Disenchantment of Nature

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In this paper, I aim to charitably summarize and analyze McDowell's diagnosis of and cure for the characteristic anxieties that permeate discourse on the mind-world relation. Specifically, though, I will focus on the importance that McDowell affords to a new conception of nature, demonstrating the significance of this conception to the sort of "cure" he offers. By introducing second nature, McDowell resolves the quandary of the seesaw between Davidson's self-contained coherentism and Evans' lapse into the Myth of the Given, without completely naturalizing reason. Nonetheless, his partial re-enchantment of nature fails to break free from the ideological force that pervades the majority of this discourse—namely, epistemological hegemony. In his book, Local Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges, and Border Thinking, Walter Mignolo offers a critique of epistemological hegemony, deconstructing the geopolitics of knowledge and offering a vision for a new way of thinking about knowledge. My focus in this paper is the disenchantment of nature in philosophy and the implications of this disenchantment in light of Mignolo's thesis. Consequently, a great deal of this examination involves a discussion of epistemology and the nature of knowledge. I survey the works of McDowell, Mignolo, Churchland, Rorty, and Stone in order to provide a multi-dimensional picture of the disenchantment of nature and its implications for knowledge.

Introduction

A characteristic anxiety of modern philosophy, with which John McDowell deals in Mind and World, is the tension between a pair of pressures, amounting to an antinomy: experience both must and cannot stand in judgment over our attempts to make up our minds about how things are. Central to McDowell's thesis is the emphasis on second nature, which serves as the backbone of his account of nature. Second nature allows room for spontaneity in nature, "keep[ing] nature as it were partially enchanted, but without lapsing into pre-scientific superstition or a rampant platonism."[1] This position, unlike bald naturalism, resolves the quandary of the seesaw between Davidson's self-contained coherentism and Evans' lapse into the Myth of the Given, without completely naturalizing reason, retaining the sui generis status of spontaneity. Yet, although McDowell's contribution to philosophy of mind discourse in this respect is certainly significant, his partial re-enchantment of nature fails to break free from the ideological force that pervades the majority of this discourse—namely, epistemological hegemony.

Walter Mignolo's main thesis in Local Histories/ Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges, and Border Thinking, is that coloniality/modernity "has built a frame and a conception of knowledge based on the distinction between epistemology and hermeneutics and, by so doing, has subalternized other kinds of knowledge."[2] He asserts that, with coloniality/modernity, philosophy became "a tool for subalternizing forms of knowledge beyond its disciplined boundaries."[3] Although Mignolo does not use this term, I see him as offering a critique of epistemological hegemony. Ultimately, he argues that rather than viewing knowledge in terms of an epistemic/hermeneutic distinction, we should do away with this distinction altogether. Mignolo's new conception of knowledge is a gnoseology, achieved by border thinking, the goal of which is "transcending hermeneutics and epistemology and the corresponding distinction between the knower and the known."[4]

It would do well to outline and define some of the key expressions that compose this exposition. For the most part, the terms nature and natural should be understood as McDowell uses them: the logical space opposed to the space of reasons, characterized by a different sort of intelligibility, which we can appropriately call "the realm of law."[5] By disenchantment of nature, I mean the process by which this separation occurs, i.e., the distinction between the space of reasons and the realm of law and the consequent removal of meaning

from nature. The space of reasons, on the other hand, signifies the logical space in which we find meaning; it is here that we locate rationality and spontaneity, terms we can reckon as functionally analogous, the former being understood as the possession of conceptual capacities and the latter as the free exercise of those capacities (as opposed to a passive taking-in-the-world, i.e., receptivity). Regarding knowledge, we can accept epistemology and hermeneutics as they are classically defined, although the terms will be complicated and further developed in sections three and four. Key expressions from Mignolo include gnoseology, modernity/coloniality, and border thinking; they will be elaborated in section four.

Assuming Mignolo's observations are given ethical weight in the undertaking of philosophical pursuits, a few concerns become apparent. What is the significance of the disenchantment of nature? What role does nature's disenchantment play in conceptions of knowledge? Is the disenchantment of nature hegemonic? If so, where do we locate McDowell on a spectrum of epistemological hegemony? Does his account of rationality make room for allegiance with Mignolo's cause? To some extent, it might be argued, McDowell's rationality addresses Mignolo's concerns—namely, his partial re-enchantment of nature (or partial naturalization of reason), involving an account of language as initiation into a tradition and an orientation to the world, could make room for a plurality of knowledges. In that sense, he might be taken as an ally rather than an opponent of Mignolo. I will argue, however, that McDowell's partial re-enchantment of nature is insufficient because he holds on to the idea of knowledge as privileged representation, operating within an epistemological/hermeneutical framework that is inherently hegemonic, believing that "knowledge" can only be saved by retaining the sui generis status of spontaneity and leaving nature mostly disenchanted.

Section I: The Disenchantment of Nature

Our point of departure is the question: whence arises the disenchantment of nature? McDowell explains that the contemporary conception of nature came as "a hard-won achievement of human thought at a specific time, the time of the rise of modern science," which "understands its subject matter in a way that threatens, at least, to leave it disenchanted."[6] The advances of modern science have incited an emergent contrast between two kinds of intelligibility: (1) that of natural science, which is causal and oft governed by law, and (2) that of the logical space of reasons, which is justificatory and inferen-

tial. The result is that nature is emptied of meaning, or disenchanted. Nature is seen "as the home of a perhaps inexhaustible supply of intelligibility of the other kind, the kind we find in a phenomenon when we see it as governed by natural law."[7] McDowell holds that this distinction between types of intelligibility is important, indeed, that it was "an achievement of modern thought," arguing later that we ought not "blur the contrast between the space of reasons and the realm of law."[8] This distinction between types of intelligibility plays a central role in McDowell's account of rationality. Specifically, although he argues for a partial re-enchantment of nature, he still wants to retain the separation of two logical spaces, keeping spontaneity sui generis. Before further developing McDowell's position, however, let us examine another relevant perspective on the disenchantment of nature.

In her piece, "Adorno and the disenchantment of nature," Alison Stone asserts that disenchantment means "that we have ceased to see nature as an inherently meaningful order" and "that we have come to assume that nature is devoid of mystery, wholly accessible to our understanding."[9] Stone frames the process of disenchanting nature as developing concurrently with modernity, drawing from the ideas of Adorno and Horkheimer. For them, the disenchantment of nature has facilitated its domination by humanity.[10] Analyzing Adorno and Horkheimer, she states:

> [T]hey see the historical process of disenchanting nature as coextensive with that of 'enlightenment,' (Aufklärung), which they understand as 'a series of related intellectual and practical operations which are presented as demythologizing, secularizing or disenchanting some mythical, religious or magical representation of the world'… humanity's aim in pursuing enlightenment has been to gain increased knowledge of nature, knowledge that we have desired because it enhances our ability to predict and so control the behavior of natural entities.[11]

The link drawn here between emptying nature of meaning and the aim of making nature fully intelligible so that it can be dominated gives reason to be wary of the modern distinction between two types of intelligibility (i.e., space of reasons and realm of law). McDowell takes for granted that this is a necessary distinction and, indeed, that it is an "achievement" of modern science. For him, the spontaneity of the understanding and the knowledge it brings us must be clearly demarcated as separate from the sort of knowledge we have about nature, because he sees the success of his project to hinge upon retaining the

sui generis status of spontaneity. Stone, however, demonstrates that there is quite more at stake here than a mere account of knowledge—the disenchantment of nature is not just the result of an epistemological pursuit but rather is the byproduct of Enlightenment thinking and modernity, aimed at nature's domination. A significant portion of Stone's article is dedicated to examining various forms of re-enchantment. For her, the only form of re-enchantment sufficient to combat nature's disenchantment is one that recognizes nature's suffering.[12] Immediately clear from this critique is the fact that the disenchantment of nature, executed in the name of an epistemological (and perhaps also industrial/capitalistic) project, can be regarded as hegemonic. For now, though, it will suffice to say that the disenchantment of nature (and, by extension, epistemology) operates not in isolation but rather is implicated in social and historical webs of power. This is a point to be further examined in section four.

Section II: McDowell's Rationality and the Partial Re-Enchantment of Nature

Hoping to alleviate the anxiety in philosophy regarding the explanation of how we come to possess knowledge, McDowell must reckon with a pair of pressures that amount to an antinomy: we want to find a way to have experiencestand in judgment over how things are, but there does not appear to be such a way. On one end, Davidson advocates a self-contained coherentism, lacking an external rational constraint on thinking, and therefore he is unable to "make room for empirical content at all."[13] On the other, we find Evans, lapsing into the Myth of the Given and/by offering non-conceptual content as the basis for conceptuality. McDowell urges, "that we must conceive experiences as states or occurrences in which capacities that belong to spontaneity are in play in actualizations of receptivity."[14] In order to do this, we must find a way to connect spontaneity with receptivity. It is at this point that we encounter trouble with nature's disenchantment. McDowell argues:

> [The] familiar modern conception of nature tends to extrude rationality from nature. The effect is that reason is separated from our animal nature, as if being rational placed us partly outside the animal kingdom. Specifically, the understanding is distanced from sensibility. And that is the source of our philosophical impasse.[15]

The familiar modern conception of nature, in which nature is disenchanted, establishes a dichotomy between types of intelligibility, and this division prevents a linkage from being established between the spontaneity of understanding (i.e., rationality) and the receptivity of sensibility (i.e., some empirical content that can serve as an external rational constraint). The constraint that McDowell seeks must be rational rather than causal, for a causal explanation of rationality lapses into the Myth of the Given. However, to avoid Davidson's self-contained coherentism, this constraint must be external and rational, , which necessitates that room be made in nature, understood as the realm of law, for spontaneity.

One way of getting past this dilemma is what McDowell labels bald naturalism. This position "tells us not to go on being nagged by these anxieties."[16] If we abandon the idea that "we cannot have thought in our picture unless we secure an application for sui generis notions of rational justification," i.e., "notions that function in their own logical space, which is alien to the structure of the realm of law," we can reconstruct rationality "in terms of conceptual equipment that is already unproblematically naturalistic."[17] The bald naturalist argues that the problem is not our conception of nature but rather our conception of rationality. One such example is Paul Churchland's eliminative materialism, which aims to replace the principles and the ontology of rationality as presently conceived with completed neuroscience.[18] For Churchland, the idea that rationality is sui generis and requires its own logical space of reasons is merely that—an idea, or a theory.

Churchland argues that it makes no sense to keep this theory in light of its incommensurability with the expansion of scientific knowledge. Examining the history of "folk psychology," as he labels it, Churchland points out that it was precisely by this paradigm of rationality that nature was previously enchanted:

> The presumed domain of FP [i.e., folk psychology] used to be much larger than it is now. In primitive cultures, the behavior of most of the elements of nature were understood in intentional terms. The wind could know anger, the moon jealousy, the river generosity, the sea fury, and so forth. These were not metaphors. Sacrifices were made and auguries undertaken to placate or divine the changing passions of the gods.[19]

For the bald naturalist, the problem is this flawed idea of rationality. The solution to McDowell's problem, from Churchland's perspective, is to abandon the attempt at holding that spontaneity is sui generis. Instead, the problem is resolved by conceptualizing rationality as natural. In this view, nature is completely disenchanted and, as a part of nature, so is rationality; it is all firmly fixed within

the realm of law.

For McDowell, this explanation is ultimately dissatisfying. He believes that the space of reasons must be sui generis, and that we must find a way to make room in nature for spontaneity. If we do not, and if we accept bald naturalism, "The threat is that an animal endowed with reason would be metaphysically split, with disastrous consequences for our reflection about empirical thinking and action."[20] Furthermore, if we consider Stone's points on the implications of nature's disenchantment, Churchland's resolution seems problematic. With the naturalization of reason and complete disenchantment of nature, Churchland ushers in an entirely scientific, mechanistic worldview—one that easily facilitates the unquestioned domination of nature. Also worth noting is the fact that Churchland's eliminative materialist vision is merely a worldview, albeit a rigorous, scientific one. In suggesting that we ought to accept scientific realism, Churchland does not seem to recognize that it is just another paradigm for knowledge, claiming to provide universal truths. Surely, this is epistemological hegemony. In light of these considerations, we can discard eliminative materialism as a resolution to our philosophical quandary.

McDowell's way of establishing a connection between nature and spontaneity is through an Aristotelian second nature. McDowell argues that this makes room for spontaneity in nature, as reason is a partially natural development insofar as it is second nature. In other words, "exercises of spontaneity belong to our way of actualizing ourselves as animals."[21] For Aristotle, second nature is central to the formation of ethical character. McDowell suggests, "human beings are intelligibly initiated into this stretch of the space of reasons by ethical upbringing, which instills the appropriate shape into their lives. The resulting habits of thought and action are second nature."[22] This partial re-enchantment of nature allows McDowell to bridge the gap between the space of reasons and the realm of law while still maintaining their separation, avoiding a naturalization of reason and keeping spontaneity sui generis. McDowell eventually explains that human beings, as rational animals, develop this second nature by initiation into a language:

> Now it is not even clearly intelligible to suppose a creature might be born at home in the space of reasons. Human beings are not: they are born mere animals, and they are transformed into thinkers and intentional agents in the course of coming to maturity. This transformation risks looking mysterious. But we can take it in our stride if, in our conception of the Bildung that is

a central element in the normal maturation of human beings, we give pride of place to the learning of a language.[23]

According to McDowell, the language into which a human being is initiated serves as "a repository of tradition, a store of historically accumulated wisdom about what is a reason for what."[24] Being initiated into a tradition is how a human being acquires concepts. He adds the qualification that any such tradition "is subject to reflective modification by each generation that inherits it. Indeed, a standing obligation to engage in critical reflection is itself part of the inheritance."[25] Here we might ask—does McDowell's rationality allow for a plurality of knowledges? Even if so, does McDowell still avoid the charge of epistemological hegemony? I will further explore these questions in the following two sections.

Section III: Epistemology, Hermeneutics, and the "Nature" of Knowledge

In the first two sections, I have aimed to outline the problem of the disenchantment of nature and charitably summarize McDowell's account of rationality, which involves a partial re-enchantment of nature. A few major things to take away from these sections are: (1) the disenchantment of nature, as the distinction between two kinds of intelligibility and the removal of meaning from nature, developed concurrently with Enlightenment thinking; (2) McDowell has attempted to provide an account of rationality that will establish a connection between these kinds of intelligibility because, without such a connection, there appears no way to find correspondence between spontaneity and receptivity; (3) McDowell's rationality, then, must make room for spontaneity in nature, but it cannot completely naturalize reason, so he offers second nature as a partial re-enchantment of nature in which spontaneity comes about as a development of rational animals' second nature, while still retaining its sui generis status.

In aiming to provide an account of rationality and how it comes to be, McDowell has embarked upon an epistemological pursuit. At this point, it makes sense to turn to the question of the nature of knowledge. Specifically, we ought to consider the aims of epistemology and hermeneutics, as well as the distinction drawn between them. Rorty asserts that "philosophy-as-epistemology will be the search for the immutable structures within which knowledge, life, and culture must be contained—structures set by the privileged representations which it studies."[26] In other words, epistemology seeks

to explain the foundations of knowledge and the limits within which understanding must remain. These limits are defined by privileged representations, i.e., representations that are believed to be more accurate or reliable than others. Rorty challenges the idea that philosophy should confine itself to this realm, arguing that it is precisely this sort of representational model that creates the problems of epistemology. He declares:

> To think of knowledge which presents a "problem," and about which we ought to have a "theory," is a product of viewing knowledge as an assemblage of representations—a view of knowledge which, I have been arguing, was a product of the seventeenth century. The moral to be drawn is that if this way of thinking of knowledge is optional, then so is epistemology, and so is philosophy as it has understood itself since the middle of the last century.[27]

Epistemology has the appeal of seeming to provide "a field within which certainty, as opposed to mere opinion, [is] possible;"[28] however, as Rorty points out, it is perhaps this very quest for certainty by way of viewing knowledge as an "assemblage" of privileged representations that makes us believe that there is a need for epistemology. In any case, it would appear from this critique that epistemology is optional.

The alternative to epistemology, for Rorty, is hermeneutics. In his view, hermeneutics looks at "relations between various discourses" as "strands in a possible conversation."[29] In this conversation there is no universal disciplinary matrix, as there is presumed to be in epistemology. Nonetheless, there is the hope of agreement. Rorty says of hermeneutics as opposed to epistemology:

> This hope is not a hope for the discovery of antecedently existing common ground, but simply hope for agreement, or, at least, exciting and fruitful disagreement. Epistemology sees the hope of agreement as a token of the existence of common ground which, perhaps unbeknown to the speakers, unites them in a common rationality. For hermeneutics, to be rational is to be willing to refrain from epistemology—from thinking that there is a special set of terms in which all contributions to the conversation should be put—and to be willing to pick up the jargon of the interlocutor rather than translating it into one's own. For epistemology, to be rational is to find the proper set of terms into which all the contributions should be translated if agreement is to become possible.[30]

Here we may ask whether McDowell's account of ratio-nality is epistemological or hermeneutical in nature. One wonders whether McDowell, holding that spontaneity must be sui generis, could be considered hermeneutical at all. McDowell's account of rationality sounds very much like Rorty's description of epistemology. If, however, we take the charitable stance that a rationality of second nature—in which reason is acquired through initiation into a language, a tradition, and a worldview—then we might say that McDowell's account makes room for more than one rationality, indeed as many rationalities as there are traditions, worldviews, and communities of language users, and consequently a plurality of knowledges. Such a reading of McDowell would certainly make him hermeneutical by Rorty's description. If we take McDowell's approach to be epistemological, there will be no question as to whether his account of rationality is hegemonic. If we take it to be hermeneutical, he might escape this charge. However, in the following section, I aim to demonstrate not only that any epistemological account will be hegemonic, but also that, even if we take the charitable reading of McDowell as hermeneutical, his insistence that spontaneity is sui generis leaves his account of rationality guilty of epistemological hegemony. What McDowell faces is the following dilemma: either he must concede that spontaneity is not necessarily sui generis, and so jeopardize the foundation of his entire project, or else his account of rationality fails to escape the trappings of epistemological hegemony.

Section IV: Mignolo and the Geopolitics of Knowledge

In Local Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges, and Border Thinking, Mignolo argues that modernity and coloniality are inextricably linked. He stresses that "there is no modernity without coloniality, that the coloniality of power underlies nation building in both local histories of nation that devised and enacted global designs as well as in those local histories of nations that had to accommodate themselves to global designs devised with them in mind but without their direct participation."[31] In other words, modernity "carries on its shoulders the heavy weight and responsibility of coloniality."[32] Colonialism and modernity emerged together and depended upon one another in their development, creating a colonial/modern world-system in which the two are inseparable. Coloniality describes the total influence of colonialism in the modern world, whether it is the impact of slavery and exploitation of natural resources at colonialism's outset or the subalternization of

local knowledges and traditions still occurring.[33] With this crucial fact in mind, the disenchantment of nature, tied to modernity through Enlightenment thinking, is also inseparable from coloniality. A primary focus for Mignolo is the subalternization of knowledge. In light of Mignolo's claims, we might say that the disenchantment of nature is the result of the geopolitical, epistemological project of modernity/coloniality. What is at stake, then, is clearly not only the domination of nature, but also the domination of nations and peoples who had to accommodate themselves to the global designs imposed upon them by others.

On the point of knowledge, Mignolo argues that the distinction between epistemology and hermeneutics is problematic. He writes:

> The imaginary of the modern/colonial world system located the production of knowledge in Europe. The early versions of Occidentalism, with the discovery of the New World, and the later version of Orientalism, with the ascension of France and Britain to world hegemony, made non-Western epistemologies something to be studied and described. In the very act of describing Amerindian or Oriental knowledge and customs, they were detached from the grand Greco-Roman tradition that provided the foundation of modern epistemology and hermeneutics.[34]

Here, Mignolo offers a snapshot of the geopolitics of knowledge. Mignolo's vision is one in which we escape distinction that some knowledge is epistemic while the rest is hermeneutic. This vision is a gnoseology that Mignolo calls border thinking or border gnosis. Gnoseology, as Mignolo uses the term, is the result of letting go of the distinction between epistemology and hermeneutics. What we are left with is a way of understanding knowledge that does not ascribe value to certain forms while devaluing others, thus rejectingprivileged representations. What makes this sort of gnoseology different from Rorty's hermeneutics is the insistence that epistemology and hermeneutics must be abandoned as dominant conceptions of how we ought to frame knowledge. Unlike Mignolo, Rorty does not seem to believe we can abandon the distinction between epistemology and hermeneutics, believing instead thatwe need to reconsider how we think about them. Rorty offers:

> …[T]he line between the respective domains of epistemology and hermeneutics is not a matter of the difference between the "sciences of nature" and the "sciences of man," nor between fact and value, nor the theoretical and the practical, nor "objective knowledge" and

something squishier and more dubious. The difference is purely one of familiarity. We will be epistemological where we understand perfectly well what is happening but want to codify it in order to extend, or strengthen, or teach, or "ground" it. We must be hermeneutical where we do not understand what is happening but are honest enough to admit it.[35]

Mignolo would criticize Rorty's reframing of the distinction, pointing out that the question of epistemology being the realm "where we understand perfectly well what is happening" and hermeneutics being the realm "where we do not understand what is happening" subliminally perpetuates an embedded hierarchy in the way we think about knowledge.

Mignolo's gnoseology of border thinking represents a new way of thinking about knowledge that subverts the force of epistemological hegemony and the colonial difference. For him, "the transcending of the colonial difference can only be done from a perspective of subalternity, from decolonization, and, therefore, from a new epistemological terrain where border thinking works."[36] Paradoxically, this "new epistemological terrain" is one in which epistemology is transmuted from a global design to a local history, meaning epistemology becomes merely one of several in a plurality of knowledges without any inherent value over one another. At this point, it is clear that McDowell's account of rationality and his partial re-enchantment of nature are irreconcilable with Mignolo's vision. Even in a charitable reading, McDowell still ascribes value to the sui generis status of spontaneity and, as such, maintains a position in which value is ascribed to a particular form of knowledge. McDowell's approach to knowledge, even if considered hermeneutical, like Rorty, fails to escape the epistemic/hermeneutic distinction, making it insufficient to achieve Mignolo's aim of gnoseology and border thinking andthus epistemologically hegemonic.

Section V: Conclusion

In this paper, I sought to argue that McDowell's partial re-enchantment of nature is insufficient because he holds on to the idea of knowledge as privileged representation. By holding on to this notion, he operates within an epistemological/hermeneutical framework that is inherently hegemonic, a point made clear by Mignolo's observations. Because McDowell believes that "knowledge" can only be saved by retaining the sui generis status of spontaneity and leaving nature mostly disenchanted, he fails to break free from the force of epistemological

hegemony.

Perhaps McDowell's account of rationality could be revised so that it would be reconcilable with Mignolo's vision. However, to do so would mean abandoning the sui generis status of spontaneity and possibly compromising the entire worth of his pursuit. Yet I will suggest that McDowell's rationality would not necessarily be compromised if he let go of the notion of knowledge as privileged representation. By simply acknowledging that this account of knowledge and partial re-enchantment of nature is only one of several accounts on equal footing, McDowell can avoid the charge of epistemological hegemony, while still making a significant contribution to philosophy of mind discourse. We need only reorient the way we frame the landscape of knowledge so as to account for a multiplicity of local histories; with such a view, we make room for the subalternized forms of knowledge and conceptions of nature that would otherwise be overlooked.

Notes

1 John McDowell, *Mind and World* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994), 85.

2 Walter Mignolo, *Local Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges, and Border Thinking* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), 13.

3 Ibid., 10

4 Ibid., 18

5 McDowell, Mind and World, 70-71.

6 Ibid., 70.

7 Ibid., 71.

8 Ibid., 71, 78.

9 Alison Stone, "Adorno and the Disenchantment of Nature," *Philosophy & Social Criticism* 32 (2006): 231.

10 Ibid., 232.

11 Ibid., 234.

12 Ibid., 248-249.

13 McDowell, *Mind and World*, 46.

14 Ibid., 66.

15 Ibid., 108.

16 Ibid., 76.

17 Ibid.

18 Paul Churchland, "Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes," *The Journal of Philosophy* 78 (1981): 67.

19 Ibid., 74.

20 McDowell, *Mind and World*, 108.

21 Ibid., 78.

22 Ibid., 84.

23 Ibid., 125.

24 Ibid., 126.

25 Ibid., 126.

26 Richard Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 163.

27 Ibid., 136.

28 Ibid., 138.

29 Ibid., 318.

30 Ibid.

31 Mignolo, *Local Histories/Global Designs*, 43.

32 Ibid., 37.

33 Ibid., 17-18.

34 Ibid., 92-93.

35 Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, 321.

36 Mignolo, *Local Histories/Global Designs*, 45.

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