their passion for computing. Now each of them works within the system to aid, encourage, and guide the next generation of women who will attempt to enter the workforce.

Some women who pursue computer science degrees are already convinced that the IT industry is not for them. Professor K., who started in CS department only this year, said that after her graduation her family, "a strict family", asked her to go into the teaching field because it is a "career for ladies" due to its regular hours, plentiful vacations, and the fact that teachers are shielded from the public gaze. The IT industry, in her view and the view of her family, is "not suitable for ladies" because "after 8 o'clock they come home" and as a software engineer they "will not be able to manage the family" and the other household chores women are

expected to complete. Prof K. in no way is passing a judgment on those already in the IT field. Her advice for students entering the workforce is that they must be "strong in all aspects," indicating her belief that while the work is challenging, it is possible for some women. As for herself, she would not be able to "care for [her] family" if she worked in the field and "that is a problem" both for her parents and for herself. It's clear that the lifestyle inspired by the IT industry of long hours, moving away from home, and late nights is not copasetic with traditional family values still held by many people in India today.

Some of the women I talked to were sure that they were headed for a career in the IT field until unfavorable reports from other women in the industry deterred them. Professor T., a hardware specialist, was planning to go into tech, and even had a second on-campus interview lined up with a potential employer before she backed out. Some friends of Prof. T's, who were already in industry, told her that if you're put on a team with a male lead you have to "pamper your manager." As a woman she would have to "talk to him, you know…you have to keep satisfying him in all aspects, so that you can get promoted." Prof. T. decided she was unwilling to join that type of work environment, so she turned to teaching, which she said is a "little bit [more safe] for girls in India." Even though her plans for career have not materialized as hoped, Prof. T. still wants to help students pursue their dreams of working in the industry. Her advice to them, however, does not ring of hope, but rather of risk calculation. "Only [pursue a career] if you are going to get married to an IT person…you cannot survive on your own." The logic behind the advice as she explains it is: if your husband is at your job and interacting with the other men then they will know to leave you alone. Prof. T.'s husband was her professor when she was in school, and helped to sway her towards a professorship rather than a software engineering career.

While she has resigned herself to teaching for the present, Prof T. is still toying with the idea of dabbling in the tech world, just not in India. "It's not like this everywhere… my friends say it isn't like that in America," Prof. T. explains as she begins to lay out her one-day plan of moving to the states with her husband and two-year-old daughter to join her sister working in the Midwest. Another professor mentioned that "around 10%" of the students choose a computer science major because they think it will give them an opportunity to go abroad. Prof T. outlines that it's a bit trickier than that, but also one of the most realistic ways that she would be able to engage in the work that she loves. In her mind, the only thing standing in her way is a PhD, which may seem like a large barrier to some, but when compared with the barriers some other women face to enter the workforce does not seem too big. Moving internationally is another way in which the women, discouraged by the patriarchal control over the computing industry in India, seek to maneuver outside of or escape from it.

Not all workforce experiences need to be escaped from; one professor returned to college after an immensely positive two-year stint in the industry to aid her marriage prospects. Professor R., after graduation, worked at a small, satellite office in Madurai with nine other computer science "freshers", or first years. On her team were 6 men and 4 women who worked to develop tools for the larger company, headquartered in Bangalore. Together the team worked on an internal e-mail system and then an internal database to serve as a forum for trouble shooting and a record of what software the company had already developed. Prof R. relished her time in industry saying it was the "very first time" she could "sit alongside men" who became her "close friends" during her two years of work. The experience gave her "confidence" and a new perspective on her current job as a teacher. There was one marriage between colleagues, but the rest remained only platonic. After all, there were only ten of them.

Professor R., in switching from her satellite office to a college professorship, was seeking the stability that came with a university position to make her not only a more attractive marriage candidate, but also a better future wife. Working in IT required her to come home late some nights, which is "not accepted" by society and seen as "not feasible" if she wants to marry in Madurai. Prof. R. states that she "cannot be money minded" about the issue, after all she does take a large pay cut to go from one profession to the next. The choice to switch professions was not solely based on how society will view her work. The IT industry is demanding and prof R. wants to ensure that she will have enough time to take care of her "husband and child" and "relax." So far, prof R. is content with her work at the college, describing it as "a very spiritual profession" to teach the next generation of computer scientists.

Each of these women, in her own way, is paving the way for future women of in computer

science. Navigating the system has lead them away from directly interacting with the IT industry, however it has not discouraged them from continuing their work permanently. In this way, professorships are able to serve as buoys in the sea of the workforce. Teaching is considered a safer profession than IT, and to see a women professor is commonplace in Madurai. The next step for women is to go into the workforce. Professor R. made some strides by working in the satellite office, even if it was only for 2 years. Another professor spoke to me about how her wish to go into industry was denied by her father who was vexed by the idea of his daughter having to move to a large city, to "live in hostel" and "manage everything alone." This same father has let his younger daughter go into the IT industry after watching other families send their daughters to do the same thing. There is no doubt that the perceptions of women's place are changing in society, and it seems only natural that one day the IT industry will be as common for women as the teaching profession. This change can be seen by talking to professors, but also through talking to the students and interpreting what they want to do next.

Questionnaire:

Through the questionnaires and limited follow up conversations, I hoped to see the impact that female professors had on the students' trajectory (if any). While no student directly referenced any difficulties being a woman in computer science, almost everyone who filled out the survey either plans to go on to further studies or to seek a job in IT or business administration where they would surely confront discrimination. As far as reasons to matriculate go, I found four main themes in the questionnaire responses: the relevance of technology in the world today, a long standing interest in the capabilities of computing, input from their parents, and attraction to the opportunities afforded them through a computer science major.

Keeping in mind that many of the responses were made in collaboration with other students, the first broader theme of response spoke to the overall enjoyment of computing, whether in program creation, programming languages, or subject matter. Responses in this category often contained phrases like "I have an interest in computers," "I love computers," or "it is a very interesting field." Some students elaborated on their previous computer science coursework explaining that it was their favorite subject in high school while others did not seem to have a sense of the field before going to college.

The next set of response found throughout the surveys is similar to the first and is a general interest or excitement about the technological revolution. Responses in this category contain phrases like "now-a-days, computer is day-to-day essential in all life," "In this world, technology of computers play a vital role" or "today's world is running on technology", "now-a-days all the things are becoming digital-based. So, this is a most important field for a developing nation." These answers normally ended with the writer saying that, because of the importance of technology, they felt they needed to stay updated on the modern systems and saw a CS major as the best way to do that.

One response trend, only found in a cluster from one of the classes, was that their parents made the decision for them. Responses surrounding this motivation included responses like "Actually I did not plan taking this major. Unfortunately, I was forced to take this major," "unfortunately… my fate…" and "because of my parent's compulsion." One respondent in this category went on to elaborate and say that she now loves the subject matter, however that sentiment does not seem to be ubiquitous amongst her colleagues. Why the parents wanted their children to enter in to computer science is not expounded upon in the survey. It is possible that computer science's reputation as "the best major" has a role to play here. Another possibility brought forth in an interview later is that this degree makes the women more eligible for marriage. Because of the esteem associated with the degree, parents may think that it will make their daughter more attractive when they are trying to arrange her marriage. Lastly, one professor, who said she had both marks for CS or engineering, was instructed by her father to go into computer science because there are fewer jobs for engineers in India. "Most of the crimes happening here is only from engineering students. They study well but they don't get jobs so they go and put a skimmer on the ATM machine." Regardless of the parents' reasoning, each of them sees some promise in the computer science major, a field not conforming with many traditional Indian values, for their daughter which shows the subjects integration into culture.

The last broad group is respondents who viewed their computer science education as a gateway to productive futures. Responses in this category included vague responses like, "because it is very useful for all technology. But it is useful for future

also. So I choose this course. Because this technology has wide varieties type for every things," and "There are many opportunities after completing graduation in computer science," to more specific ones like "to become a web design in the IT field" or "to become a professor in a college" and "to become a programmer in IT field." In conjunction with this response, often times the promise of "high salary" was listed on the survey. These responses lay clear the sense of promise held in computer science either through the economic independence of a job or the freedom to follow a passion. Whether participants were planning to continue their studies after graduation or pursue a degree, the majority of respondents expected to continue engaging with computer science, with the exception of a few who cannot seem to escape it fast enough!

Hewner and Mishra's assertion that CS is the best major seems to not be true here. Yes, some students did come just because of the scores, but most students, even the "my parents made me" group, are here for a different reason. Many did list salary as shown in the Hewner and Mishra study, but very few seemed to come just for the status of being a computer science major. In my interactions with students, they aspired to pursue a career or further studies. My survey also did not align with Serapigilia and Lenox's work. Positive influence of men was not mentioned in any conversation I had or survey response I read. Early positive exposure could be seen in the students that mentioned their high school work, but largely, early positive computing experiences are not listed. Natural interest in problem solving is also never listed. In fact, some students state that they believe computer science to be an easier field of study than other STEM fields. The one point that the findings support is interest in a higher salary as a motivator for women in the U.S. and the Indian context.

Discussion:

The contradictions between my research and that of Hewner and Mishra or Serapigilia and Lenox is a clear indicator that more research is needed. Women in the tech field are battling centuries of gendered expectations every day. How they interact in these spaces, engage in the material, and claim a space in the computing world are topics that not only apply to women in tech, but women all over India. In conversation with a sociology professor at LDC, Prof. R. explained to me how "women getting into this industry has widened up spaces for women generally." Take the example of travel. Ten to fifteen years ago it was rare to see a woman traveling alone from Madurai to Chennai. Now, slowly, more and more women are making the commute because there are few tech opportunities in Madurai and many more in Tamil Nadu's capital, Chennai. According to Prof R., one daughter's need to travel for work is inducing individual families to begin the process of "letting her go." This process of "letting go" can be viewed in multiple ways – in terms of the daughter's actual travel, her engagement with crafting space for herself, and in terms of her allowing to make her own decisions based on her newfound economic sovereignty. The benefit of her work is seen not just in her ability to move within society, but also in her family "negotiating" the mobility of women. With this negotiation comes more acceptance for women who have other dreams. For instance, maybe the next daughter doesn't want to be a computer scientist, but rather a fashion designer in Chennai. That ambition is no longer as foreign to the family, and is more likely to be accepted.

Other researchers, like Susan Seizer (2005), have examined the way women find and utilize their agency to expand the traditional mold of a "good woman" to include themselves.

Seizer's work focuses on how Tamil stage actresses attempt to change the stigma surrounding their profession by leading quiet, private lives and fulfilling the role of a good woman on stage (2005:32). The actresses would take control of their public perception by creating private space within the public. This can be seen in the curtains on the private buses, imitating a good woman on stage and setting up boundaries in the booking process (Seizer 2005).

In the realm of computer science, while actions may vary, the overall desire to expand a public domain to include women remains the same. This paper has elaborated on how women not only stretch the definition of good woman to include themselves, but in doing so create space for women who come after them. Because both education and employment in computer science take place in a more private space, women are more easily able to claim aspects of this patriarchal, western invention as their own. After all, what computer science teaches is nothing more than a tool kit, within which rests the ability to affect one's larger community. That community, though, is neither inherently masculine nor inherently western.

In conversation with a third-year student, the

current developer of Indicome, I asked why jobs in the IT industry were considered boring. She replied, "there's not any chance for invention here. Working for a large company you're just implementing algorithms handed you by your boss." Your boss, answering to demands from America, was the unstated end to her sentence. While my work did not deal directly with the influences of American firms on the Indian tech sphere, the connection is unavoidable. When students at Lady Doak told me that they would love to work at Microsoft or Amazon India, it was a direct parallel to what some of my peers in the U.S. are telling me as they begin their internship hunts. Here, working those jobs implies hours sitting in a room staring at a monitor, whereas in the U.S. there are expectations of free lunches, corporate buses, and other business perks. One professor at Lady Doak mentioned that her brother, who worked in IT, quickly lost his perfect eyesight staring at the screen and lived an inactive lifestyle until her father paid for him to go back to school to become a teacher. This description is a far throw from the open office, free gym access, free bus to work, and free meal perks that are commonly associated with IT in America today. As long as Indian tech remains claimed by the U.S., these conditions may never change. It is small actions to claim technology as the Indian woman's own that can change this system.

I saw these acts of laying claim to technology throughout my stay at Lady Doak. I saw it when students my age described the applications they planned to build which catered to a specifically Indian and sometimes specifically female audience. I saw it in the positive workspace among the faculty where each member's achievements were congratulated with hugs and smiles (and sometimes tears), and faculty's children's birthdays were celebrated with chocolate bars for the whole staff. I saw it in the enthusiasm with which one professor addressed my question about a breadth first traversal of a tree in class and then again the next day when she approached me to amend her answer to one she had looked up the night before. Despite the inhospitality of the computer science world for women at the moment, these women still see something worth committing their lives to. It may be the ability to step outside the home and pursue a job, or the economic freedom that accompanies a computing's higher salary. It could be because of a nudge from a parent, or a long-standing interest in the way technology shapes our world. Regardless of the reason, Indian women are taking ownership of this patriarchal, western system to create a space for themselves, and we as an academic community would be amiss not to recognize this.

Works Cited

Barry, Ellen
2016
In India, a Small Band of Women Risk It All for a Chance to Work . The New York Times, January 30. http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/31/world/asia/indian-women-labor-work-force.html, accessed November 22, 2016

Bhattacharyya, Asmita, and Bhola Nath Gosh
2012
Women in Indian Information Technology (IT) Sector: a Sociological Analysis. Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences 3(6): 45–52. http://iosrjournals.org/iosr-jhss/papers/vol3-issue6/f0364552.pdf?id=5734, accessed October 5, 2016

Chatterjee, Partha
1989
Colonialism, Nationalism, and Colonialized Women: the Contest in India. American Ethnologist 16(4): 622–633

Duraisamy, Malathy, and P. Durisamy
1999
Gender Bias in the Scientific and Technical Labor Market: A Comparative Study of Tamil Nadu and Kerala. Indian Economic Review 34(2): 149–169

Educational Pipeline FAQ

2006
Educational Pipeline FAQ. http://www.highereducation.org/reports/pipeline/faq.shtml, accessed November 22, 2016

Garg, Kirti, and Vasudeva Varma
2008
People Issues Relating to Software Engineering Education and Training in India. Proceedings of the 1st Conference on India Software Engineering Conference - ISEC '08

Hewner, Michael, and Shitanshu Mishra
2016
When Everyone Knows CS Is the Best Major. Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on International Computing Education Research - ICER '16: 3–11

Kellar, Govind, Girija Shrestha, and Veena N
205ADAD
Women's Agency and the IT Industry in India. Essay. In Gender and the Digital Economy: Perspectives from the Developing World. Cecilia Ng and Swasti Mitter, eds. Pp. 110–131. London: Sage Publications Inc

Rao, Nitya
2014
Caste, Kinship, and Life Course: Rethinking Women's Work and Agency in Rural South India. Feminist Economics 20(3): 78–102

Serapiglia, Constance Patricia, and Terri L. Lenox
2010
Factors Affecting Women's Decisions to Pursue an IS Degree: A Case Study. Information Systems Education Journal 8(12): 3–13. http://isedj.org/8/12/. issn: 1545-679x, accessed October 5, 2016

Josiah Bushnell Grinnell:

Radical Abolitionist Through and Through

Will Hamilton
Class of 2017

Content Warning: This essay includes direct quotes from historical sources and transcripts which use derogatory racial epithets.

On June 14, 1866 congressman Lovell Rousseau from Kentucky cornered Josiah Bushnell Grinnell, a representative from Iowa, in the east front house portico of the United States Capitol building and repeatedly beat Grinnell with an iron-tipped cane until the cane broke. The incident was the culmination of several months of fiery arguments between Rousseau and Grinnell, which devolved over the course of 1866 into a bitter vendetta consisting of personal attacks exchanged on the House floor.[1] On the surface, the caning of Grinnell by Rousseau was yet another incident illustrative of the violent tensions between leaders from different parts of the country endemic of the Civil War and early Reconstruction eras. However, the caning represents a much more complex story: J.B. Grinnell's individual role in shaping the Union during the most turbulent time in American history.

Residents of Grinnell, Iowa, named after J.B. Grinnell, consider his legacy to be the foundation of the town and namesake of Grinnell College.[2] The foremost historian on J.B. Grinnell, Charles E. Payne, presents Grinnell as a man with vigorous character and strong abolitionist convictions that produced significant progress in his local community, the state of Iowa, and the country during his lifetime.[3] Considering Grinnell's achievements over the course of his life, the legacy given to him by Payne and his fellow Grinnellians is accurate and rightly deserved. Yet, if Grinnell maintained a righteous character throughout his lifetime, as Payne argues, how did his character and abolitionist beliefs weather the profound impact of the events of the Civil War on himself and other Union leaders?

In the debate over Union politics during the Civil War, scholars agree that the progress of the war effort directly influenced Union politics, causing ideological transformations by Union politicians toward the acceptance of abolition as a war measure. Congress was far from united at the outset of the war. Northern Democrats were strongly against abolition, and while the Republican coalition was firmly antislavery, Congress' dominant party lacked unity regarding when, how, and why abolition should occur. It is important to note that the Republican Party was still in its fledgling stage: as a combination of former Free-Soilers, Whigs, and other progressives, the party's umbrella ideology was constantly evolving before the war broke out.

Once the war broke out, Union politicians faced an unprecedented national crisis which created the necessity for leaders to abandon their personal ambitions and agendas and compromise on the Capitol floor, or in clandestine meetings in the dead of night, in order to preserve the United States. Given the extraordinary circumstances of a Congress in war, Michael Vorenberg argues that the Thirteenth Amendment was possible only after the war began, and that scholars underestimate the extent and complexity of the inter-party and intra party discourse that went into the emancipation question.[4] J.B. Grinnell served in Congress during a time when his Republican party was evolving, becoming more radical in policy and public discourse in response to the increasingly dire prospect of saving the Union. Despite their pre-war convictions regarding abolition, Michael Green contends that the Republicans put aside their regional, moral, and political differences and united under a wartime ideology valuing freedom, the Union, and power.[5]

The importance of the evolution of Union politics highlighted by these scholars suggests that J.B. Grinnell's legacy is incomplete without a close examination of his actions taken in Congress during the Civil War. Based on Grinnell's autobiography and speeches given by Grinnell in the House recorded in the Congressional Globe, his efforts in Congress during the war contradict the scholarly assumption that all Union politicians departed from their antebellum convictions and adapted to the Union cause. J.B. Grinnell's efforts in

advocating for the expansion of the Freedmen's Bureau and a Reconstruction plan that would seek justice for the wrongs done by the Confederate States on behalf of the country's Southern black population demonstrate that, while his colleagues compromised their principles because of the circumstances of the Civil War, Grinnell upheld his original radical abolitionist principles throughout his time in Congress.

J.B. Grinnell's Antebellum Career: a Rising Star in the Antislavery Debate

J.B. Grinnell grew up and spent his formative years in New England, antebellum America's hotbed for radical antislavery activism. Grinnell was born on December 22, 1821 in New Haven, Vermont.[6] His family subsisted on a modest income from the family's farm and his father's work as a writer and schoolmaster.[7] Although his father died when he was young, his vocations undoubtedly influenced Grinnell's interest in legislation and the promotion of education that would become one of the core tenets of his political platform later on.[8] After his father's death, Josiah finished his education and secured a job as a teacher in a country school when he was 16.[9] At an early time in his life, Grinnell developed an appreciation for education and serving others that would become a lifelong characteristic of his.

Grinnell decided to pursue higher education after his time spent in the country school. He intended to study at Yale, but a family friend convinced him to instead study at the recently founded Oneida Institute in Whitesboro, New York.[10] During this period, upstate New York was the epicenter for the religious revival that gave birth to the national abolition movement. As antislavery ideas fermented in New York, the movement's evangelist leaders expanded their influence into politics and higher education. Gerrit Smith, the largest landowner in the state and a proponent of the movement, contributed considerable funds to the expansion of the Oneida Institute on the grounds that the institute would teach radical antislavery ideology.[11] Exposure to the antislavery zeitgeist in New York, and especially the radical community at the Oneida Institute, shaped Grinnell into a young, radical abolitionist.[12]

After graduation from the Oneida Institute, Grinnell pursued Congregational ministry as his first profession. In 1846, he graduated from Auburn Theological Seminary and moved to Union Village, New York to preach in the Congregational church for three years.[13] Grinnell's exposure to the radical abolition movement continued during this time. As the movement gained momentum, evangelist leaders in upstate New York increasingly believed it was a moral imperative to exercise political power to right the wrongs of slavery.[14] Grinnell's role in the Congregational church meant that he became involved in the second largest abolitionist denomination in the state.[15] The growing intersection between evangelism and antislavery politics in New York influenced Grinnell's career trajectory, leading him to move to Washington D.C. in 1850 to attempt to influence political players through sermons.

Once in the nation's capital, Grinnell purchased a small churchouse and founded the First Congregational Church. Grinnell's new life in Washington exposed him to the flourishing slave trade. Upon witnessing for the first time the evils of slavery he had grown to reject during his time in New York, of which chained slaves seemed to be the most jarring, Grinnell wrote that his "blood boiled."[16] Inspired by Washington's slave trade scene, Grinnell's debut sermons in his new church focused on freedom based on equality. His sermons were incredibly unpopular and quickly led to his literal escort out of town by a proslavery contingent.[17] Grinnell's first foray into the nation's political hub ended disastrously because of his commitment to preaching abolitionist principles. Ironically, his forced removal from D.C. on the grounds of his radical stance led to the circumstances that would allow him to return to the capital poised in a more powerful position to create change a decade later.

After the failed stint in Washington, Grinnell moved back to comfortable grounds in New York City, where he dedicated his time to earnestly preaching against slavery. He met his wife Julia Chapin in the city and married her in 1852. Grinnell's activism in New York exposed him to important political circles and fostered what would become a lifelong friendship with New York Tribune editor Horace Greeley. According to his autobiography, Grinnell was the recipient of the famous advice by Greeley to "Go West, young man. Go West."[18] Whether this is actually true is uncertain, but in 1854, Grinnell purchased several hundred acres of land west of the Mississippi and founded the village that would become Grinnell, Iowa.

J.B. Grinnell's vision for the town of Grinnell reflected the personal values he developed growing up in New England. Grinnell wanted a community antithetical to the conditions he witnessed in Washington D.C.

In the advertisements he released to draw residents, Grinnell called for people, "desirous of educational facilities, and of temperance and Congregational affinities."[19] Implicit in Grinnell's advertisements was the message that the town would be forward-thinking, and thus open to abolitionists seeking a welcoming destination in the West. The foundation of Grinnell is part of a larger narrative in Iowa's rapid growth in the 1840's and 1850's, in which evangelists from the Northeast, drawn by the promise of land and the allure of Manifest Destiny, settled into small communities across the state. Northeasterners brought with them their progressive ideas, shifting public opinion in the '40s and '50s to a solidly antislavery public opinion as part of the larger drive to make new states and territories free of slavery.[20]

As Grinnell grew, the town gained a reputation around the state as an antislavery town. Soon after founding the town, Grinnell also founded Grinnell University, which would later merge with Iowa College to become Grinnell College. Founders and early professors at the college shaped it into a radical abolitionist institution.[21] The influence from J.B. Grinnell and the college community created an open and accepting culture in the town for radical abolitionist thought and activism.[22]

Right around the time of the foundation of Grinnell, Iowans found themselves increasingly drawn into the national debate about slavery because of the state's close proximity to the slave state Missouri and the two states involved in the Kansas-Nebraska Act. Iowa quickly became an important corridor for settlers and railroads pouring into the region to settle in the two new states.[23] Iowans also faced a natural byproduct of all of the traffic: the Underground Railroad. Grinnell's reputation as an abolitionist stronghold made the town an important stop on the Underground Railroad.[24] Given his well established abolitionist convictions, it is no surprise that J.B. Grinnell himself played a key role in facilitating the town's stop on the path to freedom. At the same time that Grinnell was hiding runaway slaves in his wool barn, he began to get involved in state legislation in order to address Iowa's growing involvement with the slavery issue.

In the mid-1850s the slavery question dominated public consciousness, and with the issue intimately affecting his community, J.B. Grinnell decided his work on the Underground Railroad was no longer enough and embarked on a political career that would span two decades. The national genesis of the Republican Party spurned a consolidation of Whigs and Free-Soilers in Iowa. In 1856, Governor James Grimes orchestrated a state convention of known leaders sympathetic to the Republican Party and the antislavery cause in Iowa City to found Iowa's Republican Party. Grinnell's growing regional influence earned him an invitation to the convention. The newcomer's charisma and energetic participation in debate turned heads at the convention and earned him a coveted position as chairman of the committee to draft the new party's address to Iowans.[25] The address was a successful introduction for both the Iowa Republican Party and for Grinnell, garnering high acclaim from Salmon Chase, governor of Ohio and an old friend of Grinnell's from his time spent in Washington D.C.[26] Grinnell's strong first impression also led to his nomination as the Republican candidate for the state senate position for the district encompassing Poweshiek, Jasper, Tama, and Mahaska counties. Running on a platform promoting temperance, free soil, and universal free education, Grinnell was elected to his first public office in 1856 as a state senator to the Iowa state legislature's Sixth General Assembly.[27]

J.B. Grinnell entered the Iowa state legislature during a tumultuous decade in the history of Iowa. The decade began with a considerable setback to Grinnell's cause, as the General Assembly passed a bill in 1851 banning free blacks from moving into the state.[28] As the decade progressed, Iowa Democrats continued to control the majority of Iowa's elected offices when the Kansas-Nebraska Act was issued by Congress.[29] The proslavery leaning Democrats made the spread of slavery to Kansas, Nebraska, and even Iowa seem possible, due to the state's influence over the growing popular sovereignty states and the settlers passing through. Furthermore, Iowa entered into a period of severe economic hardship which wreaked havoc on the state's banks in 1857 and 1858. To make matters worse, a series of natural disasters ravaged the state's crop production.[30]

Grinnell produced significant accomplishes in the state senate during these trying times. The Sixth General Assembly became the conductors for a political takeover, as the unified Iowa Republicans, led by James W. Grimes, Grinnell, and James Harlan wrested control from Democrats and pushed for progressive policies. As chairman of the Committee on Education, Grinnell secured the adoption of a bill in 1857 that organized school districts for any community containing at least

200 inhabitants.[31] Following through on his temperance platform, he took part in the enactment of a bill that restricted the production and sale of alcohol in the state.[32] The bill was wildly unpopular, forcing Grinnell to devote much of his time on restructuring an amendment to allow for the production and sale of beer and wine. Grinnell, annoyed by the time the drafting of the amendment took away from the pursuit of the slavery question, expressed his frustration in his autobiography that "the millions of black men enslaved were set over against the freemen depraved by appetite."[33]

Despite the amendment, the bill earned Grinnell support from the German immigrant community crucial to his reelection to the Seventh General Assembly in 1858. Grinnell's work in his second term in office produced his crowning achievement in the Iowa state legislature, the introduction of a standardized education system. Facing immense public pressure, Grinnell worked with the renowned expert on public education Horace Mann to introduce and enact a bill that created township school districts, introduced educational reforms, and established the office of the county superintendent to oversee the new school districts.[34] Importantly, J.B. Grinnell was able to express in legislation for the first time his stance on racial equality by making public schools free to students of all races. Grinnell's reforms on the education system ignited public enthusiasm for education and stand out as considerable achievements for the advancement of the cause of education in the early history of Iowa.[35] The success of the reforms and the integration of African-Americans into Iowa's school system enhanced Grinnell's prestige as a champion of education and racial integration. His experience with shaping Iowa's education system paved the way for his influence on the Freedman's Bureau Bill's plan to extend educational opportunities to freedmen later in his career.

As J.B. Grinnell worked in the Seventh General Assembly to promote education reforms, momentous events in his home district permanently linked Grinnell's name with radical abolitionism. By 1859, both Grinnell and his town had become well-known to Iowans as facilitators of the Underground Railroad. An editorial in the Des Moines Journal claimed the town had developed a "widespread reputation of being the most notorious rendezvous for stolen and fugitive Negroes west of the Mississippi."[36] Grinnell's notoriety drew an unexpected guest, when in February of 1859, John Brown, the infamous impetus of Bleeding Kansas, showed up on J.B. Grinnell's doorstep. He allowed Brown to spend the night in his house and Brown's posse to stay in his barn. The following day, Brown gave a speech in front of a large gathering of Grinnellians before departing on the journey that would lead him to Harper's Ferry. State newspapers quickly heard about Brown's visit and the warm reception he received by Grinnell, dubbing him with a polarizing new nickname, "John Brown Grinnell."[37]

The visit by John Brown and the subsequent attention given to the affair by the press solidified Grinnell's status as the most prominent abolitionist in the state of Iowa. An article published in the Iowa City Press following the incident succinctly summed up J.B.'s new status: "No man in America, Owen Lovejoy not excepted, more fully embodies the whole juice and spirit of rampant abolitionism in its purest essence, than does J.B. Grinnell."[38] The news of Grinnell's association with Brown gained traction and spread around the country, assisted by Brown himself who gave credit to Grinnell wherever he went for providing him shelter in Iowa.[39] Iowa's Democrats naturally grilled Grinnell for harboring the notorious face of Bleeding Kansas, but despite the negative publicity, the news further boosted his meteoric rise on the national abolitionist scene. Brown's radicalism displayed at Harper's Ferry linked Grinnell with the Far Left of an already radical Republican Party, and once he was elected to Congress, it earned him a seat with the Radical Republicans in the House.[40]

Following Brown's visit, two more events confirmed J.B. Grinnell's commitment to the abolitionist cause. In July of 1860 Grinnell harbored five runaway slaves in his home. The slaves were the most wanted fugitives in the area because of the reward published by their owner from Nebraska City in several regional newspapers. Grinnell's notoriety was heightened to a new level when the Democratic Iowa State Journal published the headline, "J.B. Grinnell & Co. have recently received another consignment of negroes from Missouri."[41] The fact that he was widely regarded by Iowans as a conscientious lawbreaker probably contributed to his failure at reelection to the state legislature in 1859 by one vote.[42] Although he lost his spot in public office, he continued to gain greater political honors, as he was selected to the serve on Iowa's delegation to the Republican primaries in Chicago.[43] Grinnell submitted his vote for Lincoln at the primary, and although Lincoln did not fully support

abolition at the time, the vote should still be seen as Grinnell's first official act towards equality on the national level.

By the time of the 1862 congressional elections, J.B. Grinnell's political career and his private life proved that radical abolitionism was at the core of his being. Every step of Grinnell's career trajectory reflected his earnest passion for the abolitionist cause. He left his mark as a leader committed to his principles everywhere he went, from his time spent at the Oneida Institute during the proliferation of antislavery activism in New York, to his fiery sermons that got him kicked out of Washington D.C. Finally, in the state of Iowa, he left a legacy as a legislator that promoted education for all races, and as a member of the Underground Railroad who harbored John Brown on his way to Harper's Ferry. Grinnell's die-hard commitment to abolitionism prepared him to preside as a representative from Iowa to two of the most momentous sessions of Congress in American history, which would decide the fate of the cause he was most passionate about: the slavery issue.

The Evolution of Congressional Attitudes Toward Abolition

J.B. Grinnell entered his freshman term in Congress during a period of great uncertainty for the future of the country, and for the future of the millions of black Americans whose fates hinged on the outcome of the war and the actions taken by Congress. In 1862, when the Union held its wartime congressional elections, the Civil War was in full swing and victory for the Union seemed far from certain. The elections threatened the progress made by abolitionists and the Republican Party as control of the House and Senate seemed to be tilting in favor of the Democrats. J.B. Grinnell's race with Samuel Rice for their district's seat in the House of Representatives reflected the closely contested political divide in the Union, as Grinnell won by a measure of just 50 ballots.[44] Grinnell's election in Iowa was part of a delegation of swing states that secured Republican majorities in the House and the Senate for the Thirty-eighth Congress.[45] Despite the control of Congress by Republicans, internal divisions within the party jeopardized the solidarity necessary to instituting landmark abolition legislation.

From the very beginning of the war, Radical Republicans pushed for discussion of abolition in congressional debates, and pressured Lincoln to take a more radical stance regarding slavery.[46] While Radical Republicans called for Lincoln to expand his executive powers, Liberal Republicans opposed expansion of the federal government.[47] Conservative Republicans primarily focused on free labor and the preservation of the Union.[48] Republicans entered the war ideologically divided, but the rapid turn of events of the war drew them together under the common cause of preserving the Union.

Developments in the war catalyzed an evolution within the Republican Party, as partisans from competing ideological camps compromised over legislation that would contribute to Union military success, even if the measures contradicted their respective antebellum principles. President Lincoln led the way for his party's unification by promoting and approving increasingly radical legislation designed to restrict slavery's reach and tighten the noose on the Confederate economy. Civil War historian James Oakes maintains, "if anything guided Lincoln, it was the demands of war. [...] emancipating slaves from the seceded states, for so long disavowed, was becoming a 'military necessity.'"[49] In 1862, Republicans in Congress passed several quasi-emancipatory acts, including the Confiscation Acts, the prohibition of the expansion of slavery into federal territories, the abolishment of the Atlantic slave trade, and the abolishment of slavery in Washington D.C.[50] The measures taken by Congress in 1862 naturally aligned with Radical Republicans. For Liberals and Conservatives, however, Congress' actions defied their antebellum commitment to limiting the expansion of the federal government. Their acquiescence to the increasingly radical measures endorsed by Lincoln and the Radicals reflects the evolution of the mindset regarding the war by many Union congressman: that Congress should do what was necessary to secure a total military victory and preserve the Union.

One such action taken by Congress to contribute to military victory was approving the admission of black soldiers into the Union army, a milestone in the war that J.B. Grinnell played an important part in orchestrating. Grinnell proudly recalls in his autobiography:

> The blacks, their position in the war, and their future, was a question which loomed high and was the occasion of many a threatening storm. Even if egotistic, I must say that the first resolution which I ever offered in the American Congress and which was adopted, gave focus to an

> opinion and was in these words: Resolved, that a more vigorous policy to enlist, at an early day and in larger numbers, in our army, persons of African descent, would meet the approbation of the House. More than a mere sentiment, it was heeded by land and by sea.[51]

That the first resolution proposed by Grinnell in the House called for the enlistment of black soldiers is remarkable because it indicates that he was committed to advocating for blacks from the very beginning of his tenure in Congress. His adopted resolution for the inclusion of black soldiers in the army was part of the trend of legislation made possible by the demands of the war that fit neatly into Radical Republican ideology. The other resolution echoing radical principles that involved Grinnell was the Thirteenth Amendment.

The progress of the war changed public opinion on the prospect of the national abolishment of slavery, making the Emancipation Proclamation possible for Lincoln. According to Vorenberg:

> [...] people's prewar attitudes toward the founding document and its revision constantly shifted in relation to changing political and social objectives. The immediate circumstances of the Civil War, rather than established principles concerning slavery and the Constitution, shaped people's understanding and appreciation of the antislavery amendment.[52]

Indeed, as the war raged on, citizens in the Union and their political leaders realized that the abolitionist cause and the preservation of the Union were intimately linked.[53] Union victory and reconciliation would only be possible if Congress abolished the Confederacy's principal cause, the institution of slavery.

Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation on January 1, 1863, setting in motion the process of drafting and ratifying the Thirteenth Amendment that would force the need for the Thirty-eighth Congress to continue to find ways to compromise. By framing emancipation as a war measure, Lincoln gained the full support of Republicans, despite some reluctance by conservatives, because emancipation was directly tied to securing Union victory. Although the proclamation catered to the interests of each of the factions in the Republican Party, the public's reaction signified that the country would have to adapt to Lincoln's radical decision.[54] Furthermore, Lincoln and the Republicans faced immediate backlash by Democrats against the Emancipation Proclamation, claiming that Lincoln had given over to fanaticism.[55]

Following the proclamation, the Thirty-eighth Congress embarked on two years of heated congressional debates over the contents of the Thirteenth Amendment and the promotion of the amendment by Republicans in order to swing Democratic votes to gain the two-thirds majority in the House and the Senate necessary for ratification. Once again, the spirit of disgruntled compromise characteristic of the Civil War congresses prevailed on January 31, 1865, when enough Democrats changed their votes to ratify the Thirteenth Amendment. Even though their decision to ratify the amendment countered their convictions about abolition, these Democrats came around to ratification because they believed it removed an important political roadblock to Congress' contribution to winning the war.[56]

J.B. Grinnell was able to resist the trend of voting against personal principles experienced by many congressman in the Thirty-eighth Congress simply because the tides of war veered public opinion, Lincoln, the Republican Party, and even some Democrats toward Grinnell's abolitionist cause. He served in the House of Representatives during a period of unbridled optimism for Radical Republicans, as the proclamation and the Thirteenth Amendment set the country on a course to finally accomplish emancipation.[57] The circumstances of the war contributed to a series of compromises that allowed for J.B. Grinnell to assert his antebellum antislavery ethic by adding his signature to the decisive act by Congress to abolish slavery in the United States forever.[58] Yet, while emancipation was a watershed achievement for Grinnell and the rest of the Radical Republicans, the fight for equality had only just begun. In the Thirty-ninth Congress, J.B. Grinnell's principles would be tested by the enormous task of Reconstruction, an issue that would cause divisions even within his own radical faction.

The Headstrong Radical: J.B. Grinnell's Commitment to

Upholding Equality in the Thirty-ninth Congress

J.B. Grinnell developed an outspoken voice in the House of Representatives upon his reelection to the Thirty-ninth Congress in 1865. The process of adjusting to his first term in Congress and the singular direction of the Republican Party toward winning the war limited Grinnell's opportunity for oration in the Thirty-eighth Congress, save for his resolution for the enlistment of black soldiers. But confidence drawn from a session of experience under his belt, and the growing divide in the debate over the direction the country should take during Reconstruction, encouraged Grinnell to take a more active role on the House floor. Grinnell became one of the leaders of the Freedmen's Bureau committee's efforts to expand the powers of the Bureau in order to protect the rights of the country's black citizens during Reconstruction.

He distinguished himself as one of the most outspoken Radical Republicans in the Thirty-ninth Congress with fiery rhetoric on the House floor that drew bitter political enemies from the Johnson camp in the Reconstruction debate, which led to the feud with Rousseau that put Grinnell's own life in danger. The caning by Rousseau was all due to his persistence in promoting his principles, as Grinnell himself recalls on his time in Congress during Reconstruction, "my humble acts were based on decided convictions."[59]

Upon the conclusion of the war, Congress entered a fierce debate over the nature of Reconstruction. Conservatives under President Johnson approached Reconstruction from a perspective of reconciliation, pardoning hundreds of ex-Confederates and allowing for Southern states to shape their own reconstructive laws. Radical Republicans, led by Thaddeus Stevens and Charles Sumner, argued for federal intervention in Reconstruction in order to protect freedmen, redistribute land, and extend suffrage to black Southerners.[60] At the beginning of the Thirty-ninth Congress, Lyman Trumbull introduced the Freedman's Bureau Bill, which would extend the existence of the Freedman's Bureau, abolish the discriminative Black Codes instituted by the Southern states, and provide for military and judicial protection of freedmen.[61]

Grinnell emerged as a leader for the Freedman's Bureau committee, and in early 1866, Grinnell made a series of speeches on the House floor advocating for the expansion of the powers of the Freedman's Bureau. According to his autobiography, General Oliver Howard, the head of the Bureau, and several prominent black leaders saw Grinnell as a "champion" of the Freedman's Bureau Bill.[62] He delivered one of his most controversial speeches on February 5, when he used the state of Kentucky as an example for the necessity of the protection of civil rights guaranteed under the proposed bill. In that speech, he argued:

> The white man in Kentucky can testify in courts; the black man can testify against himself. The white man can vote; the black man cannot. The white man, if he commits an offense, is tried by a jury of his peers; the black man is tried by his enlightened, unprejudiced superiors. The rape of a negro woman by a white man is no offense; the rape of a white woman by a negro man is punishable by death, and the Governor of the State cannot commute.[63]

His objective in this speech was to advise the House that, without the adoption of the Freedman's Bureau Bill, black citizens in Southern states would continue to live without equal protection under the law. Grinnell recognized that his abolitionist ethic did not end with emancipation. To remain true to the egalitarian morals he developed before the war, Grinnell needed to maintain the fight for equal rights for freedmen during Reconstruction.

As he continued his oratory, Grinnell personally attacked representative Lovell Rousseau in order to highlight the dangers freedmen in Kentucky faced due to racial prejudice. Grinnell fearlessly claimed:

> The honorable gentleman from Kentucky declared on Saturday as I caught his language that if he were arrested on the complaint of a negro and brought before one of the agents of this bureau, when he became free he would shoot him. Is that civilization? It is the spirit of barbarism, that has too long dwelt in our land, the spirit of infernal regions that brought on the rebellion and this war.[64]

By making Rousseau's comments known to the House, Grinnell hoped to show that freedmen were potentially not even safe from their own congressmen. His personal attack did not further the cause of the Freedman's

Bureau Bill as he intended. Rather, the speech only served to exacerbate the divide between proponents of the bill and those aligned with President Johnson's vision for Reconstruction. On February 19, Johnson, who had previously expressed little concern over the bill, shocked Republicans with a veto.[65]

On an individual level, Grinnell's speech initiated a personal vendetta with Rousseau that would culminate in his own caning. The speech came at a time when tensions by competing factions in Congress were approaching the level of belligerence exhibited in the antebellum congressional sessions that prompted the caning of Charles Sumner. Indeed, as William M. Carter writes in an article regarding the Thirteenth Amendment in the Columbia Law Review, Sumner's caning happened because "one of the key aspects of the Slave Power was the use of violence and intimidation to retaliate against persons who advocated ideas of liberty and equality."[66] In Grinnell's case, the "Slave Power" was Johnson and his band of Conservative Reconstructionists who wanted to limit equality by blocking the expansion of the Freedman's Bureau. Grinnell was a prime target for the return to violent retaliation by Southern congressmen because of his renewed activism evident in the series of speeches he delivered on behalf of freedmen. According to Payne, Grinnell's "uncompromising attitude on negro rights made him many bitter enemies in the House who lost no opportunity to attack him."[67]

In the months between his initial speech and the caning, Grinnell continued to attack Rousseau on the House floor, questioning Rousseau's personal honor as a Union general who fought for emancipation in the war, but supported the version of Reconstruction that would limit the rights of the black population the Union fought to free.[68] Grinnell was motivated to continue his persecution of Rousseau because he saw him as the representation of the trend by Union congressmen to abandon the fight for black equality after emancipation. He lambastes the congressmen that discarded their wartime convictions during Reconstruction in his autobiography:

> The shame of so-called patriots in opposing the policies of the war party should have brought confession, but rather angered those who had been defeated at every step. Those amendments which were designed to forbid slavery and to protect the poor were not supported by the anti-war party. This alone was enough to place obstructionists at the North under suspicion as to future acts. Not as prodigals, then, did the South come back, but to affiliate with the most dangerous foes of the Union at the North. Trade and commerce wanted peace and outvoted the radicals.[69]

In Grinnell's opinion, Rousseau, in pushing to block the Freedman's Bureau Bill, was colluding with the former Confederate States so that they could continue the disenfranchisement of freedmen. Rousseau, Johnson, and their colleagues endangered veering Congress away from the path of progress it had worked for during the war. But by using Rousseau as an example for his argument, Grinnell brought on unnecessary controversy that detracted from his original aim.

Although he was a Unionist, Rousseau, as a Kentuckian, came from a traditional Southern society that placed a high value on the integrity of a man's honor. The Southern honor culture was extreme, mandating a willingness to die in defense of one's own character and reputation.[70] Grinnell seems to have gotten carried away with his hatred for Rousseau, as their verbal fights on the House floor devolved into petty exchanges that detracted from congressional discussions and drew ire from national press.[71] Having been raised in a slave society, Grinnell's verbal dominance over Rousseau embarrassed the Southerner, and may have caused Rousseau, much to his chagrin, to view himself as the subordinate in their relationship much like the master-slave relationship in slave societies.[72] Such an imbalance in the control of power in personal relationships, especially when one party was relegated to having slavelike qualities, usually led to Southerners to feel the need to defend their honor.[73]

On June 14, 1866, Lovell Rousseau decided Grinnell had disparaged his honor too much, and he beat the defenseless Grinnell with a cane in the Capitol building until the cane broke. The caning received widespread press coverage, and a hearing in the House on the event. Though a vote in the House did not collect enough for votes for Rousseau's expulsion, he was reprimanded by Congress and resigned from his seat.[74] Grinnell was shaken by the incident, but maintained his resolve. He was also condemned by the House for his excessive antagonization of Rousseau, nevertheless he was allowed to continue serving in Congress. Although

the prolonged instigation by Grinnell should not be celebrated, the root of the conflict deserves recognition. In his initial speeches for the Freedman's Bureau, J.B. Grinnell exhibited a significant degree of courage in disclosing the jeopardization of civil rights for black Kentuckians in a hostile session of Congress that would become notorious in American history books for ignoring the rights of black citizens.

While he weathered the changing political sphere of the Thirty-eighth Congress, and argued in favor of the Freedman's Bureau and all of its protections, Grinnell was not immune to the weight of politics on personal principles. In 1866, as he gave speeches in the House promoting suffrage for Southern freedmen, Grinnell actually mobilized a group of Republicans in Iowa to oppose granting suffrage to blacks in Iowa.[75] Payne argues:

> The inconsistency of his record on this question laid Grinnell open to the charge of putting party above principle. He would doubtless have replied that the negro did not require the vote in Iowa for his own protection, as he did in the South, and that the ascendancy of the Republican party was essential to negro security in both regions.[76]

The argument is credible that the sacrifice of black suffrage in Iowa, so that the Republican party could retain power and thus ensure a better future for black Americans, was a necessary evil committed by Grinnell. Still, as a man so focused on exposing the wrongs done by other congressmen, Grinnell teetered on forgoing his own principles in this episode. But the sacrifice allowed Republicans in Iowa to maintain their position, which in turn allowed Grinnell to continue arguing for Southern black suffrage in Washington. Furthermore, a clash with one of his best friends on the House floor would prove that Grinnell's endgame was justice for freedmen.

On January 17, 1867, Grinnell argued against the architect of Radical Reconstruction, Thaddeus Stevens, in a speech on the House floor. By this time, Grinnell was no stranger to confrontation, but his speech represented a professional break with a personal friend. Stevens and other prominent radicals admired Grinnell from afar when the John Brown affair broke national news in 1859.[77] Grinnell met Stevens during the roll call at the beginning of the Thirty-eighth Congress, when he offered Stevens his favorable seat in the House hall so that the leader of the Radicals could sit in a prominent position.[78] The move sparked a lifelong friendship between the two, and Grinnell's admission into the Radical Republican inner circle. The friendship made Grinnell privy to important information, as he says, "I had only to hint to Mr. Stevens to learn the order of bills, with the privilege of amendment and frequent yielding of time in debate."[79]

Stevens was a fierce proponent of confiscating Confederate lands and redistributing them to freedmen, and part of his plan hinged on the cooperation of leaders of the ex-Confederate states to institute reconstruction on the state level. In the speech he made against Stevens' plan, Grinnell argued that Reconstruction needed to be handled by the federal government, and that it was the federal responsibility to ensure "justice and safety meted out for the loyal millions."[80] He warned the House that Stevens' plan, which asked for the former Confederate states to swear allegiance to the government as a requirement for state level administration, did not ask enough of the states in question because they needed to be held accountable for the crime of slavery.[81] Stevens' plan was radical in itself, but Grinnell called for even more radical measures to ensure justice for freedmen beyond emancipation.

By taking on his colleague Thaddeus Stevens, Grinnell demonstrated a willingness to tackle any obstacle to equal rights for black Southerners. After years of leadership of the Radical Republicans, and as chairman of the Appropriations committee, Stevens wielded immense power in the House of Representatives.[82] Only the desire to act on deep moral convictions would motivate Grinnell to challenge such a political behemoth, and a personal friend, and push for a version of Reconstruction beyond the plans proposed by his own Radical Republican faction. Grinnell's crystallized personal beliefs regarding justice for freedmen by the end of his run in Congress are best expressed by the conclusion to his speech against Stevens:

> Allow me to say, in conclusion, that it rests upon us to decide at an early day whether we are to allow rebels to come and take their seats here unwashed, unrepentant, unpunished, unhung, [laughter;] or whether we will heed the voice of our friends, fleeing from the South for their lives; whether we will listen to the supplication of four

> million black people, all true to the great principles which we ere seek to establish. For one I urge the earliest action. I desire we should place those States in a position where a home may be possible, where education may be established, where the ballot may be secured to all those who are loyal to this Government.[83]

Conclusion

J.B. Grinnell's steadfast commitment to his principles ultimately led to his political downfall. As Rousseau repeatedly struck Grinnell with his cane that fateful day in 1866, Grinnell withstood the blows to his head without fighting back. Upon hearing the news that he did not fight back, Iowans lost respect for Grinnell and voted against his bid for reelection to the House of Representatives.[84] J.B. Grinnell may have appeared cowardly for refusing to physically retaliate at the time, but his record shows that Grinnell exuded courage and a tiresome willingness to fight for his principles along every step of his political journey. From his fiery sermons against the antebellum slave trade in Washington D.C., to his reception of John Brown, his signature on the Thirteenth Amendment, his audacity to take on the state of Kentucky, and to the challenge of his friend and preeminent Radical Republican Thaddeus Stevens, Grinnell proved that he would not back down from a fight. J.B. Grinnell's legacy does not end at founder of Grinnell, Iowa, and namesake of Grinnell College. Grinnell's legacy stands among the very few congressmen who overcame the chaotic events of the Civil War and emerged as a headstrong champion of their own principles on the other side.

Notes

1. "Representative Lovell H. Rousseau Assaulted Representative Josiah B. Grinnell," United States House of Representatives," accessed November 8, 2016, http://history.house.gov/HistoricalHighlight/Detail/36235?ret=True
2. "Josiah Bushnell Grinnell--A Man of Many Avocations," Grinnell Herald Register (Grinnell, IA), April 22, 1971, accessed through the Grinnell College Archives, http://www.grinnell.lib.ia.us/files/archives/JB%20Grinnell%20article.pdf
3. Charles E. Payne, Josiah Bushnell Grinnell (Iowa City: The State Historical Society of Iowa, 1938).
Michael Vorenberg, Final Freedom: The Civil War, the Abolition of Slavery, and the Thirteenth Amendment (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 5.
4. Michael S. Green, Freedom, Union, and Power: Lincoln and His Party During the Civil War (New York: Fordham University Press, 2004), 6.
5. J.B. Grinnell, Men and Events of Forty Years, Autobiographical Reminiscences of an Active Career from 1850 to 1890 (Boston: D. Lothrop Company, 1891), 1.
6. Ibid, 5.
7. See Grinnell's accomplishments as chairman of Iowa's Committee on Education, page 10.
8. David Hudson, Marvin Bergman and Loren Horton, The Biographical Dictionary of Iowa (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 2009), 199.
9. Ibid, 199.
10. Douglas M. Strong, Perfectionist Politics: Abolitionism and the Religious Tensions of American Democracy (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1999), 89.
11. Grinnell, 30.
12. Hudson, Bergman and Horton, 199.
13. Strong, 74.
14. Ibid, 114.
15. Grinnell, 51.
16. Ibid, 57.
17. Hudson, Bergman and Horton, 199.
18. John S. Nollen, Grinnell College (Iowa City: The State Historical Society of Iowa, 1953), 54.
19. Lowell J. Soike, Necessary Courage: Iowa's Underground Railroad in the Struggle Against Slavery (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 2013), 28.
20. Joseph F. Wall, Grinnell College in the Nineteenth Century: From Salvation to Service (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1997) 115.
21. Ibid, 116.
22. Soike, 99.
23. Wall, 116.
24. Payne, 66.
25. Grinnell, 122.
26. Ibid, 68.
27. Morton M. Rosenberg, "The People of Iowa on the Eve of Civil War," Annals of Iowa 39 (1967): 114. http://ir.uiowa.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=7857&context=annals-of-iowa
28. Soike, 85.
29. Rosenberg, 128.
30. Payne, 70.

31. Ibid, 72.
32. Grinnell, 128.
33.Payne, 79.
34. Ibid, 82.
35. Nicole Etcheson, "Daring death for an idea: J.B. Grinnell and the Underground Railroad," Grinnell Herald Register (Grinnell, IA), accessed through the Grinnell College Archives, http://www.grinnell.lib.ia.us/files/archives/JB%20Grinnell%20and%20Underground%20RR.pdf
36. Nollen, 56.
37. Payne, 112.
38. Wall, 118.
39. Ibid, 118.
40. Soike, 181.
41. Payne, 116.
42. Ibid, 125.
43. Payne, 148.
44. Ibid, 148.
45. Green, 145.
46. Andrew L. Slap, The Doom of Reconstruction: the Liberal Republicans in the Civil War Era (New York: Fordham University Press, 2006), 62.
47. Green, 143.
48. James Oakes, The Radical and the Republican: Frederick Douglass, Abraham Lincoln, and the Triumph of Antislavery Politics (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2007), 155.
49. Oakes, 182.
50. Grinnell, 143.
51. Vorenberg, 61-63.
52. Green, 155.
53. Ibid, 158.
54. Oakes, 192.
55. Green, 167.
56. Ibid, 161.
57. "Congress 1864 - Photo Tiff," Digital Grinnell, accessed October 21, 2016, https://digital.grinnell.edu/islandora/object/grinnell%3A10173
58. Grinnell, 155.
59. Slap, 77.
60. Ibid, 78.
61. Grinnell, 169.
62. Congressional Globe, 39th Cong. 651 (Feb. 5, 1866).
63. Ibid, 652.
64. Slap, 79.
65. William M. Carter, "The Thirteenth Amendment and Pro-Equality Speech," Columbia Law Review 112 (2012): 1863, http://www.jstor.org/stable/41708166
66. Payne, 190.
67. Ibid, 223.
68. Grinnell, 157.
69. Kenneth S. Greenberg, Honor & Slavery (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 36.
70. Payne, 224.
71. Greenberg, 62.
72. Ibid, 62.
73. Payne, 230.
74. Ibid, 183.
75. Ibid, 184.
76. Wall, 120.
77. Grinnell, 132.
78. Ibid, 132.
79. Congressional Globe, 39th Cong. 536 (Jan. 17, 1867).
80. Ibid, 536.
81. Raymond W. Smock, "Searching for the Political Legacy of Thaddeus Stevens," Pennsylvania History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic Studies 60 (1993): 190, http://

Bibliography

Carter, William M. "The Thirteenth Amendment and Pro-Equality Speech." Columbia Law Review 112 (2012): 1855-1881. http://www.jstor.org/stable/41708166

"Congress 1864 - Photo Tiff." Digital Grinnell. Accessed October 21, 2016. https://digital.grinnell.edu/islandora/object/grinnell%3A10173

Congressional Globe, 39th Cong. February 5, 1866.

Congressional Globe, 39th Cong. January 17, 1867.

Etcheson, Nicole. "Daring death for an idea: J.B. Grinnell and the Underground Railroad." Grinnell Herald Register (Grinnell, IA). Accessed through the Grinnell College Archives, http://www.grinnell.lib.ia.us/files/archives/JB%20Grinnell%20and%20Underground%20RR.pdf

Green, Michael S. Freedom, Union, and Power: Lincoln and His Party During the Civil War. New York: Fordham University Press, 2004.

Greenberg, Kenneth S. Honor & Slavery. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996.

Grinnell, J.B. Men and Events of Forty Years, Autobiographical Reminiscences of an Active Career from 1850 to 1890. Boston: D. Lothrop Company, 1891.

Hudson, David, Marvin Bergman and Loren Horton. The Biographical Dictionary of Iowa. Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 2009.

"Josiah Bushnell Grinnell--A Man of Many Avocations." Grinnell Herald Register (Grinnell, IA), April 22, 1971. Accessed through the Grinnell College Archives, http://www.grinnell.lib.ia.us/files/archives/JB%20Grinnell%20article.pdf

Nollen, John S. Grinnell College. Iowa City: The State Historical Society of Iowa, 1953.

Oakes, James. The Radical and the Republican: Frederick Douglass, Abraham Lincoln, and the Triumph of Antislavery Politics. New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2007.

Payne, Charles E. Josiah Bushnell Grinnell. Iowa City: The State Historical Society of Iowa, 1938.

Rosenberg, Morton M. "The People of Iowa on the Eve of Civil War" Annals of Iowa 39 (1967): 105-133. http://ir.uiowa.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=7857&context=annals-of-iowa

Slap, Andrew L. The Doom of Reconstruction: the Liberal Republicans in the Civil War. New York: Fordham University Press, 2006.

Smock, Raymond W. "Searching for the Political Legacy of Thaddeus Stevens." Pennsylvania History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic Studies 60 (1993): 189-195. http://www.jstor.org/stable/27773618

Soike, Lowell J. Necessary Courage: Iowa's Underground Railroad in the Struggle Against Slavery. Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 2013.

Strong, Douglas M. Perfectionist Politics: Abolitionism and the Religious Tensions of American Democracy. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1999.

Vorenberg, Michael. Final Freedom: The Civil War, the Abolition of Slavery, and the Thirteenth Amendment. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

Wall, Joseph F. Grinnell College in the Nineteenth Century: From Salvation to Service. Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1997.

Raymond W. Smock, "Searching for the Political Legacy of Thaddeus Stevens," Pennsylvania History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic Studies 60 (1993): 189-195, http://www.jstor.org/stable/27773618

"Representative Lovell H. Rousseau Assaulted Representative Josiah B. Grinnell." United States House of Representatives." Accessed November 8, 2016. http://history.house.gov/HistoricalHighlight/Detail/36235?ret=True

Marijuana, Mothers, Morals, and the Military:

Rhetorical Motifs and Epistemic Authority in Pro-Medical Cannabis Testimonies

Misha Lamb
Class of 2018

Introduction

Cannabis is being legalized across the United States at an astounding pace, both for medical and recreational purposes. As of March 2017, 28 states and DC have legalized medical cannabis in some form (ProCon.org). However, as individual states march ahead, questions still linger about the true efficacy of the botanical plant and its extracts as treatment for various medical conditions. The lists of these qualifying conditions vary from state to state, sending and reinforcing an inconsistent message about cannabis' effectiveness (Hoffman and Weber 2010; Troutt and DiDonato 2015). Advocates and patients claim that cannabis helps manage a wide variety of conditions and can even replace prescription drugs in some instances, so discerning the truth about cannabis is crucial to addressing an increasingly prominent topic in public health (Ilgen et al. 2013; Lucas et al. 2016; Osborn et al. 2015; Walsh et al. 2013). However, the evidence of cannabis' efficacy – much of it anecdotal – is guilty of self-selection bias, among other flaws that make it difficult for some corners of the scientific community to take seriously (Ilgen et al. 2013; Press et al. 2015). The result is a situation of "medicine by popular vote," in which powerful political and financial interests (on both sides) influence policy more than a neutral appraisal of existing literature (Thompson and Koenen 2011).

Complicating matters is the fact that the United States federal government prevents most medical cannabis research from taking place due to its regulations, limited number of strains, and "paradigm of prohibition" (Harris 2010). This federal paradigm cites the abuse potential and "crudeness" of the substances in the botanical plant (as opposed to the refined, synthetic versions used in pharmaceuticals like Marinol), rendering it unfit for serious medical usage (Chapkis and Webb 2008). Therefore, medical cannabis advocates in the US must sometimes resort to methods outside the realm of evidence-based medicine to reframe the consumption of cannabis as a necessary medical act. This work of discursive analysis compares the epistemology of the federal government's paradigm against advocates' relative privileging of anecdotal evidence in the form of individual testimonies and personal narratives. While researchers using well-established and widely accepted methods are increasingly frustrated by federal restrictions, advocates invent new avenues for evidence to reframe medical cannabis for public policy and perception (University of New Mexico 2016). In their narratives, advocates deemphasize or omit information about the psychoactive features of the drug while emphasizing their own various positions of respectability (e.g., veteran status or parenthood) to distance themselves from stereotypical potheads (Chapkis 2007).

Paradigm of Prohibition

In 1970, US Congress passed the Controlled Substances Act, which was later used to classify cannabis as a Schedule I drug, or highly addictive with no medicinal properties (Bostwick 2012). In the name of protecting the public, the federal government also shut the door to future cannabis research. The bureaucracies of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) have been known to cause delays in cannabis acquisition lasting from months to years, with disastrous results for scientific studies already underway (Harris 2010). Furthermore, NIDA's implicit agenda to highlight the study of negative consequences of drug use (they are the institute of "drug abuse," after all) generates a conflict of interest between it and the scientists who would like to investigate the potential positive benefits of responsibly used medical cannabis (Bostwick 2012). Political factors play a crucial role in what kind of research can be done, how it can be done, and which conclusions are "permitted" or expected, as shown by the following

quote from a NIDA spokeswoman (Harris 2010):

> As the National Institute on Drug Abuse, our focus is primarily on the negative consequences of marijuana use … We generally do not fund research focused on the potential beneficial medical effects of marijuana.

What little research is authorized is of poor quality due to the difficult of performing double-blind studies with an obviously psychoactive drug, as well as its irrelevance to the concerns of real-life patients (Noonan 2016). The limited and weak cannabis strains NIDA provides for studies are highly deficient in THC and CBD compared to the strains that many patients use (National Institute on Drug Abuse 2016; University of New Mexico 2016). Research on other compounds in the cannabis plant, such as terpenes, is practically nonexistent (Lupkin 2016; Russo and McPartland 2003). Some past scholars have even expressed skepticism at the notion that the currently accepted scientific method can be properly applied to problems of this nature (Kalant 1968; Mikuriya 1973).

As the American medical cannabis movement began to gain steam in the late 1980s, it generated vigorous debate and concern from anti-drug advocates and many governmental figures, who saw it as a subversion of federal authority and antithetical to the War on Drugs. This was exemplified at a hearing on October 1, 1997 before the Subcommittee on Crime – that the issue even went to this committee indicates how cannabis consumption was still framed at that time. There, officials and lawmakers alternately called existing medical cannabis research insufficient, while denying that it should even be allowed in the first place, as cannabis' illicit status, countercultural associations, "crude" and botanical nature, and generally pleasurable effects made it antithetical to much of American medicine (Chapkis and Webb 2008). General Barry R. McCaffrey, Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, criticized Arizona and California's 1996 medical cannabis referenda for "bypass[ing] the rigorous scientific approval process required of all medicines" and called for "science [to] prevail over ideology." Meanwhile, Representative Bob Barr of Georgia considered even the suggestion of medical cannabis research "a counterproductive message" and declared: "You talk about that [sic] the medical use of marijuana ought to be decided by doctors and scientists, it already has been: that's why it's in Schedule I" (Subcommittee on Crime 1997). The complications of this rhetoric would restrict funding and tie up medical cannabis researchers in red tape for years to come.

Instead of relying solely on the evidence of doctors and scientists (among whom open supporters of medical cannabis were a small number at the time), the medical cannabis movement encouraged patients and their families themselves to directly testify about the plant's effectiveness. As if to anticipate these arguments, the responses from the Subcommittee on Crime were both admonishing and mocking. Representative Bill McCollum of Florida accused the medical cannabis movement of "cynically exploit[ing] the suffering of the terminally ill," stripping those patients of their agency. McCaffrey and Barr belittled patients themselves by accusing them of insincerely malingering or exaggerating minor health concerns as an excuse to obtain psychoactive drugs under the aegis of medical care. For example, McCaffrey joked about the "element of humor in growing pot in your own backyard … for amnesia or writer's cramp," making patients' complaints seem insignificant. As Barr said (Subcommittee on Crime 1997):

> One of our other witnesses is positing that marijuana can be effective against aging; that it can be effective against phantom limb pain; it can be effective against violence. There is a – you have to take some of this stuff with a large grain of salt or some other substance. It is goofy what these folks are proposing, and one would think that they would have, at least, enough intelligence to not put out silly stuff like this, because it would help their credibility, marginally, perhaps, if they didn't, but maybe it's good that they do, because it illustrates very graphically how goofy their ideas are.

Taking up the banner where conventional science has struggled, medical cannabis advocates – experts on nothing besides their own bodies and those of their loved ones – find themselves facing a prohibitive paradigm whose effects reverberate through cannabis discourse today.

Deserving Victims, Discreditable Identities, and the Social Self

Medical anthropologists and sociologists have filled in many gaps in knowledge with critical appraisals

of recreational drug use and clinical medicine. However, little ethnographic information about medical cannabis patients exists. An important counterexample is Chapkis and Webb's (2008) ethnography of a Californian medical cannabis collective. Among other topics pertaining to cannabis' social status, they also discuss the categories of "deserving victims" and "discreditable identities":

> Medical marijuana users … become divided in the public mind between patients … who have never used marijuana except as medicine, and pretenders who have a social relationship to the drug. As with other discreditable identities (like the prostitute, the poor person, or the single mother), a line can be drawn between a small class of deserving "victims" and a much larger group of the willfully bad who are unworthy of support.

Although such divisions are "illusory and dangerous" due to the blurring of medical and social identities and usages in real life, that does not stop medical cannabis advocates from framing the debate in a way that pits patients (deserving victims) against users who are not. However, Chapkis and Webb omit examples of what deserving victims and discreditable identities might look like in the case of medical cannabis discourse. Therefore, to expand upon their theory, it is necessary to look for themes in the types of testimonies to which they refer. This discursive analysis is based off 30 testimonies from state and federal hearings on medical cannabis, hailing from 15 states and DC between 1987 and 2016. Materials were discovered by extensive database and web searches and the top results selected only if they included stories about a medical cannabis patient told from the standpoint of a non-expert. (Although two testimonies were given by family members who happened to be medical doctors, neither discussed the patient's story as a medical case study.) All sources for materials can be found in Appendix A. As this analysis will demonstrate, seemingly extraneous details that testifiers like to add to their testimonies, such as veteran status, parenthood, and moral background, can be meticulously unpacked for hidden discursive meaning. Mobilization of certain identities not only reveals how advocates construct themselves and other patients as deserving victims, but also how they avoid being labeled with discreditable identities.

However, when examining political discourse, it is crucial to include the elements of rhetoric and persuasion as part of the process of constructing narratives and the self for others, rather than exclusively focus on the impersonal relationship between political events and speech alone. Duranti (2006) argues that politicians (the subject of his study) utilize personal narratives to construct a social persona he calls the "political self," which impresses voters with its trustworthiness, expertise, and likeability. In the case of medical cannabis, these narrative accounts not only help patients make sense of their own experience, but lets them evaluate those experiences in moral terms, pitting "the acceptable" against "the authentic." This project, building on Chapkis and Webb's (2008) concepts, uses Duranti's (2006) framework to explore the possibility that a similar process of narrative-making is used to construct the persona of the deserving victim.

Veteran Status: Countering the Counterculture

> I also speak before you as a military veteran suffering from health problems associated with my service … I am wondering why Minnesota has turned its back not only on the terminally ill and those who are greatly suffering with debilitating sicknesses, but also the many military veterans who fought for the freedoms that we enjoy today?
>
> Timothy Majerus, MN (2007)
>
> (Minnesotans for Compassionate Care 2017)

Veteran status is a potent force in all kinds of American activism. Entire organizations, such as Weed For Warriors, have sprung up to advocate for combat veterans who use medical cannabis. Advocates are well-aware of the social capital of veterans. As Dr. Sue Sisley, medical cannabis researcher and activist, commented to a reporter, veterans' groups are capable of "persuading even the most conservative Republicans that [cannabis] is medicine," reflecting the intertwined roles of science and anecdote in advocacy (O'Connell 2016). Incidentally, as of April 2017, Dr. Sisley is also undertaking the only federally funded study on the effects of medical cannabis on post-traumatic stress disorder – a study which uses veterans as its study population. As a class of deserving victim, veterans are difficult to oppose; in a society that reveres military service as a sign of patriotism, it is socially and politically risky to be perceived as snubbing someone who has served their country. Therefore, veteran status can be mobilized to

negate cannabis' countercultural associations, and to reframe the debate from one of "justifying" to one of "deserving."

Hippies and the anti-war movement are two prominent symbols linked with cannabis use in American culture. In the United States, cannabis was bestowed the reputation of a uniquely pacifistic and countercultural drug, with implications of opposition to American militarism and even veteran-worship. Despite many of them possessing liberal values themselves, however, medical cannabis advocates work hard to distance themselves from stereotypical potheads, and mobilization of veteran status is an extremely effective way of contradicting cannabis' undesirable associations. Indeed, some veterans were emphatic about their unwavering support of the American military and its actions (Minnesotans for Compassionate Care 2017):

> I'm a Vietnam veteran and my youngest son has recently returned from 18 months in Iraq. We are a family that honors this country, having served it in the military in every conflict since the Revolutionary War.
>
> Joni Whiting, MN (2007)

This directly contradicts the popular stereotypes of recreational cannabis users as being socially liberal and pacifistic. In doing so, it also attempts to portray more "legitimate" medical cannabis as especially deserving of bipartisan support. By stripping cannabis of its political metadata, it becomes possible for observers to evaluate it on their own partisan terms. For many Americans, and particularly conservatives, those terms include the valuation and appreciation of veterans.

The veteran narrative is also effective at shifting the burden of responsibility from the prospective patient to the government. Majerus (see the beginning of this section) effectively mobilizes his veteran status to completely flip the debate. Rather than having to justify their use before gatekeeping doctors, it is the government that finds itself in the awkward position of having to justify its denial of medical care to the people who served it. In the narrative reimagined by veterans, it is not the veterans who are betraying their country by breaking the law, but the government who is unpatriotically betraying its veterans by denying them the medicine they deserve.

Some veterans who are not patients also draw connections between the sacrifices they made for their country and the sacrifices they make for their loved ones in an attempt to transfer respectability to cannabis use (Georgia Care 2016):

> When friends and strangers thanked me for my military service, I would make sure they understood that it's my family that was essentially part of that same commitment, that they made some sacrifices for me to be able to go serve my country, especially when I was called to Iraq. So I refer to [my wife's] illness as a family disease. Not her illness alone, but a family disease because we all make sacrifices to support her.
>
> Warren Tannenbaum, GA (2016)

Here, the testifier compares his loyal care for his wife to his service to his country. The ill, cannabis-using wife corresponds to the innocent nation whose security the veteran-husband defends. And, just as he put his own life on the line for his country, he is also prepared to risk everything for his wife (Georgia Care 2016):

> As law-abiding citizens, and as a 28-year Navy veteran, we always follow the law. When it comes to helping improve my – my wife's MS symptoms, I'll risk everything to help her. I will give up my security clearance if I ever get arrested in an attempt to help her.
>
> Warren Tannenbaum, GA (2016)

Caring for one's loved ones by obtaining medical cannabis is neither criminal conspiracy nor simply a compassionate act, but a patriotic and laudable duty.

Moral Approval and the Politics of Pleasure

> Most people who smoke marijuana … constantly talk about the marijuana "high." To be honest, I never had the slightest clue what these people were talking about … I didn't like smoking. I do not smoke tobacco and smoking marijuana makes me cough … When people talked about being "high," I didn't know what they meant. I still don't.
>
> Irvin Rosenfeld, FL (1987)
> (Randall 1989)

Of course, only a minority of cannabis-using patients are veterans. Many more are ordinary civilians who cannot bolster their identities with military service, and are thus much more likely to be socially diagnosed as

addicts or potheads. The key distinction in the public mind, as Chapkis and Webb (2008) mentioned, is the separation between medical cannabis patients as deserving victims, and recreational users as discreditable ones. Testifiers tread a fine line between conveying what is "appropriate" (what they know their audience wants to hear) and what is "authentic" (what parts of their story are true reflections of their experience). However, the argument testifiers use to distance patients from potheads is a simple one: if potheads smoke cannabis for pleasure, then the natural counterpoint would be that medical users get no extraneous enjoyment out of using cannabis at all. Whether from the psychophysiological effects of the drug or the moral and legal guilt of obtaining it, cannabis is portrayed as an un-pleasurable but necessary experience for testifiers.

Detractors of the medical cannabis movement frequently accuse it of exploiting the suffering of ill patients to bring legal cannabis in through the backdoor. The rising medical cannabis movement has also had to contend with anti-drug movements spearheaded by parents and aided by the federal government (Brown and Fee 2014). Allowing medical cannabis use for only a few supposedly deserving victims, they say, would open the floodgates for anyone to use minor health complains as excuses to obtain an illicit drug for recreational purposes alone. Even in states where cannabis is currently legal, it remains in an awkward social limbo: unlike other medicines, like opiates, its recreational uses are increasingly accepted. Therefore, to legitimize their own use in places where cannabis use is more restricted, medical cannabis users downplay or deny the potentially pleasurable effects cannabis has for them (Chapkis 2007). Many, such as Donald Spear of Michigan, appeal to their personal upbringing or background as proof they would never partake in drugs for recreational purposes (Randall 1989):

> I was very reluctant to smoke marihuana [sic] not only because it was illegal but also because I did not like to use drugs of any kind. Years earlier I briefly drank alcohol and smoked cigarettes, but decided I did not like them and gave them up … I come from a strict, moral background and using drugs of any kind, even aspirin, is not really right.
>
> Donald Spear, MI (1987)

For cannabis to be medicine, it must not subvert American biomedical expectations that medical treatment be devoid of pleasurable side effects, or even that it must be painful. Generally, positive side effects are to be avoided because of their "addictive" potential, and evidence of enjoying a drug (such as an opiate) is justification to suspect patients of addiction, malingering, or drug-seeking (Chapkis and Webb 2008).

Other testifiers not only deny the pleasurable effects of cannabis in themselves, but morally condemn recreational users altogether (Minnesotans for Compassionate Care 2017):

> My work history includes 26 years with the Minnesota Department of Corrections. Twenty of those years were spent as a Lt. and two as a caseworker. I was security director for the Treatment Unit at Minnesota Correctional Facility Oak Park Heights from 1982-1984, giving me much exposure to the negative effects of the illicit use of drugs. I was also a licensed part-time police officer in Hastings for eight years. Our daughter is presently a Sgt. with the Madison, Wisconsin Police Department and has been employed there for 13 years. I give you this background to assure you that we're not at all supportive of the illicit use of recreational drugs. But that's not what this issue is about.
>
> Jerry Petersen, MI (2007)

But despite the testifier's disclaimer, that is exactly what this issue is about: separating the deserving from the undeserving, the patients from the potheads. The existential conflict of being a law-enforcer and a law-breaker is neatly resolved by shifting the discreditable identity of "recreational user" onto another, more criminal class of others.

When testifiers acknowledge that they have broken the law, they underscore their shame and bewilderment at having to go through the experience. As with the argument from legal authority above, a clear line is drawn between criminals who willingly break the law for selfish purposes, and medical cannabis supporters who reluctantly break the law out of necessity (Minnesotans for Compassionate Care 2017; Randall 1989):

> My husband and I came to resent the fact that Keith's marijuana therapy was illegal. We felt like criminals. We are honest, simple people and we hated

having to sneak around.

Mae Nutt, MI (1987)

I couldn't imagine how to obtain marijuana. The most serious crime I'd ever committed was speeding when I was in college. Was I supposed to go downtown to some alley in the middle of the night and just stand there, hoping not to get shot?

Ron Oveson, MN (2007)

Not all the gritty details of a patient's authentic story may be acceptable to observers. Some even risked legal consequences by testifying about their experiences. But by selectively choosing their utterances about pleasure and crime, they construct a persona for themselves that falls safely between the two categories.

"Mother Knows Best": Maternal and Scientific Authority

My name is Angie Weaver. I am a stay-at-home mom from Hibbing, MN. I earned my bachelor's degree in Family Consumer Science from Minnesota State University, Mankato. Before I had my daughters, I worked with children and families in a variety of settings including daycares, an elementary school, and also for Lutheran Social Services. I have always loved children, and could not wait to have my own. My husband … and I have been married for 13 years. We have two daughters, Amelia, age 7, and Penelope, age 3. I would like to tell you about my daughter Amelia.

Angie Weaver, MN (2007)
(Minnesotans for Compassionate Care 2017)

Some demographic patterns in the data were distinctly gendered. 16 of the 30 testifiers were speaking on their own behalf as patients, with 13 of that subset being men. This is consistent with the known demographics of medical cannabis users in various states, where men predominate regardless of differing qualifying conditions (e.g., Aggarwal et al. 2009a; Braitstein et al. 2001; Troutt and DiDonato 2015). 8 of the 30 testifies were patients testifying on behalf of their children who were cannabis patients; although women (5/8) only slightly predominated men (3/8) in this category, among women as a whole (10/30) there was a greater number of women testifying for their children (5/10) than for their parents (1/10), spouses (1/10), or themselves (3/10). (Men, in comparison, focused mainly on themselves [13/20], followed by children [3/20], spouses [2/20], and non-related others [2/20].) This suggests that women play a unique role in medical cannabis testimonies as the caregivers of children over any other group. What mothers say about their children's cannabis use is highly relevant, since mothers who use drugs themselves (let alone provide drugs to their children) are vilified for having broken a strict tenet of "good mothering" (Springer 2010). Mothers' narratives adhere to stereotypical gender roles as the primary caregivers to children, while also drawing upon said status to portray their knowledge of cannabis' effectiveness as self-evident.

Gender roles in testimony place the testifier within the realm of what is "acceptable" for men and women. Women, in this instance, underscore their experiences with powerful feelings of love and affection for their children, something devoid from (or at least less pronounced) in the collected testimonies of fathers. For example, Weaver (see the beginning of this section) introduces herself as a "stay-at-home mom" who, starting from at least university onward, has been fulfilling her culturally expected role as a woman by being enthusiastic about children and pursuing their care at every opportunity. Such a persona contradicts the popular image of mothers who purchase drugs (or allow their children to use drugs), which is usually a portray of an irresponsible or drug-addicted parent.

Mothers also used their maternal authority to assert cannabis' effectiveness as medicine (Randall 1989):

As a mother, nothing seems more important to me than a strong appetite … Eating together helps to bind families together. When Josh regained his ability to eat, he rejoined our family. He could come to dinner without vomiting. We could talk and he could eat. As a mother it is impossible for me to put into words how wonderful it is to watch your son eat a mouthful of mashed potatoes.

Janet Andrews, ID (1987)

One of the more common claims of the American anti-drug movement is that using drugs is anathema to the nuclear family, and that using them results in the dissolution of healthy parent-child relationships. The argument in this quote contradicts

that in a counterintuitive way: rather than supplying drugs to children being the opposite of good mothering, it is exactly what family-building requires. Later in the same testimony, this mother also mobilizes her status as "mother of Josh" to claim medical cannabis' effectiveness is self-evident (Randall 1989):

Is marijuana effective? It was for Josh. When your kid is riding a tricycle while his other hospital buddies are hooked up to IV needles, their heads hung over vomiting buckets, you don't need a federal agency to tell you marijuana is effective. The evidence is in front of you, so stark it cannot be ignored.

Janet Andrews, ID (1987)

As with veteran narratives, this rhetorically challenges governmental authorities to question a "good mother's" authority over her own children and her rightful place as caretaker of the family. Mobilizing one's identity as a mother to project a "maternal self," even reifying gender roles in the process, is a rhetorical strategy that helps families defend the nature of the medicine their children receive, even when those children are technically adults in charge of their own care. This was the case with the parents of Keith, who was diagnosed with cancer in his 20s and died at the age of 24 (Randal 1989):

As a parent, I once had to confront a stark choice – obey the law and let my son suffer or break the law and provide my son with genuine relief from chemotherapeutically induced misery. I chose to help my son. Faced with the same choice again, my husband and I would help our son again. We are confident any parents confronting such circumstances would make the same decision.

Mae Nutt, MI (1987)

Parenthood, particularly motherhood, reframes the medical cannabis debate by casting parental authority against governmental authority and constructing the persona of the "responsible parent" to challenge dominant anti-cannabis narratives.

Conclusion

Each type of narrative functions in a slightly different way, but all have the same overarching goal: to separate medical cannabis users from recreational ones. Veterans' narratives emphasize the difference between deserving victims and the countercultural hedonists who purportedly popularized the drug, while reaching across party lines and rhetorically appealing to observers' sense of patriotic obligation. Innocents' narratives dissociate medical users from recreational users by highlighting the former's distaste at using cannabis or being involved in its criminal acquisition. Mothers' narratives also draw boundaries of protection around faultless, suffering children (regardless of their actual age) while privileging their own self-reported medical miracles. Testifiers with intersecting identities – a veteran who is also a mother, a veteran who is also a devout Christian, and so on – may use any combination of these narratives to construct their own version of an identity for themselves (or others) that constitutes the deserving victim. Multiple kinds of narratives can have similar goals and results, but have slightly different methods of accomplishing them. What matters is the consistency of the overarching narrative, its coherence to its audience, and the degree to which it helps the testifiers process and make sense of their own experiences (Duranti 2006).

But the testifiers who construct their personas as deserving victims – veterans, the innocent, and children and their good mothers – also cast a shadow. That shadow is the conglomeration of discreditable identities in the background, the things they deny about themselves and condemn in others. This category includes the bad patriots, bad parents, criminals, addicts, and people who have a recreational relationship to cannabis. In addition, the cannabis patients in these testimonies were not representative of users as a whole: although one-third of testimonies referred to cancer, only around 5% of the entire medical cannabis-using population in the United States has acquired cannabis for that diagnosis (McVey 2016). Furthermore, as Chapkis and Webb (2008) noted, for many of the patients who were part of the collective they studied, there was no clear boundary where recreational use ended and medical use began (and vice versa). The medical cannabis movement has been hugely successful at propagating its divisional narrative, but the deliberate blurring of nuance has unfortunate implications for how cannabis use is studied.

When medical cannabis is legalized and studied based on the false binary between deserving and discredited users, inequities in patient access and further stigmatization of certain "undesirable" classes of drug

users may result. For instance, many studies on cannabis use do not account for users who fall between or across categories, such as recreational users who discover that their cannabis use helps them manage symptoms of a disease, or medical users who discover and pursue the pleasant effects of a cannabis high. By failing to investigate the multifactorial motivations for cannabis use, these studies risk reproducing the same stigmatizing dichotomy between patients and potheads. The impact of this discourse may also affect certain demographic groups over others; while the race of testifiers could not be determined from this sample, further qualitative and quantitative research could elucidate details about the intersections of this divisionary discourse with race and doctor-patient or patient-dispensary interactions. However, some effects of this discourse are more immediate and apparent. For instance, even in states where cannabis is legal, prisoners do not have the right to access medical cannabis (Matthews 2014). Because they hardly fall into the category of "innocent victim," their motives are considered less sincere, and their pain less legitimate. The possibility that other stigmatized identities, perhaps those related to race, disability, and class, may encounter similar struggles, should not be dismissed. Although "medicine by popular vote" has triumphed where federal regulatory stonewalling has stifled progress, it may ultimately trump the rights and liberties of society's most vulnerable individuals.

Works Cited

Aggarwal, Sunil K., Gregory T. Carter, Mark D. Sullivan, Craig ZumBrunnen, Richard Morrill, and Jonathan D. Mayer
2009 Characteristics of patients with chronic pain accessing treatment with medical cannabis in Washington State. Journal of Opioid Management 5(5):257-286.

Bostwick, J. M.
2012 Blurred boundaries: the therapeutics and politics of medical marijuana. Mayo Clinic Proceedings 87(2):172-186.

Braitstein, Paula, Tamil Kendall, Keith Chan, Evan Wood, Julio S. G. Montaner, Michael V. O'Shaughnessy, and Robert S. Hogg
2001 Mary-Jane and her patients: sociodemographic and clinical characteristics of HIV-positive individuals using medical marijuana and antiretroviral agents. AIDS 15(4):532-533.

Brown, Theodore M. and Elizabeth Fee
2014 Social movements in health. Annual Review of Public Health 35:385-398.

Chapkis, Wendy
2007 Cannabis, consciousness, and healing. Contemporary Justice Review 10(4):443-460.

Chapkis, Wendy and Richard J. Webb
2008 Dying to Get High: Marijuana as Medicine. New York: New York University Press.

Duranti, Alessandro
2006 Narrating the Political Self in a Campaign for U.S. Congress. Language in Society 35:467-487.

Harris, Gardiner
2010 Researchers find studies of medical marijuana discouraged. Electronic document, https://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/19/health/policy/19marijuana.html, accessed December 3, 2016.

Hoffman, Diane E. and Ellen Weber
2010 Medical marijuana and the law. New England Journal of Medicine 362(16):1453-1457.

Ilgen, Mark A., Kipling Bohnert, Felicia Kleinberg, Mary Jannausch, Amy S. B. Bohnert, Maureen Walton, and Frederic C. Blow
2013 Characteristics of adults seeking medical marijuana certification. Drug and Alcohol Dependence 132(3):654-659.

Kalant, Oriana J.
1968 An Interim Guide to the Cannabis (Marihuana) Literature. Toronto: Addiction Research Foundation.

Lucas, Philippe, Zach Walsh, Kim Crosby, Robert Callaway, Lynne Belle-Isle, Robert Kay, Rielle Capler, and Susan Holtzman
2016 Substituting cannabis for prescription drugs, alcohol, and other substances among medical cannabis patients: the impact of contextual factors. Drug and Alcohol Review 35:326-333.

Lupkin, Sydney
2016 Marijuana researchers are tired of working with the US government's shitty weed. Electronic document, https://news.vice.com/article/medical-marijuana-researchers-are-tired-of-working-with-shitty-weed, accessed November 5, 2016.

Matthews, Kay
2014 Do American and Canadian prisoners have access to medical marijuana? Electronic document, https://www.medireview.com/2014/07/do-american-and-canadian-prisoners-have-access-to-medical-marijuana/, accessed February 28, 2017.

Mikuriya, Tod H.
1973 Marijuana: Medical Papers 1839-1972. Oakland: Medi-Comp Press.

National Institute on Drug Abuse
2016 Marijuana Plant Material Available from NIDA Drug Supply Program. Electronic document, https://www.drugabuse.gov/researchers/research-resources/nida-drug-supply-program-dsp/marijuana-plant-material-available-nida-drug-supply-program, accessed December 8, 2016.

Noonan, David
2016 Scientists want the smoke to clear on medical marijuana research. Electronic document, https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/scientists-want-the-smoke-to- clear-on-medical-marijuana-research/, accessed December 4, 2016.

O'Connell, Kit
2016 Why veterans with PTSD are turning to cannabis. Electronic document: https://theestablishment.co/why-veterans-with-ptsd-are-turning-to-cannabis-2a9049593806#.o1l3t5h3v, accessed February 28, 2017.

Osborn, Lawrence A., Kirstin J. Lauritsen, Nicole Cross, Alan K. Davis, Harold Rosenberg, Francis Bonadio, and Brent Lang
2015 Self-medication of somatic and psychiatric conditions using botanical marijuana. Journal of Psychoactive Drugs 47(5):345-350.

Press, Craig A., Kelly G. Knupp, and Kevin E. Chapman
2015 Parental reporting of response to oral cannabis extracts for treatment of refractory epilepsy. Epilepsy & Behavior 45:49-52.

Randall, R. C.
1989 Marijuana, Medicine & the Law. Washington: Galen Press.

Russo, Ethan and John M. McPartland
2003 Cannabis is more than simply delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol. Psychopharmacology 165(4):431-432.

Springer, Kristen W.
2010 The race and class privilege of motherhood: The New York Times presentation of pregnant drug-using women. Sociological Forum 25(3):476-499.

Subcommittee on Crime
1999 Medical marijuana referenda movement in America: hearing before the Subcommittee on Crime of the Committee of the Judiciary, House of Representatives, One Hundred Fifth Congress, first session, October 1, 1997. Washington: U.S. Government Publishing Office.

Thompson, John W., Jr. and Mark A. Koenen
2011 Physicians as gatekeepers in use of medical marijuana. The Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law 39(4):460-464.

Troutt, William D. and Matthew D. DiDonato
2015 Medical cannabis in Arizona: patient characteristics, perceptions, and impressions of medical cannabis legalization. Journal of Psychoactive Drugs 47(4):259-266.

University of New Mexico
2016 How the federal government limits valid scientific research on Cannabis sativa: researchers attempt to navigate difficult system. Electronic document, https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2016/06/160624154612.htm, accessed November 5, 2016.

Walsh, Zach, Robert Callaway, Lynne Belle-Isle, Rielle Capler, Robert Kay, Philippe Lucas, and Susan Holtzman
2013 Cannabis for therapeutic purposes: patient characteristics, access, and reasons for use. International Journal of Drug Policy 24(6):511-516.

Effects of CO_2 Enrichment on the Responses of Legume-Rhizobia Symbiosis to Elevated Soil Temperature

Siyuan Du
Class of 2020

Introduction

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2014) has predicted that the global mean surface temperature may rise 0.3°C - 0.7°C by 2035, a continuation of the gradual warming caused by the release of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases into the atmosphere. Rising temperature and CO2 concentration, both separately and together, can strongly affect the growth of plants by changing photosynthesis rates, nutrient and water availability, and other key aspects of the growth environment (Lira et al, 2005; DeLucia et al., 1999; Phillips et al., 1976). It is therefore important to continue studying plant responses to temperature and CO2 fluctuations as we try to prepare for future climate change. We focus on legumes because they are important food crops that are planted alternatively with other crops to enrich the soil via a symbiotic relationship with nitrogen-fixing rhizobial bacteria. Previous studies investigated the effect of either only temperature or CO2 on the legume-rhizobia symbiosis, and few have looked into the interaction of these two factors. The factorial experiments that have been conducted mostly discuss the response of the plant and fail to provide a holistic understanding on the symbiosis system (Aranjuelo et al., 2005; Wang et al., 2011).

Regarding CO2 as a single factor, various studies found that CO2 enrichment increases the rate of photosynthesis and thus increases plants' production and root proportion (DeLucia et al., 1999; Schaffer, Whiley & Searle, 1999; Rogers et al., 1996). As atmospheric CO2 levels continue to increase and C3 plants produce more carbon photosynthate, bacteria growth will be stimulated since the rhizobia acquire carbon from the plants. However, the long-term effect of CO2 enrichment on the mutualistic relationship remains unclear, since other studies pointed out the uneven N-partitioning between plant-microbial symbiosis will alter their interaction in favor of nitrogen intake of plants and suppress microbial decomposition (Hu et al., 2001). Some researchers also found that over longer periods (months or years rather than days), plants, including legumes, down-regulate their rates of photosynthesis in response to elevated CO2 (Aranjuelo et al., 2005).

Another factor, soil temperature, is likely to have various effects on legume-rhizobium symbiosis. It is known that changes in soil temperature affect temperature-dependent processes such as belowground respiration, decomposition, and root nodulation. Increases in soil temperature result in higher rates of soil respiration (Lloyd & Taylor, 1994; Peterjohn et al., 1994), decomposition (Swift et al., 1979) and higher nitrogen mineralization (Peterjohn et al., 1994). However, how root nodulation will respond to warmer soil temperature is inconclusive. According to Lira et al. (2004), increased root temperature accelerates nodulation and nodule growth rate for bean (Phaseolus vulgaris L.), but effects are not consistent with crops originated in different climate zones. Other studies revealed that although nodule number increases in higher root temperature, high temperature induces detrimental effects on later development of the nodules by reducing nodule size and nitrogen fixation, which subsequently decreases plant growth. These effects also varied among species of both hosts and strains (Piha & Munns, 1987; Gibson, 1963; Gibson, 1971). Furthermore, soil temperature is an important factor that determines crop management. For example, according to Climate Change Impacts on Iowa (2011), fall application of nitrogen is usually conducted when soil temperature drops below 50°F. Higher temperature results in soil fertilization delay, leading to declined crop yield.

It is still unclear how the early growth of legume-rhizobium symbiosis will respond to new interactions between soil temperature and CO2. According to Wang et al. (2012), higher CO2 concentration increases net photosynthesis of legumes

at heat stressed environments.

Since the results are far from comprehensive in understanding how legume-rhizobium symbiosis will be affected by simultaneous changes in temperature and CO2, we seek to explore the interaction between the two factors. In our study, we investigated three questions: (1) how will elevated CO2 affect legume-rhizobium symbiosis, (2) how will elevated soil temperature affect legume-rhizobium symbiosis, and (3) how will the interaction of elevated temperature and CO2 enrichment affect the symbiosis. Since CO2 and soil temperature response experiments on legume-rhizobia symbiosis are species-specific (West et al., 2005; Piha & Munns, 1987), we chose to study Pisum sativum, a model species of the Fabaceae family, and also an important crop cultivated all over the world. Since early growth of plants is crucial for their performances in later growth, such as responses to environmental stress (Grant et al., 2001; Aspinall, Nicholls & May, 1964), we focused our study on the first 4 weeks after germination. We hypothesized that (1) elevated CO2 levels enhance the legume-rhizobia mutualism through increased rate of photosynthesis and nodulation in its early development. Since the primary production of a plant is stimulated by CO2 enrichment, the growth of bacteria will increase and supply the plants with more nitrogen, thus forming a positive loop. We predicted that both the total biomass (g) and the root proportion (percentage of root biomass to total biomass, %) of legumes growing in elevated CO2, ambient soil temperature will be larger than those in ambient CO2, ambient soil temperature; the nodule abundance will be larger, and C:N ratio in plants, an indicator of nitrogen limitation, will decrease. (2) Elevated soil temperatures inhibit the mutualism through increasing root respiration in plants and reducing nodule nitrogen fixation (Lloyd & Taylor, 1994; Peterjohn et al., 1994). While high soil temperature initially stimulates nodulation (Lira et al., 2004), it will retard nitrogen fixation in later development of the symbiosis (Gibson, 1963; Gibson, 1971). Thus, we predicted that the total biomass and root proportion of the legumes growing in ambient CO2, elevated soil temperature will be smaller than those growing in ambient CO2, ambient soil temperature. At the same time, although the root nodulation will increase, C:N ratio will increase. (3) Elevated CO2 concentrations will remove the inhibition effects by elevated soil temperatures, promoting both plant's growth and rhizobial nitrogen fixation. We predicted that the total biomass and root proportion of the legumes growing in elevated CO2, elevated temperature will be larger than those in ambient CO2, elevated temperature; nodule abundance will increase and C:N ratio will decrease.

Methods

A factorial experiment was conducted with 4 groups of Pisum sativum (sample size of five) growing in (1) 400ppm, 25°C, the control group; (2) 400ppm, 30°C; (3) 800ppm, 25°C, (4) 800ppm, 30°C. Twenty Pisum sativum seeds were planted with inoculants in a 20-cell flat. After all the seeds germinated, 10 plants were moved to a chamber with CO2 controlled at 400ppm and air temperature maintained at 25°C, where the soil temperature of 5 cells controlled at 25°C, the ambient temperature, and the other 6 cells elevated to 30°C with a heat mat. The other 10 cells were placed in another chamber with CO2 levels at 800ppm and air temperature at 25°C, and similarly the soil temperature of 5 cells was elevated to 30°C. All the seedlings were supplied with constant light and 30ml of water on a daily basis. After four weeks of germination, we dried the plant tissues at 60°C for 24 hours, measured total plant biomass and root proportion. Afterwards, we used a flash combustion elemental CN analyzer to measure C:N. We used ANOVA to determine the effects of elevated soil temperature and CO2 on total biomass, root proportion, C:N ratio, and nodule abundance.

Result

Total Biomass

Pisum sativum grown in elevated CO2/ambient soil temperature had significantly higher total biomass than those grown in ambient CO2/ambient soil temperature (Fig. 1). There was no significant interaction between soil temperature and CO2 concentration on total biomass (Fig.1).



Fig.1 Interaction plot for total biomass (g) of Pisum sativum grown at 400 ppm and 25°C, 400 ppm and 30°C, 800 ppm and 25°C, 800 ppm and 30°C after 4 weeks. N=5 for each group. p=0.002 for effects of soil

temperature, p=0.010 for effects of CO2, and p=0.790 for CO2 * temperature.

C:N Ratio

Pisum sativum grown in elevated CO2/ ambient soil temperature had significantly lower C:N ratio than those in ambient CO2/ambient soil temperature (Fig. 2). There was no significant interaction between soil temperature and CO2 concentration on C:N ratio of Pisum sativum grown in elevated CO2/elevated soil temperature (Fig.2).



Fig. 2 Interaction plot for C:N ratio of Pisum sativum grown at 400 ppm and 25°C, 400 ppm and 30°C, 800 ppm and 25°C, 800 ppm and 30°C after 4 weeks. N=5 for each group. p=0.548 for effects of soil temperature, p<0.001 for effects of CO2, and p=0.9731 for CO2 * temperature.

Root Proportion

The elevated CO2/elevated soil temperature group showed significantly smaller root proportion relative to the ambient group (Fig. 3). Soil temperature and CO2 levels had no effects on root proportion.



Fig. 3 Interval plot for root proportion Pisum sativum grown at 400 ppm and 25°C, 400 ppm and 30°C, 800 ppm and 25°C, and 800 ppm and 30°C after 4 weeks. N=5 for each group. p=0.837 for effects of soil temperature, p=0.283 for effects of CO2, and p=0.048 for CO2 * temperature. Error bars stand for standard error of the mean.

Significance

Consistent with our hypothesis, elevation of CO2 benefited the legume-rhizobia symbiosis. Legumes in elevated CO2/ambient soil temperature had larger biomasses and lower C:N ratios, indicating a positive effect of CO2 enrichment on legume's growth. This is explained by the fact that removal of carbon limitation and increase in water use efficiency promote photosynthetic rate in legume species (Cernusak et al., 2011), which not only increases plant's biomass but also provides more photosynthate for the growth of bacteria. This is consistent with past findings that CO2 enrichment enhances nitrogen reduction short-term (Phillips et al., 1976). Therefore, the bacteria supply the plants with more nitrogen, forming a positive loop. On the other hand, Pisum sativum grown at higher soil temperature had lower total biomass. We also observed much less nodulation than expected for the elevated soil temperature groups, which may indicate that elevated temperatures delayed or inhibited nodule development. The delay of nodule development most likely results from unsuccessful formation and hastened degeneration of bacteroid tissue under high root temperatures (Gibson 1971). Moreover, the elevated soil temperatures could also increase root respiration and reduce the amount of photosynthate available for bacterial growth (Lloyd & Taylor, 1994).

Contrary to our hypothesis, the results suggested that the interaction between elevated CO2 and elevated temperature did not benefit the symbiosis in the short-term. The group with both factors elevated showed lower total biomass and smaller root proportion, suggesting that the effects of CO2 did not counteract negative effects of high soil temperature on the symbiosis.

Corresponding with other studies on legume species, nodulation and nitrogen fixation of Pisum satvium are sensitive to change in CO2 levels and soil temperature (Piha & Munns, 1987; Lira et al., 2005; Philips et al., 1974). We speculate that legume-rhizobia symbiosis is sensitive to variation in soil temperature during nodule development and performance. We believe this holds important implications for crop yield as global warming progresses.

These results are relevant to crop management on soil fertilization as CO2 levels continue to increase,

raising temperature and impacting climate patterns. We not only demonstrated the detrimental effects of higher soil temperature on the growth of legume-rhizobia symbiosis, but we also showed that elevated CO2 did not offset higher soil temperature. Thus, it may be too optimistic to believe that higher CO2 levels will stimulate photosynthetic processes as a result of climate change. We suggest further studies on the long-term effects of the interaction between CO2 levels and soil temperature, as well as the ways that other factors like precipitation and air temperature affect the legume-rhizobia symbiosis.

Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Professor Peter Jacobson and Ashley Millet for their help and advice.

References

Aranjuelo, I, Pérez, P, Hernández, L, Irigoyen, JJ, Zita, G, Martinez-Carrasco, R, and Sánchez-Díaz, M (2005). The response of nodulated alfalfa to water supply, temperature and elevated CO2: photosynthetic downregulation. Physiologia Plantarum, (123), 348-358. Retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Aranjuelo_Iker/publication/240492560_Response_of_nodulated_alfalfa_to_water_supply_temperature_and_elevated_CO2/links/53e91bc50cf2fb1b9b644f47.pdf

Aspinall, D., Nicholls, P. B., & May, L. H. (1964). The effects of soil moisture stress on the growth of barley. I. Vegetative development and grain yield. Crop and Pasture Science, 15(5), 729-745. http://dx.doi.org/10.1071/AR9640729

DeLucia, Evan H. et al. (1999). Net Primary Production of a Forest Ecosystem with Experimental CO2 Enrichment. Science, 284, 1177. http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.284.5417.1177

Gibson, A.H. (1963). Physical Environment and Symbiotic Nitrogen Fixation. Australian Journal of Biological Sciences, 16, 28-42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1071/BI9630028

Gibson, A.H., (1971). Factors in the physical and biological environment affecting nodulation and nitrogen fixation by legumes. Plant and Soil Special Volume, 139–152. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF02661847

Grant, C. A., Flaten, D. N., Tomasiewicz, D. J., & Sheppard, S. C. (2001). The importance of early season phosphorus nutrition. Canadian Journal of Plant Science, 81(2), 211-224. http://dx.doi.org/10.4141/P00-093

Hu, S., Chapin, F. S., Firestone, M. K., Field, C. B., & Chiariello, N. R. (2001). Nitrogen limitation of microbial decomposition in a grassland under elevated CO2. Nature, 409(6817), 188-191. http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/35051576

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. (2014). Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Geneva, Switzerland: Core Writing Team, R.K. Pachauri, R.K. and Meyer, L.A. (eds.).

Iowa Climate Change Impacts Committee. (2011). Consequences for Agriculture in Iowa. In Climate Change Impacts on Iowa. Retrieved from

http://www.energy.iowa.gov

Lira Junior, M. de A., Lima, A. S. T., Arruda, J. R. F. & Smith, D. L. (2005). Effect of root temperature on nodule development of bean, lentil and pea. Soil Biology & Biochemistry, 37(2005), 235-239.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.soilbio.2004.07.032

Lloyd, J., & Taylor, J. (1994). On the Temperature Dependence of Soil Respiration. Functional Ecology, 8(3), 315-323.
http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2389824

Pan, B., Smith, D.L., (1998). Genistein and daidzein concentrations and contents in seedling roots of three soybean cultivars grown under three root zone temperatures. Journal of Agronomy and Crop Science, 180, 77–82.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1439-037X.1998.tb00374.x

Peterjohn, W. T., Melillo, J. M., Steudler, P. A., Newkirk, K. M., Bowles, F. P. and Aber, J. D. (1994), Responses of Trace Gas Fluxes and N Availability to Experimentally Elevated Soil Temperatures. Ecological Applications, 4: 617–625.
http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1941962

Phillips, DA, Newell, KD, Hassell, SA, and Felling, CE (1976). The effect of CO2 enrichment on root nodule development and symbiotic N2 reduction in Pisum sativum L. American Journal of Botany, 63(3), 356-362.
Piha, M.I. & Munns, D.N. (1987). Sensitivity of the common bean (Phaseolus vulgarism L.) symbiosis to high soil temperature. Plant and Soil, 98, 183-194.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF02374822

Rogers, H.H., Prior, S.A., Runion, G.B. et al. (1995) Root to shoot ratio of crops as influenced by CO2. Plant Soil, 187:229.
http://dx.doi:10.1007/BF00017090.

Schaffer, Bruce, Whiley, Anthony W. & Searle Christopher. (1999). Atmospheric CO2 Enrichment, Root Restriction, Photosynthesis, and Dry-matter Partitioning in Subtropical and Tropical Fruit Crops. HortScience, 34(6), 1033-1037.
Retrieved from:
http://hortsci.ashspublications.org/content/34/6/1033.full.pdf+html

Swift, M. J., O. W. Heal, and J.M. Anderson. (1979). Decomposition in terrestrial ecosystems. University of California Press, Berkeley, California, USA.

West, J. B., HilleRisLambers, J., Lee, T. D., Hobbie, S. E., & Reich, P. B. (2005). Legume species identity and soil nitrogen supply determine symbiotic nitrogen fixation responses to elevated atmospheric [CO2]. New Phytologist, 167(2), 523-530.